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8. Inclusive Dreams and Excluded Realities: Applying Social Exclusion Theory to the Analysis of Xenophobia in the South African 'Rainbow Nation'

Khushal Naik

Abstract: Over the last decade, three significant 'waves of violence' have been observed across South Africa in 2008, 2015, and 2019. These have been significant as the targets of each wave of attacks were African migrants. Scholarly, media, and popular discourses on the violence highlight their xenophobic nature in the so-called Rainbow Nation—a term used popularly by former President Nelson Mandela to refer to the national dreams of inclusion for all, towards the future of South Africa. In the face of calls for unity and inclusion by powers both foreign and domestic, the reality in contemporary South Africa thus sees a rise in exhibitions to the contrary. The rise in hostilities towards those perceived to be foreign is therefore of vital significance to contemporary studies of social exclusion, as the climate of xenophobic victimisation and scapegoating seems only to escalate in proportion to the multi-dimensional deprivation of the modern South African state. With specific focus on the anti-foreigner violence, this chapter utilises the concept of social exclusion to explore the scale by which foreigners to South Africa have become a scapegoat for the failings of the modern nation-state.

Keywords: Xenophobia, South Africa, Rainbow Nation, 'waves of violence', inclusion, exclusion, Anti-foreigner violence

Introduction

This chapter explores the application of social exclusion theory to analysing xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. I employ the following definition of social exclusion:

Exclusion consists of dynamic, multi-dimensional processes driven by unequal power relationships interacting across four main dimensions—economic, political, social and cultural—and at different levels, including individual, household, group, community, country, and global levels. It results in a continuum of inclusion/exclusion characterised by unequal access to resources, capabilities, and rights (Popay et al. 2008, p. 2).

The South African context is unique. Its emergence from the socially exclusionary Apartheid regime in 1994 brought an ideology of inclusion envied by the rest of the continent. The 'Rainbow Nation' ideology¹ was introduced by Nelson Mandela (1994), upon which he envisioned the birth of a nation of inclusion for all (Buqa 2015; Greffrath 2016). However, the 'dream' of a rainbow nation appears to have been just that, as the reality of post-apartheid South Africa has seen the resurgence of exclusionary practices in the form of *xenophobia* against African migrants. Xenophobia is characterised and defined in the South African context through discriminatory attitudes and behaviours to perceived foreigners, negative stereotyping and derogatory name-calling of black Africans, and violent exhibitions of hatred (Marumo et al. 2019). In analysing xenophobia in South Africa, I will be reviewing three 'waves of violence' (WoV) as severe exhibitions of the socio-political exclusion against migrants from other African countries. In 2008, 2015, and 2019 three WoV have been of particular significance as the targets of each wave were specifically black African migrants in South Africa (Mamabolo 2015; Langa and Kiguwa 2016). The importance of this case of social exclusion thus resides in

¹ Throughout this paper, I will be using 'rainbowism', 'rainbowist', 'rainbow interchangeably to refer towards the same concept of 'rainbow nation' ideology.

the unique position and patterned resurgence of violent exhibitions of exclusion within a rainbow nation of inclusivity.

Following a conceptualisation of social exclusion, I will briefly outline the events of each WoV. The existing research on these three WoV agrees on a shared description of the attacks' *xenophobic* attitudes and actions (Pillay et al. 2008; Landau 2011; Vahed and Desai 2013; Gordon 2019; Hiropoulos 2020). In each discourse, there is a debate around the underlying causes of the violence (Neocosmos 2008; Misago et al. 2010; Matsinhe 2011; Gordon 2020). Additionally, there is widespread agreement that African migrants are made scapegoats for the shortcomings of the post-apartheid nation (Morris 1998; Landau et al. 2005; Brown 2020). Crucially, Harris (2001) explores these debates by grouping them according to three hypotheses: 'the scapegoating hypothesis', 'the isolation hypothesis', and 'the biocultural hypothesis'.

After reviewing the events, I will expand on these three hypotheses to argue that xenophobia in South Africa is more than an outcome of hatred against foreigners - as exhibited in each WoV – but results from more extensive processes across multiple dimensions. I will lastly analyse the multi-dimensional and multi-faceted aspects of social exclusion and explain why African migrants were the target of violence.

Crucially, Popay et al. (2008) observe that the development of measurements of social exclusion has been primarily focused on Europe and the European contexts of social exclusion. Instead, they propose that the complexity of social exclusion must be measured through a combination of exclusion indicators and stories. Their work through the Social Exclusion Knowledge Network (SEKN) also reveals that the dominant discourse in Sub-Saharan Africa is poverty, vulnerability, and marginalisation. Thus, this paper aims to contribute to the academic literature on social exclusion by analysing xenophobia in South Africa from a broad multi-dimensional and multi-faceted approach.

Social Exclusion as Multidimensional and Multi-faceted

Social exclusion is multidimensional and multi-faceted. In attempting to define social exclusion, Levitas et al. (2007) review various definitions of the concept and found that they emphasise the exclusion of individuals from participation in society's economic, social, cultural, or political arenas. As mentioned before, Popay et al. (2008) also address these arenas by emphasising the role of unequal power relations that interact across them. Furthermore, Mathieson et al. (2008) explain that definitions of social exclusion now explore the phenomenon through different dimensions (social, economic, cultural, political) and different levels (macro, meso, micro). Bradshaw et al. (2004) explore the drivers of social exclusion at the micro and macro levels. These facets are significant as exclusion occurs across individuals and communities, nationally and internationally (Silver 2007). The different levels represent the multi-faceted, relational, and dynamic nature of social exclusion and show that exclusion can occur in many directions (Silver 2007). To this end, Silver argues, "social dynamics should also be conceptualised at the meso- and macro-levels" (Silver 2007, p. 8). I will briefly outline how this conceptualisation is documented.

Micro-Level

Silver (2007) notes that exclusion may be expressed as 'persistent' or 'chronic' dislocation at the level of the individual, wherein a person may be in the *process* of moving between different dimensions towards more or less social integration. Silver explores the benefits of applying Seebom Rowntree's 'life course perspective' to micro-level studies of social exclusion as the approach traditionally considered how individuals manage and adapt to social events, transitions, and life stage passages in different domains of life (Silver 2007). Additionally,

Silver explores Karl Ulrich Mayer's work on 'life course regimes', which shows that different societies develop different life course patterns due to their institutional configurations. Therefore, micro-level analyses of social exclusion must consider that "the process of individual exclusion is embedded in and structured by local, national and international contexts" (Silver 2007, p. 13). Whilst context is a significant factor of social exclusion research, so too are the institutional processes within which individuals operate. This is an argument made by Room (2006), who argues that micro-level analyses must utilise a dynamic approach and should shed light on the institutional processes by which individual relationships are mediated.

Meso-Level

Silver explains that the meso-level comprises the distinctions, barriers, or social boundaries that establish the conditions for exclusion. Silver further explains that "some boundaries are more porous, formal, salient, complex, and specialised than others" (2007, p. 15). Silver provides citizenship as an example of a boundary that falls according to political-legal notions of membership where outsiders are profane strangers, and insiders are sacred. Berman and Phillips (2000) would agree with this and explain Demos in terms of citizenship as an integral part of statehood. They explain how the nation-state defines accessibility to services within the citizenship framework and explain how multi-ethnic societies have challenged the tradition of nations and citizenship.

Macro-Level

In writing about the macro-level, Silver explains that the meaning of social exclusion varies according to national contexts. She provides the example of France, which treats social exclusion as a progressive rupturing of the social bonds; Britain, which emphasises poverty; and the EU, which explores the lack of social integration through such things as cultural deprivation. Additionally, in explaining the drivers of social exclusion on the macro-level, Bradshaw et al. argue that "poverty, inequality, and social exclusion are driven upwards and downwards by three major contextual factors: demographic, labour market and social policy" (2004, p. 9). The macro-level is thus concerned with exclusion in a national context.

Social Exclusion in Post-Apartheid South Africa

The context of South Africa is unique in that the national project since 1994 has been the establishment of a 'rainbow' ideology and the promotion of inclusion. This rainbow ideology was born from 'Ubuntu' and the 'African Renaissance'. Ubuntu is a philosophical call for group solidarity and community interdependence to achieve a morally 'good' and shared humanity (Shange 2017). The African Renaissance pertains to the rebirth and revival of a post-colonial, free and prosperous Africa (Dalamba 2000). The national rebuilding project thus aimed to reconfirm the "identity and overall ambitions of the post-Apartheid state as focused upon African emancipation, non-racialism, humanism and social justice" (van Hensbroek 2001, p. 5). However, the principles and ideals of inclusion have been challenged by the reality of pervasive exclusion in South Africa, as evidenced by three WoV as the culmination of exclusion against African migrants in South Africa. In the following section, I will begin by outlining the events of three WoV. I will proceed to discuss three hypotheses that explain the underlying causes behind xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. Lastly, I will utilise social exclusion, primarily the concept's multi-dimensional and multi-faceted aspects, to delve deeper into the violence.

Three Waves of Violence

The first wave occurred between January and April 2008. Surveys conducted by the South African Migration Project (SAMP) show that these attacks had no immediate trigger but resulted from a growing process of attitudes over many years (Crush 2008; Vahed and Desai 2013). However, debates suggest that a significant catalyst for the ensuing violence were community meetings and numerous organised events² in which political party members advocated for the removal of foreigners from South Africa whom they blamed for crimes, murders, and rape in townships (Republic of South Africa 2008; Mosselson 2010). The conflict began in the impoverished township of Alexandria and later spread to other provinces. The attacks exclusively targeted foreign nationals from other African states; however, South African citizens were also the victims (Republic of South Africa 2008; Vahed and Desai 2013; Matunhu 2011). Casualties to the violence numbered 62 people killed, 670 wounded, and over 150,000 people displaced (Segatti 2011; Gordon 2016). Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the violence, government rhetoric under President Thabo Mbeki maintained a denial of the existence of ‘xenophobia’, as ‘criminality’ and ‘racist elements’ were instead blamed for attempting to undermine state institutions and credibility (Crush 2008).

A second wave ensued in 2015, directed once more against foreign nationals. The violence began in Durban in April 2015, after rumours were spread that foreigners were committing murders in communities. Additionally, a speech by Zulu King Goodwill Zwethilini seemingly exacerbated the situation (Wehmhoerner 2015; Human Rights Watch 2016). The violence after that spread to other provinces in a similar pattern to 2008. In October 2015, the situation escalated in Grahamstown (Eastern Cape), following the spread of rumours that Muslim foreigners were behind a series of recent murders in the township (O’Halloran 2015a). The casualties of this wave saw over 70 dead, over 100 assaulted, 600 foreign-run shops looted, and 10,000 people displaced with few arrests or criminal persecutions (Hiropoulos 2020). The government of then-President Zuma decried the events, further citing criminality as the source (Wehmhoerner 2015). Despite the government vowing to act, no concrete measures were implemented. However, the government launched ‘Operation Fiela’³ to arrest and deport suspected illegal immigrants and foreigners accused of having initiated crimes in the country (O’Halloran 2015b; Pineteh 2017).

Lastly, the 2019 wave was a culmination of events beginning in the previous year following activism by the new anti-foreigner political party, the African Basic Movement, who marched the streets of Johannesburg seeking to expel non-South Africans from the country (Powell and Cassim 2018). These events resulted in attacks on foreign truck drivers between January and March 2019 (Al Jazeera 2019; Human Rights Watch 2019; Xenowatch 2019). In August, violence escalated when anti-foreigner attacks intensified in most regions of South Africa following the circulation of rumours and anti-foreigner rhetoric on social media (Dahir 2019; Human Rights Watch 2019). The 2019 wave saw 68 incidents occur, with 18 people killed, 43 assaulted, and 1449 displaced (Xenowatch 2019). Following the attacks, the government launched a ‘National Action Plan’ to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance⁴ (Mavhinga 2019; Republic of South Africa 2020). President Cyril

² The South African National Civics Organization and the Alexandra Community Policing Forum held meetings in March 2008. Additionally, the Inkatha Freedom Party held their Annual General Meeting on May 10th 2008 with resolutions to drive out foreigners tabled and passed by the committee.

³ ‘Operation Fiela-Reclaim’ was launched as a crime-fighting operation to eliminate criminality and general lawlessness by sweeping clean affected communities and create a safe and secure environment (Republic of South Africa 2015). The operation saw the arrest and deportation of hundreds of migrants.

⁴ The National Action Plan seeks to combat ‘intolerance’ through a five-year plan of raising awareness, education programmes, and data collection of racist and discriminatory activities.

Ramaphosa further condemned the attacks by stating that ‘xenophobia’ is not welcome in South Africa. The pattern remained to decry widespread violence against foreign nationals without implementing policies to combat the root causes of the violence itself.

Explaining Xenophobia in South Africa

In this section, I employ the three hypotheses Bronwyn Harris (2001) outlined to explore some of the underlying causes of xenophobia in South Africa. 1. The *scapegoating hypothesis* explains xenophobia according to broad socio-economic factors and comparisons. It explains hostilities towards foreigners in terms of frustrations of South Africans to their relative deprivation of resources. 2. *The isolation hypothesis* positions *foreignness* as an unknown and locates the seclusion of apartheid South Africa from the international community as the basis for this positioning. 3. *The biocultural hypothesis* finds the visible physical-biological and cultural differences of *African* migrants as identifiers of otherness that provide a visual target for aggression. Through these hypotheses, I demonstrate how the existence of xenophobia reinforces exclusion across the social, economic, and political spheres.

Scapegoating Hypothesis

The *scapegoating hypothesis* functions as an underlying cause of xenophobia whereby “hostility towards foreigners is explained in relation to limited resources, such as housing, education, health care and employment, coupled with high expectations during the transition” (Harris 2001, p. 171). The 1994 election is located as the transition into the post-apartheid era. At this point, politicians promised the South African people a ‘Rainbow Nation’ “at peace with itself and the world” (Mandela 1994). This chapter locates the African National Congress’ (ANC) 1994 election manifesto, the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP)⁵, and these promises’ policy manifestation. The consequences of the RDP on the social sphere were creating high expectations amongst the transitioning South African people who largely expected to receive a share of the perceived wealth of the apartheid era’s hegemonic white population (Landau 2011; Dubbeld 2013; Padayachee and Desai 2013). However, the post-apartheid reality has greatly challenged these expectations and has resulted in the need to place blame for the unfulfilled promises and expectations. Accordingly, Harris (2001) observes how a frustration conceptualises xenophobia to the relative deprivation of resources and the perceived threat from immigrants. An example of this frustration is the common social perception in South Africa that African migrants are responsible for the high crime rates since 1994 (Landau et al., 2005; Glaser 2008; Coplan 2009; Pineteh 2017).

Statistics rank South Africa within the top ten recorded national murder rates globally (World Population Review 2021). Consequently, social perceptions on crime correlate to political rhetoric and legislative action on “illegal” immigration, which have shaped a national narrative that “illegal” immigrants threaten national stability. Despite no evidence supporting such perceptions, foreign nationals are blamed for crimes (Brown 2020). Glaser (2008) argues that the high crime rates lead many South Africans to feel vulnerable. Similarly, the accumulation of wealth by African migrants is commonly perceived to be through illegitimate enterprise (Coplan 2009), whilst large sections of the South African population continue to live in poverty. Landau observes that “many [South African] residents are relatively poorer than they were during apartheid and South Africa remains the tenth-most unequal country in the world” (2011,

⁵ Released March 15 1994, the RDP outlined its promises to the nation along with all of its future development goals and was in November of the same year tabled in parliament.

p. 11).⁶ The frustration generated by unfulfilled promises, high crime rates, and poverty has arguably led to impoverished South Africans asking questions about how African migrants can compete with locals for employment, resources, housing, and institutional services. To this, Mamabolo (2015) draws connections between conditions of poverty and an inability to access resources by South Africans. This inability to access resources is attributed to the perceived illegitimate activities of African migrants. Also, scrutinised government officials openly deflect from their shortcomings by employing existing fears of economic competition between foreigners and locals and frame immigrants as a drain on already limited resources (Landau et al. 2005; Hiropoulos 2020). For example, government ministers⁷ have publicly claimed that immigrants strain the nation's resources, taking South African jobs and being the perpetrators of violent crimes (Naik 2020). The social perception of African migrants has consequently resulted in their vilification (Amusan and Mchunu 2018). Therefore, what is evident from this hypothesis is how African migrants are framed as a threat, and the frustrations born of the fears of this threat prompt the creation of the "frustration-scapegoat" (Harris 2001, p. 171).

The Isolation Hypothesis

The *isolation hypothesis* explains that "suspicion and hostility towards strangers in South Africa exists due to international isolation" (Harris 2001, p. 173). According to this hypothesis, the positioning of foreignness in South Africa stems from the apartheid era's isolation from global participation. Morris (1998) observes how apartheid South Africa encouraged white immigration whilst relentlessly limiting black immigration. Despite these restrictions, there was limited black immigration through contract labour, mainly in the gold and diamond mines (Wilson 2001). Contract labour from the neighbouring Southern African mines was the most prominent form of labour at this period (Crush and Dodson 2007). Furthermore, miners resided exclusively in single-sex compounds until the end of their contracts (Vosloo 2020). However, the latter half of the 1970s saw a shift towards internalising the South African labour market and reducing the availability of jobs to migrant workers (Wilson 2001). The mining crisis of the 1980s further continued South African isolation as it produced a significant decline in migration into South Africa (Hicks 1999; Tati 2008). This isolation continued through legislation such as the Aliens Control Act (ACA) of 1991, which institutionalised the harsh treatment of undocumented immigrants into South Africa (Hicks 1999). The ANC government opened the country up to migration through entry into the South African Development Community (SADC) in 1994, which promoted regional integration via economic cooperation and migration. Similarly, the introduction of the Bill of Rights in 1996 and the Draft Green Paper on International Migration in 1997 increased the number of refugees into South Africa following implementation (Gordon 2016). However, the nation's economic reality forced the government to restrict migration to protect the domestic labour market (Crush and Dodson, 2007). The retention of the ACA as the official legislation on migration further promoted the harsh treatment of undocumented migrants. Thus, legality became a means by which exposure to migrants was limited to South Africans.

Harris (2001) argues that foreigners beyond the Southern African region remained an 'unknown' to South Africans. The sudden entry into the international community made contact between South Africans and foreigners direct and unknown. Morris' sentiments are thus echoed herein: "when a group has no history of incorporating strangers, it may find it difficult to be welcoming" (1998, p. 1125). The *isolation hypothesis* positions 'foreignness' due to the

⁶ Data from 2019 further reveals that South Africa stands as the most unequal nation in the world as measured by the Gini index; with poverty rates at 26.6% and unemployment rates of 27.3% (Partington 2019).

⁷ Eg. Minister of Home Affairs in 1997, Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Minister of Defence in 1997 Joe Modise (Naik 2020, p.71). Also, Member of Executive Council (MEC) for community safety, Vusi Shongewe (Pineteh 2017).

apartheid era's management and restrictions to migration contact of South Africans to other Africans. Here, the hypothesis argues, "xenophobia exists because of the very foreignness of foreigners. It exists because foreigners are different and unknown" (Harris 2001, p. 173).

Biocultural hypothesis

The *biocultural hypothesis* proposes a difference in perceptions towards various foreigners in South Africa. It, therefore, "offers an explanation for the asymmetrical targeting of African foreigners by South Africans" (Harris 2001, p. 173). The visible difference is observed towards foreigners' physical-biological and cultural differences as they "signify difference and point out foreignness in a way that is immediately visible" (Harris 2001, p. 174). However, the term 'foreigner' becomes problematic when it is exclusively used to address the 'black African foreigner', whilst other races or ethnicities are viewed as wealth creators (Matsinhe 2011). Similarly, Coplan (2009) observes that many citizens during the same WoV were targeted by both attackers and police, owing to their darker skin colour, which is a trait attributed to Zimbabwean immigrants in perceived stereotypes (Coplan 2009; Gibson 2011; Matsinhe 2011). Therefore, stereotypes of the idealised African foreigner become a means by which exclusion permeates and reinforces sentiments during the waves (Neocosmos 2006). Stereotyping, in this case, pertains to these physical, biological, and cultural differences and socio-economic situations. Gibson (2011), for example, observes that those not targeted in the 2008 WoV were the rich, both white and black (African and Indian), for whom the definition of a foreigner does not apply and who should not, therefore, be targeted. This is seen further in using the derogatory term '*Makwerekwere*'. Hickel observes that the term is an "onomatopoeia for someone who speaks unintelligibly, a 'babbling'" (2014 p. 103). The term signifies a hierarchy between 'intelligible' South Africans and 'unintelligible' foreigners. In this regard, according to visible signifiers, stereotyping distinguishes between different groups of 'foreigners' and positions the foreign African migrant at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The biocultural hypothesis thus explains that these visible signifiers are "significant in generating xenophobia because they point out *whom* to target" (Harris 2001, p. 174).

Beyond Hypothesis

The three hypotheses have explored three possible underlying causes of xenophobia in South Africa. Whilst each hypothesis offers its possible explanation for the existence of xenophobia, Harris explains that "they do not explain the 'whys' of xenophobia" (2001, p. 174) - they do not fully account for why African migrants are targets of violence. In the following section, I will utilise the multi-faceted aspect of social exclusion to present some of these reasons.

Discussing Multi-dimensionality of belonging in the Rainbow Nation

This final section explores the notion of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa through the analysis across the macro, meso, and micro levels. In doing this, I show how these dynamics reflect the central indicators of the multidimensional aspects of social exclusion as shown in my earlier definition, including the political, social, economic, and cultural.

Political dimension at the macro level

The political dimension of social exclusion constitutes one way in which power dynamics embedded in the constitution, policies, and practises generate unequal power relations, including citizenship (Mathieson 2008). These unequal power relations affect access to essential resources ~~to sustain life~~. As discussed earlier, the macro-level of society is concerned with exclusion in a national context. One primary form of exclusion is the notion of citizenship. According to Berman and Phillips, indicators of social exclusion on the level of the nation-state

“will measure the inaccessibility of rights and services to those who by definition of citizenship should have access to them” (2000 p.344). Neocosmos (2006) argues that the state ultimately manufactures citizenship through its practices (See chapter 9 in this book). As seen previously, the legislative application of the Aliens Control Act resulted in the draconian treatment of migrants and reinforced the categorisation of the “illegal” migrant. In this case, the ‘illegal’ is set in contrast to the ‘legal’, for which citizenship is the only incontestable criteria of legality. This distinction is reflected in the categorisation of ‘illegal’ and ‘undesirable’ immigrants written into the Immigration Act of 2002. For example, Article 27 of the Act outlines legislation on categorised “undesirable persons” and Article 30 with “illegal” foreigners” (Immigration Amendment Act 2011). Pillay (2013), therefore, observes how terminologies of belonging become preconditions to the political environment within which they reside. Thus, the categorisation of people within this environment promotes excluding individuals from national participation through mediums such as the law. The ACA and Immigration Act are presented here as examples of these laws that continue to exclude migrants, thus creating social exclusion avenues.

Examples of the excluding nature of these laws include the ACA’s treatment of ‘unauthorised’ migrants, who were selectively “rounded up and deported en masse” (Crush 1999, p.127). In addition, Gordon (2016) argues that the lack of a Refugee Bill until later in 1998 constituted a legally ‘unlawful’ form of selective entry by officials. Similarly, the Immigration Act permitted crackdowns on suspected ‘illegal’ migrants and were observably undertaken “in areas with a high concentration of black foreigners” (Tati 2008, p.430). One such controversial crackdown was ‘Operation Fiela’ in the aftermath of the 2015 WoV. The operation aimed to arrest and deport ‘suspected’ “illegal” immigrants and foreigners accused of having initiated crimes in the country. Critics argue that the operation was the government’s response to the WoV, which resulted in the illegal deportations of many migrants from South Africa (Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw 2016). Landau and Freemantle argue that the operation showed that “anti-foreign sentiments are not only an organic or spontaneous response to street level tensions but have also been shaped and legitimised by politicians and bureaucrats” (2010, p.378).

Social and economic dimension at the Meso-level

Silver (2007) explains that the meso-level is concerned with barriers, distinctions, or social boundaries where they establish the conditions for exclusion. Citizenship has been discussed at the macro-level but transcends to the meso- via boundaries. Silver explains that citizenship may be attained in some countries via ‘thin’ political-legal notions or ‘thick’ ethnonational ideas in others. In the Macro sense, the Immigration Act has functioned as the former. Regarding the latter, both public and political sentiments towards African migrants have been shown to correlate to a national narrative of portraying migrants in a negative light (Matema 2021). In this regard, the ‘thick’ boundary utilises legal notions of citizenship by framing the ‘illegal’ as a threat to the nation-state. This is supported by Trimikliniotis et al. (2008), who observes that prevalent fears of the nation being ‘flooded’ by immigrants have consequently disrupted regionally harmonised migration. Berman and Phillips (2000) explain how the inaccessibility or inability to receive rights or services is reinforced according to the notion of citizenship that defines who has access to them. In addition, Hiropoulos (2020) shows how narratives of a ‘migration crisis’ of “illegal” immigration have been given legitimacy. I argue that these have contributed to the exclusion of migrants via the degree to which their status is perceived to be ‘illegal’. This establishes barriers to access rights and services and ultimately influences notions of belonging in the rainbow nation.

Similarly, this exclusion has been reinforced through stereotyping and labelling. Existing across the social-political dimensions, social and political discourse, rhetoric, and sentiment have been

seen through the scapegoating hypothesis to blame African migrants for high crime rates, poverty, and social ills in the country. Consequently, the term '*Makwerekwere*' serves as an example of stereotyping and an attempt to reinforce the perceived superiority of the local population by strengthening their right to belonging. As seen in the biocultural hypothesis, the term is used to distinguish a hierarchy between 'intelligible' South Africans and 'unintelligible' foreigners by reaffirming the perceived inferiority of the latter. Furthermore, the term is one example of social categorisation and reflects the 'thick' boundary between belonging and non-belonging in South Africa. In the analysis of social exclusion, it is essential to highlight that '*Makwerekwere*' contradicts the inclusive concept of Ubuntu through its practice of creating and expanding the 'thick' boundaries in South Africa (Amusan and Mchunu 2018). Elias and Scotson (1994) observe that labels are used against other groups as a weapon in a power struggle to maintain the hegemony of the dominant group. In this way, '*Makwerekwere*' can be seen to replicate the use of such labels towards a similar end. In short, these labels indicate that "outsiders are profane; insiders are sacred" (Silver 2007, p.15).

Cultural, economic and political dimensions at the micro-level

To reiterate, Silver (2007) notes that exclusion may be expressed as 'persistent' or 'chronic' dislocation at the level of the individual, wherein a person may be in the *process* of moving between different dimensions towards social integration. Thus far, I have been explaining exclusion regarding African migrants, as seen through the WoV. In the conceptualisation of the micro-level, I will also employ the isolation hypothesis to show how the discrimination of black South Africans during the Apartheid system promoted a legacy of exclusion after 1994. The Apartheid system enforced white minority domination of the nation through the State's repressive powers (Wolpe 2006). Racial segregation was a vital feature of this 'separate development' regime that removed land ownership and rights of the majority black population by placing them into segregated zones called 'homelands' (Wolpe 2006; Pillay 2013). The exclusion of black South Africans during Apartheid was thus chronic and persistent. In this case, the right to residency can be seen regarding indigeneity, which is politicised and removed through the denationalisation of citizens residing in 'homelands' and making them thus domestic foreigners in their own nation. Towards the end of Apartheid, individuals were indeed in the process of exclusion as they moved between dimensions of more or less social integration. Examples such as wage increases in 1973 and the right to unionise in 1980 show more social integration. Ultimately, this process reached its peak in 1994 with the birth of the rainbow nation, which socially and politically emphasised inclusion. To summarise, the argument I am making is that the system of Apartheid before 1994 excluded the participation of black South Africans across the spheres of the social, political and economical by removing their access to citizenship and its associated rights and services.

Solomon and Kosaka (2016) observe that the Apartheid system has had significant attitudinal effects on South African citizens. The isolation hypothesis has shown how legality was a means by which exposure to foreigners was limited to South Africans. Another phenomenon witnessed at the end of apartheid - and the subsequent birth of the rainbow nation - were high expectations and an 'exceptionalist' mentality amongst the South African people. The national rebirth observably created for its citizens, the perception is that South Africa is exceptional in that it has risen above the challenges of its past and forged a new future that is different from other nations on the continent (Mbembe 2015; Gordon 2016). This form of 'exceptionalism', Gibson (2011) argues, stems from the chauvinistic perception that the 'rainbow nation' is not developmentally similar to the rest of Africa. This is due to its historical trajectory towards an ideologically free and equal ('rainbowist') democracy in 1994 and the successes of reconciliation with its exclusionary past (Neocosmos 2008; Gibson 2011). Additionally, the rhetoric of an African Renaissance increased expectations amongst the general population of

South Africa at the helm of these ideologies upon its fruition (Padayachee and Desai 2013). Therefore, the perception held that South Africa is exceptional to the rest of the continent for its cultural, political, and economic complexities. This 'exceptionalism' is a further means of justification by the state for categorising people within the nation under notions of citizenship and promoting policies targeting and excluding those undeserving (refugees and African migrants) of its resources. (Landau 2005; Neocosmos 2008). Furthermore, the high expectations experienced by many South Africans at the end of Apartheid arguably created a sense of entitlement towards the acquisition of material change which was perceived to be warranted in the face of the injustices experienced in the past, as discussed earlier. This entitlement serves as a source of discontent by many impoverished South Africans in the face of the manifest reality of unfulfilled promises (Glaser 2008). This argument holds further ground in reviews of the three WoV, wherein inequality and unrest persisted predominantly amongst the impoverished. Leary and Cottrell (2013) provide an evolutionary perspective to interpersonal rejection and explain how 'rejection emotions' arise from the feeling of being rejected. Similarly, Wesselmann and Williams argue that "ostracism threatens individuals' satisfaction of four basic human needs: belonging, control, meaningful existence, and self-esteem" (2013, p.2). In the case of South Africa, I would position this from the perspective of unfulfilled promises which make citizens feel undervalued, thus evoking these rejection emotions. In terms of citizenship, I would suggest that they feel excluded from receiving the full range of rights such as belonging, control, safety, employment, and economic growth. Therefore, interpersonal rejection reduces self-esteem by posing a threat to the need to be valued (Richman 2013). In some situations, rejection alerts people to potential problems and may evoke other emotions such as anger (Leary and Cottrell 2013). When the needs of belonging are not met, and individuals feel that they are being excluded from the social relationship, they may become more aggressive (Scott and Thou 2013). A social exclusion approach would support a combination of the scapegoat, isolation and biocultural hypotheses by answering why African migrants became the targets of this aggression. Therefore, the scapegoating hypothesis shows how migrants are blamed for the social ills in seeking blame. Growing frustrations, relative deprivation, and limited resources to meet expectations contrasted the perceived entitlement. In this way, belonging in the nation becomes a question of who holds claim to such entitlement, for which the national response is the construction of exceptional citizenship. Trimikliniotis et al. (2008) therefore argue, "the 'rainbow nation' is being built on the exclusion of the black African 'other'" (p.1331). This consequently raises arguments that the envisioned rainbow nation has failed and been replaced by a nation of unmet expectations (Greffrath, 2016).

Conclusion

This chapter sought to analyse xenophobia in South Africa through the concept of social exclusion. The idea was explored in relation to its essential characteristics, specifically its multi-dimensional and multi-faceted nature. ~~After that,~~ The subsequent sections outlined three exhibitions of violence as outcomes of the targeting of African migrants. Harris' (2001) three hypotheses were applied to explain how the violence manifested. How African migrants became a target, how such suspicions grew, and how sociobiological factors made this happen. To answer why the exhibitions occurred, the concept of social exclusion was applied using multi-dimensional and multi-faceted analyses of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa.

The main arguments were related to the nature of citizenship as it stood as one main criterion of belonging. At the macro-level, the nature of citizenship was conflicted in policy terms between the legal and illegal, by which the latter was treated harshly through applications of immigration policy. At the Meso-level, belonging was confronted with the creation of barriers.

Whilst citizenship was one barrier, the result of ‘thick’ borders discourse reproduced national rhetoric that “illegal” migrants were a threat to the nation-state. These barriers were reinforced through stereotypes and labels. The Micro-level explored how the Apartheid system birthed a legacy of exclusion. National insecurities surrounding unfulfilled promises, coupled with high expectations, resulted in the eventual exclusion of perceived threats to the rights and services of citizenship. Evidently, in this broad analysis of social exclusion, numerous dimensions of statehood have made clear that the three WoV resulted from a combination of more prominent multidimensional factors. Whilst they were highlighted by this broad analysis, future research will be required to explore the various aspects of social exclusion and underlying causes of exclusion in greater depth.

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