Co-engineering Safety and Security in Industrial Control Systems: A Formal Outlook

Inna Vistbakka; Elena Troubitsyna; Tuomas Kuismin; Timo Latvala

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65948-0_7

Co-engineering Safety and Security in Industrial Control Systems: A Formal Outlook

Inna Vistbakka, Elena Troubitsyna, Tuomas Kuismin, Timo Latvala

Information Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An increasing openness and interconnectedness of safety-critical industrial control systems makes them vulnerable to security attacks. Hence, we should establish the integrated approaches enabling safety-security co-engineering. Such approaches should support an analysis of interdependencies between the mechanisms required for safety and security assurance. In this paper, we demonstrate how formal modelling can facilitate reasoning about the impact of certain security solutions on safety and vise versa. We rely on modelling and refinement in Event-B to systematically uncover mutual interdependencies and the constraints that should be imposed on the system to guarantee its safety even in the presence of security attacks. The approach is illustrated by a case study – a battery charging system of an electric car.

Original language	Undefined/Unknown
Title of host publication	Software Engineering for Resilient Systems - 9th International Workshop, SERENE 2017, Geneva, Switzerland, September 4-5, 2017, Proceedings
Editors	Alexander Romanovsky, Elena Troubitsyna
Publisher	Springer
Pages	96–114
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-319-65948-0
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-65947-3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65948-0_7
Publication status	Published - 2017
MoE publication type	A4 Article in a conference publication
Event	International Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems (SERENE) - 9th International Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems, SERENE 2017 Duration: 4 Sept 2017 → 5 Sept 2017

Conference

Conference	International Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems (SERENE)
Period	04/09/17 → 05/09/17

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-65948-0_7

Cite this

Vistbakka, I., Troubitsyna, E., Kuismin, T., & Latvala, T. (2017). Co-engineering Safety and Security in Industrial Control Systems: A Formal Outlook. In A. Romanovsky, & E. Troubitsyna (Eds.), Software Engineering for Resilient Systems - 9th International Workshop, SERENE 2017, Geneva, Switzerland, September 4-5, 2017, Proceedings (pp. 96–114). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65948-0_7

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abstract = "An increasing openness and interconnectedness of safety-critical industrial control systems makes them vulnerable to security attacks. Hence, we should establish the integrated approaches enabling safety-security co-engineering. Such approaches should support an analysis of interdependencies between the mechanisms required for safety and security assurance. In this paper, we demonstrate how formal modelling can facilitate reasoning about the impact of certain security solutions on safety and vise versa. We rely on modelling and refinement in Event-B to systematically uncover mutual interdependencies and the constraints that should be imposed on the system to guarantee its safety even in the presence of security attacks. The approach is illustrated by a case study – a battery charging system of an electric car.",

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Vistbakka, I, Troubitsyna, E, Kuismin, T & Latvala, T 2017, Co-engineering Safety and Security in Industrial Control Systems: A Formal Outlook. in A Romanovsky & E Troubitsyna (eds), Software Engineering for Resilient Systems - 9th International Workshop, SERENE 2017, Geneva, Switzerland, September 4-5, 2017, Proceedings. Springer, pp. 96–114, International Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems (SERENE), 04/09/17. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65948-0_7

Co-engineering Safety and Security in Industrial Control Systems: A Formal Outlook. / Vistbakka, Inna; Troubitsyna, Elena; Kuismin, Tuomas et al.
Software Engineering for Resilient Systems - 9th International Workshop, SERENE 2017, Geneva, Switzerland, September 4-5, 2017, Proceedings. ed. / Alexander Romanovsky; Elena Troubitsyna. Springer, 2017. p. 96–114.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

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Vistbakka I, Troubitsyna E, Kuismin T, Latvala T. Co-engineering Safety and Security in Industrial Control Systems: A Formal Outlook. In Romanovsky A, Troubitsyna E, editors, Software Engineering for Resilient Systems - 9th International Workshop, SERENE 2017, Geneva, Switzerland, September 4-5, 2017, Proceedings. Springer. 2017. p. 96–114 doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-65948-0_7