

This is an electronic reprint of the original article. This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail.

---

## Radical (and populist) parties in European governments

Fagerholm, Andreas

*Published in:*  
Populism

*DOI:*  
[10.1163/25888072-02021040](https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02021040)

Publicerad: 01/01/2020

*Document Version*  
(Referentgranskad version om publikationen är vetenskaplig)

*Document License*  
All rights reserved

[Link to publication](#)

*Please cite the original version:*

Fagerholm, A. (2020). Radical (and populist) parties in European governments: How do they get in? *Populism*, 3(1), 29–64. <https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02021040>

### General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

### Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Radical (and populist) parties in European  
governments:  
How do they get in?

Andreas Fagerholm  
Åbo Akademi University

**Bio:** Andreas Fagerholm is a researcher in political science (comparative politics) at Åbo Akademi University, Vaasa, Finland. His research focuses on political parties, legislatures and governments. He has published his research in journals such as *Acta Politica*, *Comparative European Politics*, *Government and Opposition*, and *Political Studies Review*, among others.

**Abstract:** Existing studies on the coalitionability of (populist) radical right and left parties have concluded that government inclusion of these parties follows a complex and multi-causal pattern, and that the explanatory power of the conventional 'size and ideology' framework is limited. Starting from this observation, this study sets out to further strengthen our understanding of radical government participation by means of nested within-case analyses. First, the paper seeks to substantiate the relationships observed in a previous configurational cross-case analysis focusing on factors related to size and ideology: Are the observed paths causally related to the outcome? And, if so, how? The second aim of the paper is to further improve our understanding of radical government participation by focusing on the deviant cases found in the cross-case study: Which additional components are needed in order to enhance our understanding of why and how radical parties are able to get into office?

**Funding declaration:** –

**Declaration of conflicting interests:** No.

**Acknowledgements:** –

# 1 Introduction

The last few decades have been marked by a pan-European rise of radical parties. To the right on the left–right heuristic, the radical right family has increased its electoral and political strength significantly in both Western and – more inconsistently – Central and Eastern Europe, and several parties – the Italian Northern League (2001–06, 2008–11), the Bulgarian Attack (2009–14), the Dutch Party for Freedom (2010–12) and the Norwegian Progress Party (2013–) to name but a few – have gained experience of executive power or acted as (more or less) influential support parties (Akkerman et al., 2016; Minkenberg, 2017: chs. 5–6). A similar, albeit weaker, trend can be observed also at the other end of the left–right heuristic; the electoral support of the European radical left family has slowly recovered from the rock-bottom levels reached in the (early) 1990s, and several parties – such as, for instance, the communist parties of France (1997–2002) and Portugal (2015–), the Finnish Left Alliance (1995–2003, 2011–14) and the Icelandic Left-Green Movement (2009–13) – have either been included in coalitions or supported minority governments (Chiocchetti, 2017: ch. 3; March, 2016).

The growing importance of radical – and, in some cases, even extreme – parties in European government formation processes is somewhat surprising, especially in light of the allegedly (see March, 2012: 8–9; Mudde, 2007: 31) anti-system (but not necessarily anti-democratic) nature of these actors. Following Sartori (1976: 133), anti-system parties do not – at least not rhetorically – share the values of the prevailing political order and, as a consequence, aspire to undermine the legitimacy of the existing political regime. In the words of coalition theorists, anti-system radical right and radical left parties should hence be ‘non-coalitionable’; they should, as a general rule, be ‘excluded [from government] through the reactions of the other [pro-system] parties’ (Budge and Keman, 1990: 49, 52).

Existing comparative studies on the coalitionability of radical (right or/and left) parties have concluded that government inclusion of radical parties follows a complex and multi-causal pattern, and that the explanatory power of the conventional ‘size and ideology’-framework is limited ([*author*]; de Lange, 2008; Olsen et al., 2010; see also Andeweg et al., 2011). Starting from these puzzling observations, the present analysis sets out to further strengthen our understanding of radical government participation by means of nested within-case analyses. First, I seek to *substantiate* the relationships observed in a previous cross-case configurational analysis focusing on factors related to size and ideology: Are the observed sufficient terms causally related to the outcome? And, if so, how? The second aim of the paper is to *further improve* our understanding of radical government participation: If well-known factors related to electoral and parliamentary strength and ideological aptitude are – as recent cross-case evidence indicate – able to explain radical government participation only partly, which are the additional components that should be included in an enhanced explanatory framework? By seeking answers to these questions, the study aspires to improve our understanding of radical power exertion and, hence, contribute to increasing our still incomplete knowledge of the intricate relationship between political radicalism and liberal democratic government. From a broader perspective, the study also seeks to contribute to refining the more general theory on government participation in multiparty systems.

The paper is organized into five sections. The next section provides a brief summary of previous configurational cross-case evidence regarding the determinants of radical government participation and discusses general issues related to case study logic and case selection in configurational multi-method research. The third section includes diagnostic within-case analyses of typical cases, and the fourth section more exploratory within-case theory-improving studies. The fifth and final section concludes.

## 2 Cross-case evidence and case study design

To better understand the complex nature of radical government inclusion, a cross-case fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) focusing on factors related to party size and party ideology was conducted. This analysis included 20 relevant radical right parties and 17 relevant radical left parties observed at, in total, 207 coalition formation instances in 22 European countries 1990–2007 (see [author]). The results from this analysis suggested two solution models, with the following (factorized) solution model  $sm_{2'}$  being most relevant (for details, see appendix A):<sup>1</sup>

$$sm_{2'} : SWP(C \vee \neg R) \vee WCR\neg P \Leftrightarrow G. \quad (1)$$

To briefly summarize, the first two paths in (1) suggests that radical parties get into government if they succeeded in the most recent national election ( $S$ ) and if their policy position on their most preferred dimension is close ( $P$ ) to the policy position of a comparatively weak ( $W$ ) prime minister party on the same dimension. In addition, the first (‘feasible allies’) path underlines the importance of a (roughly) similar general left–right location ( $C$ ) while the second (‘radical partners’) path emphasizes the importance of shared radical views (with the prime minister party) on issues related to the policy dimension preferred by the radical party ( $\neg R$ ). The third (‘moderate followers’) path underscore the importance of moderation; a weak ( $W$ ) prime minister party may seek help from a distant ( $\neg P$ ) radical party if this radical party holds moderate views ( $R$ ) and is located on the same side of the left–right heuristic ( $C$ ).

[Table1]

Table 1 gives the inclusion (INCL) and coverage (COV) scores<sup>2</sup> for the three sufficient paths as well as for the entire solution model. While the inclusion scores for the first two terms in expression (1) indicate satisfactory consistency, the final term is – although being ‘more sufficient than not’ – less consistent with the statement of sufficiency. It also includes only one case and is thus rather trivial. Regarding the inclusion score for the entire solution formula, it is at a satisfactory level of 0.762. The solution coverage score, by contrast, is a low 0.293; the solution formula is, hence, able to explain a relatively small part of radical government participation. This is illustrated in figure 1, where the number of cases in the upper right box A (membership in solution model < 0.5, membership in the endogenous outcome factor > 0.5) outnumbered the number of typical cases in the upper left triangle B (membership in both solution and endogenous factor > 0.5, and membership in endogenous

factor  $\geq$  membership in solution). This underlines the need for further, more detailed, post-QCA case studies.

[Figure1]

A case study can be defined as an intensive study of one (or a small number of) spatially or temporally delimited unit(s), with the aim to generalize across a larger population of cases (Gerring, 2004: 342; 2017: 27–28). In configurational multi-method research, post-QCA case studies (on sufficiency) serve two broad purposes (Beach and Rohlfing, 2018; see also Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013; 2016 and, more generally, Goertz, 2017 and Lieberman, 2005). A first, ‘mechanism-centered’, strategy is to focus on typical cases (i.e., cases in the field corresponding to triangle B of figure 1), with the aim to probe the mechanism (or mechanisms) linking a conjunction of exogenous factors with an endogenous factor (Beach and Rohlfing, 2018: 7, 22–25). A second, ‘condition-centered’, approach seeks to substantiate cross-case claims regarding the causal relationship between an exogenous conjunction and an endogenous factor (Beach and Rohlfing, 2018: 7, 19–22). This is done by focusing on typical cases, and possibly also on deviant cases for consistency (i.e., cases in the field corresponding to box D of figure 1) and/or deviant cases for coverage (i.e., cases in the field corresponding to box A of figure 1).

To reiterate, the purpose of this paper is to improve our understanding of radical parties’ government participation using a ‘condition-centered’ design. The first step in this endeavor is to examine the quality of the solution model in expression (1): Is a within-case examination of typical cases able to substantiate the causal relationship between the sufficient conjunctions ( $SWCP$ ,  $SW-RP$ ,  $WCR-P$ ) and the outcome ( $G$ )? If there is sufficient evidence for the causal quality of the solution model, the second step of the analysis is to focus on deviant cases for coverage: Since the factors related to size and ideology included in the cross-case analysis cannot – as we have seen in table 1 – provide a complete explanation of radical government participation, we need to search for additional factors that enable radical parties to get into office. If, by contrast, the causal quality of the solution model cannot be substantiated in the analysis of typical cases, the second step of the analysis will be entirely exploratory in nature, focusing on an open-ended (non-nested) within-case search for testable hypotheses.

### 3 Typical cases

In configurational multi-method research, a typical<sup>3</sup> case for sufficiency is a case that provides good evidence of the empirical pattern of interest, demonstrating high ( $> 0.5$ , ideally maximum) set membership in the relevant conjunction as well as in the endogenous factor, with the membership in the endogenous factor being greater than or equal to the membership in the conjunction (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). To determine ‘how typical’ a typical case  $i$  is in the analysis of sufficiency ( $S_{Ti}$ ), Schneider and Rohlfing (2016: 552) suggest the following formula:

$$S_{Ti} = \frac{Y_i - X_i}{X_i}. \quad (2)$$

Since cases with larger memberships in  $X$  are more suitable for case studies (and since typical cases, by definition, have a larger membership in  $Y$  than in  $X$ ),  $S_{Ti}$  standardize the case's Euclidean distance to the secondary diagonal of an enhanced  $XY$  plot (numerator) with the case's membership in  $X$  (denominator). The lower this score is, the more typical is the case. By applying this formula to the solution in expression (1), the most typical unique case(s) of each of the three terms have been identified. As shown in table 2 (and in figures B1a–c in appendix B), the best available typical cases uniquely covered by term  $SWCP$  are the Latvian National Alliance (NA) in 2011 (a and b), both of which receive the minimum score 0. Regarding term  $SW-RP$ , the most typical case is the Danish People's Party (DF) in 2005 ( $S_{Ti} = 0.176$ ). DF is, however, not uniquely covered by  $SW-RP$  and should, according to the 'principle of unique membership', not be studied (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013; see also Goertz, 2017: ch. 3). Focusing only on unique cases, the best available typical cases covered by  $SW-RP$  are the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom (TB) in 1995 (a and b). The best available typical case of the final solution term  $WCR-P$  is, naturally, its only (unique) case – the Finnish Left Alliance (VAS) in 1999.<sup>4</sup>

[Table2]

The empirical examination of these cases – reported in the following three subsections and discussed in the fourth subsection – relies on process tracing, an analytic tool used for 'the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms' (Bennett and Checkel, 2015: 7).<sup>5</sup> In this section, the process tracing method is used deductively (to assess a hypothesis derived from configurational cross-case research) and – as already stated – following a 'condition-centered' design (see also Schimmelfennig, 2015 on 'efficient' process tracing). By employing primary (electoral manifestos) as well as secondary (extant data sets, electoral reports, yearbook entries and previous case studies) sources, the aim is, hence, to substantiate 'the QCA-based inference that a single condition is an INUS<sup>6</sup>-condition' and that 'the corresponding conjunction to which [this condition] belongs is sufficient for the outcome' (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2016: 535). This is done through counterfactual causal inference whereby a given INUS-condition can be confirmed as causal if we can plausibly argue that the outcome would be absent if the INUS-condition was absent (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2016; Rohlfing and Schneider, 2018). To increase readability, the three following subsections follow a common outline. First, I provide a general introduction of the case. This introduction is followed by accounts of party history and party ideology, the electoral campaign, the election itself (including the following government formation process). The final paragraph concludes.

### 3.1 Path $SWCP$ : The Latvian NA as a 'feasible ally' (2011)

The most typical case of path  $SWCP$  is the Latvian<sup>7</sup> radical right party National Alliance (NA) in the early 2010s. The party was included in the Dombrovskis III cabinet formed on 25 October 2011 (NA 2011a) – roughly a month after the premature election on 17 September – and again in the Straujuma I cabinet formed on 22 January 2014 (NA 2011b), after the surprising resignation of Dombrovskis in late November the previous year. The Dombrovskis

III (majority) cabinet consisted of NA and the newly formed centre-right parties Unity (V; prime minister party) and Zatlers' Reform Party (ZRP). It was also supported by six (formerly ZRP-affiliated) independents. The Straujuma I (surplus majority) cabinet included NA, V (prime minister party), ZRP and the centre-right Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS) and was again supported by the six independents. The remaining party winning seats in 2011 election was the centre-left and pro-Russian Harmony Centre (SC) (Ikstens, 2012; 2015; see also Auers, 2013).

NA was formed as an electoral alliance ahead of the 2010 election and as a party in July 2011. In terms of *ideology*, the party can be seen as an amalgamation of the main actors of the first (1990s) and second (2000s) waves of Latvian right-wing radicalism – the established but gradually weakening ethnocentrist alliance For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement (TB/LNNK) and the more youthful and more radical extra-parliamentary All for Latvia! (VL!), respectively (Auers and Kasekamp, 2015: 141). Since its foundation, NA has been firmly rooted in the right pole of a sociocultural left–right dimension, taking a hostile position towards immigration and advocating family, or ‘demographic’, issues (e.g. maternity benefits and increased child allowances) in order to put an end to the shrinking population of (ethnic) Latvians. Also with regards to the major cleavage in the Latvian party system – the one between Latvians and Russian-speakers<sup>8</sup> – NA is coherently nativist, fiercely opposing citizenship and language rights for the Russian minority and consistently refusing to cooperate with the pro-Russian SC (Auers and Kasekamp, 2015: 142–143). This anti-Russian profile is evident also in NA's 2011 election manifesto where the party proclaims to be the sole representative of Latvian interests in the *Saeima* and the only party able to prevent ‘Kremlin's partners’ from entering office (National Alliance, 2011).

NA was, however, not the only Latvian party to emphasize nativist and, more generally, socioculturally rightist ideas during the *2011 electoral campaign*. As shown in table 3 (column 3), the Manifesto Project Data (Volkens et al., 2017) suggest that the manifestos produced by V, ZRP and ZZS in advance of the 2011 election were also more or less clearly to the right on a sociocultural left–right dimension.<sup>9</sup> It seems, hence, that NA and the prime minister party V took fairly similar positions on core sociocultural issues at the evening of the 2011 election. Especially with respect to the major ethnic cleavage, both parties were, in the early 2010s, clearly on the same side: NA called, as we have already seen, for a more ‘Latvian Latvia’ and refused to cooperate with pro-Russian parties (National Alliance, 2011; Pryce, 2012: 615–616; see also Bloom, 2011: 382) while V emphasized the role of Latvian as the only official language (Unity, 2011) and portrayed the pro-Russian SC as a Kremlin stooge that threatens the very statehood of Latvia (Auers, 2013: 100). In addition to taking similar positions on the sociocultural dimension, NA and V also both positioned themselves to the right in a more general sense. As observed by Auers (2013: 100), the ethnic cleavage has ‘increasingly adopted a socioeconomic dimension’, with SC embracing a social democratic identity and the remaining (ethnic Latvian) parliamentary parties positioning themselves more to the socioeconomic right.

Taken together, then, ideological similarity between the radical party and the prime minister party – that is, proximal sociocultural positions (*P*) and an associated similarity

in terms of general left–right position ( $C$ ) – seem indeed to be important prerequisites and INUS-conditions for radical government inclusion. In the case of NA in the early 2010s, proximity to V on sociocultural matters – and, in particular, shared critical views on the Russian-speaking minority – was clearly necessary for radical government inclusion; had the government been formed by a party with pro-Russian views, the anti-Russian NA would surely not have agreed to (or been allowed to) enter (Pryce, 2012: 615–616; see also Bloom, 2011: 382). General left–right positions were probably less important, but it is worth noting that the sociocultural and socioeconomic dimensions were increasingly interlinked. In order for NA to get access to power, the government hence needed to be formed by a party with critical (sociocultural rightist) views on expanded rights of the Russian-speaking minority and, consequently, with a position on the right side of the general left-right dimension.

There is, however, good reason to believe that factors related to ideological similarity were insufficient to guarantee radical government access; the parliamentary balance of strength after the *2011 election* also played a role. In particular, the weakness of the prime minister party ( $W$ ) appears to have been an INUS-condition for radical right government inclusion. Together with the ostracism of the large pro-Russian SC, the relative weakness of V required a broad multiparty coalition to secure a majority (see columns 4 and 6 of table 3). Consequently, V formed a coalition with ZRP and NA, thus leaving SC and the corruption-stained ZZS – with whom ZRP refused to cooperate (Pryce, 2012: 614) – in opposition. By including the radical right in the coalition, the grossly weakened V not only satisfied the considerable amount of members and voters who shared the nativist concerns of NA but also mitigated the appeal of the radical right, thus preventing voters from defecting to NA (Auers and Kasekamp, 2015: 143). Despite the ideological similarities between V and NA, visible tensions begun, however, to turn up already in 2010 (Bloom, 2011: 383) and the cooperation in government turned out to be rather troublesome (see Ikstens, 2013; 2014). The counterfactual argument that a strong V would not have included NA seems, hence, plausible; if V would have scored a result comparable to the one earned in 2010 (when V, ultimately, also excluded NA from the coalition), the need to take account of the somewhat unruly radical right would have been considerably smaller. The final factor of interest focuses on the electoral result of the radical right party ( $S$ ). The key role of this factor is somewhat harder to assess. Two aspects are, however, worth emphasizing: the consolidation of TB/LNNK and VL! in 2010 was, at least in part, launched in order to put an end to the ongoing electoral stagnation of the Latvian radical right (Ikstens, 2011: 1039; see also Auers and Kasekamp, 2015: 139), and TB/LNNK’s major electoral loss in 2002 was followed by a subsequent (2004–6) expulsion from government. Successful electoral results seem, hence, to have been of at least some relevance in Latvian government formation processes in the early twenty-first century.

To sum up, the evidence from the most typical case National Alliance in 2011 provide further, case-based, support for the assumption that radical parties get access to office if their general left–right location ( $C$ ) as well as their policy position on the most important dimension is close ( $P$ ) to the policy position of a comparatively weak ( $W$ ) prime minister party and if they succeeded fairly well in the most recent national election ( $S$ ). In light of the discussion above, the causal relationship between the sufficient conjunction and the

outcome can be illustrated in the following way (see figure 2a). First, ideological kinship is an *important prerequisite* for radical government participation (M1); without some ideological affinity with the prime minister party, both in terms of general left–right positions and concerning positions on the main dimension, the radical party does not get access to power. Ideological affinity is, however, not enough. In a second step of the causal chain, there has to be also a *need* for including the radical right (M2); the prime minister party need to score a comparatively weak result in the election prior to the formation of the government, and there is also some evidence indicating that the radical party should avoid losing the election. The combination of the INUS-conditions  $P$ ,  $C$ ,  $W$  and – with some reservation –  $S$  seem, hence, to be sufficient in order to create a feasible ally that can be included in a coalition.

[Table3]

### 3.2 Path $SW-RP$ : The Latvian TB as a ‘radical partner’ (1995)

The most typical unique case of path  $SW-RP$  is also a Latvian radical right party – the For Fatherland and Freedom (TB) in the mid-1990s.<sup>10</sup> TB was included as a junior partner in the two cabinets formed after the second (1995) national election after Latvia’s restored independence: the broad Šķēle I cabinet formed on 21 December 1995 (TB 1995a) and the subsequent, and almost equally broad, Šķēle II cabinet formed on 13 February 1997 (TB 1995b). In addition to TB and the independent prime minister,<sup>11</sup> the oligarch Andris Šķēle, the Šķēle I (surplus majority) cabinet included the centre-right parties Latvian Way (LC), Latvian Farmers’ Union (LZS) and Latvian Green Party (LZP), the radical right (or centre-right) Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) and the centre-left populist party Democratic Party ‘Saimnieks’ (DP‘S’). In addition, the radical left (and nationalist) Latvian Unity Party (LVP) had one cabinet post but was, according to Pettai and Kreuzer (1999: 155), not formally a member of the coalition. The Šķēle II (surplus majority) cabinet included TB, LC, LZS, LZP, LNNK, DP‘S’ and the centre-right party Christian Democratic Union (KDS). Other parties winning seats in 1995 election were two parties favored mainly by the Russian-speaking minority – the centre-left National Harmony Party (TSP) and the radical left Socialist Party of Latvia (LSP) – and the populist centre-right Siegerist Party (ZP) (Auers, 2013; see also Kolstø and Tsilevich, 1997).

TB was founded in 1993 by the radical elements of the Latvian nationalist and anti-Soviet independent movement. Like the Citizens’ Congress of the late 1980s and early 1990s, TB (and, indeed, its successor TB/LNNK) embraced a radical ethnocentrist *ideology* (Auers and Kasekamp, 2015: 138–139). In the lively debate on the citizenship issue in the early 1990s, TB hence campaigned for a return to pre-World War II legislation, resisting the naturalization of post-war Slavic immigrants and arguing that citizenship rights should be granted solely to (the descendants of) the citizens of the inter-war period (Morris, 2004: 554). This position was maintained also during the 1995 electoral campaign. In its manifesto, TB demanded that those who arrived to the country during the Soviet occupation (1944–1991) should not be granted citizenship and, moreover, that the promotion of illegal immigration should be punished. More generally, TB also emphasized the importance of a strong Latvian state, based on the nativist traditions and experiences from the independent inter-war Latvian

state (For Fatherland and Freedom, 1995).

TB was, however, not the only party to emphasize socioculturally rightist issues during the *1995 election campaign*. Following Morris (2004: 553–537) and Pabriks and Štokenberga (2006: 58–60), questions related to language and ethnicity were the most important themes in the campaign. Looking at the Manifesto Project Data (Volkens et al., 2017), it also appears that the manifestos produced by moderately nationalist (or ‘socioeconomic’; see Smith-Sivertsen, 1998: 102) parties included in the Šķēle cabinet (DP‘S’, LC and the alliance LZS/KDS) were clearly to the sociocultural right (table 4, column 3).<sup>12</sup> The largest party DP‘S’, for example, emphasized the consolidating role of the Latvian language and underlined family values and law and moral issues (Democratic Party ‘Saimnieks’, 1995). Following Minkenbergs (2015: 39) and Auers and Kasekamp (2015: 139), nationalist ideas seem thus to have been ‘part of the mainstream’.

In all, it seems clear that the sociocultural dimension and, in particular, issues related to nationality and sovereignty were of major relevance during the 1995 Latvian election campaign. Moreover, it is also evident that several of the mainstream Latvian parties, including the largest party DP‘S’, took sociocultural positions that were – although perhaps not as distinctly nativist as those of TB – clearly to the right. Taken together, proximity on the most important dimension ( $P$ ) can thus be regarded as an INUS-condition; it is highly unlikely that TB would have been a candidate for government if the leading government party would have held socioculturally liberal and cosmopolitan views. The INUS-status and causal relevance of a lack of ideological moderation ( $\neg R$ ) is more difficult to confirm. A possible general interpretation is that even radical parties who have not moderated their ideological profile may gain access to office, provided that mainstream parties also adopt fairly radical positions.

Despite its importance, it appears that ideological similarity again was insufficient to guarantee radical government access. In addition, also the weakness of the largest cabinet party ( $W$ ) and the electoral success of the radical right party ( $S$ ) seem to have played important roles. The importance of strength is particularly stressed by the highly fragmented parliament elected at the *1995 election*. With no parties holding more than 20 per cent of the seats (see table 4, column 6) and with the effective number of parliamentary parties being as high as 7.59, government formation turned out to be difficult, and several multiparty coalitions were proposed. First, TB’s Māris Grīnblats, nominated by a cente-right ‘nationalist bloc’ consisting of TB, LC, LNNK, LZS and KDS, failed to win the vote of confidence. In a second step of the negotiations, president Ulmanis proposed a coalition with Ziedonis Čeveris of DP‘S’ as prime minister, but also this ‘national compromise bloc’ coalition (including DP‘S’, ZP, LVP and TSP) failed to obtain confidence of the *Saeima*. The Šķēle cabinets eventually formed were, as we have seen, exceptionally broad, with only the Russophone parties TSP and LSP and the populist ZP – who refused to cooperate with LC – remaining in opposition throughout the term (Davies and Ozolins, 1996: 127; Smith-Sivertsen, 1998: 100). The counterfactual argument that the radical right TB would not have been an attractive coalition partner without the presense of size-related factors seems, again, rather plausible; the need to include TB would have been less acute if the leading cabinet party would have scored a result comparable to LC in 1993 (32.4 per cent of the

votes and 36 seats, TB not included in government) and if TB would not have succeeded well (cf. TB/LNNK’s loss in the 2002 election and its subsequent ousting from government).

Summing up, the evidence from the most typical (unique) case For Fatherland and Freedom in 1995 support the assumption that non-moderated ( $\neg R$ ) radical parties get access to office if their policy position on the most important dimension is close ( $P$ ) to the policy position of a comparatively weak ( $W$ ) prime minister/largest cabinet party and if the radical party succeeded fairly well in the most recent national election ( $S$ ). The causal relationship between the conjunction and the outcome can be illustrated as in figure 2b. Although the causal importance of non-moderation is unclear, the left side of the conjunction can, again, be interpreted as an *important prerequisite* for radical government participation (M1). Hence, even non-moderate radical parties can get access to power if there is an ideological affinity with the prime minister/largest cabinet party in terms of roughly similar positions on the main dimension. Again, however, this is not enough. In a second causal step, there has to be also a *need* for including the radical right (M2); the largest cabinet party need to score a comparatively weak result in the election prior to the formation of the government, and the radical party should preferably avoid losing. Thus, in a setting where the radical party is non-moderated ( $\neg R$ ), a combination of the INUS-conditions  $P$ ,  $C$  and  $W$  is sufficient in order to create a radical partner that can be included in coalition government.

[Table4]

### 3.3 Path $WCR\neg P$ : The Finnish VAS as a ‘moderate follower’ (1999)

With a consistency score of 0.595, the final path  $WCR\neg P$  is only weakly sufficient for government inclusion. A brief illustration of the only covered case – the Finnish radical left party Left Alliance (VAS) in 1999<sup>13</sup> – may, however, be warranted because of its status as one of only two radical *left* parties covered by the entire solution term. VAS was included as a junior partner in the exceptionally broad ‘rainbow coalitions’ formed in 1995 (Lipponen I) and 1999 (Lipponen II). The Lipponen II (surplus majority) cabinet, formed in April 1999, consisted of the same parties as the Lipponen I: VAS, the centre-left parties Social Democratic Party (SDP; prime minister party) and Green League (VIHR; left the coalition in May 2002) and the centre-right parties National Coalition Party (KOK) and Swedish People’s Party (SFP). Other parties winning seats in the 1999 national election were the centre-right Centre Party (KESK), Christian League (SKL) and Reform Group (REM) and the (emergent) radical right True Finns (PS) (Sundberg, 2000; 2003).

Although founded as late as 1990, the origins of VAS can be traced back to 1944 when the Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL) was formed as an umbrella organization for the Finnish radical left. During the post-war era, the communist-dominated SKDL was a major force in Finnish politics and took part in a uniquely large number of centre-left coalition governments (for details, see especially Paastela, 1991). The pragmatic ideological and strategical profile of (the dominant faction of) SKDL was transferred to (the dominant faction of) VAS, who, especially during the 1990s and early 2000s, adopted a cautious *ideology* and a vague political identity (Dunphy, 2007: 37; March, 2012: 97). This view is also supported by the Manifesto Project Data (Volkens et al., 2017) indicating that VAS positio-

ned itself only moderately to the socioeconomic left in 1999 (table 5, column 3; see also Left Alliance, 1998).<sup>14</sup> With all the main parties – including SDP – being to the socioeconomic right during the *1999 electoral campaign*, the importance of ideological moderation seems clear: despite not positioning itself close to the prime minister party SDP ( $\neg P$ ) or, for that matter, to the leading centre-right KOK, VAS could be included due to its well-established pragmatism and its moderate ideological profile ( $R$ ). With a more radical profile, and without its pragmatic history, VAS would probably not have been a candidate for government. Even more important for VAS government entry was, however, the fortunes of SDP. Following Dunphy (2010: 83), VAS’s prospects of entering government generally depend on SDP ‘coming first in an election and being in the position of government *formateur*’ ( $C$ ). This factor also seems to have been far more important than the prime minister party’s relative weakness ( $W$ ) in the *1999 election*. Although the weakened strength of SDP surely did not decrease its eagerness to keep its main left-wing competitor VAS in government, it is worth noting that SDP – with no less than 31.5 per cent of the parliamentary seats – willingly included VAS also in the previous (Lipponen I) cabinet (see Berglund, 1995; Nurmi and Nurmi, 2001). This clearly raises doubts regarding the INUS-status of the factor  $W$ .

In summary, then, the brief evidence from the Left Alliance in 1999 sheds further light on the path  $WCR\neg P$ . It illustrates how parties with a non-proximal position to the prime minister party on the key dimension ( $\neg P$ ) may get access to office if their policy position on this same dimension is moderate ( $R$ ) and if the prime minister party is located on the same side of the left–right heuristic ( $C$ ). The importance of the weakness of the prime minister party ( $W$ ) remains, however, highly unclear. The causal relationship between the conjunction and the outcome is illustrated in figure 2c. Here, non-proximal radical parties can get access to power if they are moderate and locate themselves on the same side of the left–right heuristic as the prime minister party (M1). In contrast to the paths discussed above, these prerequisites may be enough for the inclusion of a moderate follower.

[Table5]

### 3.4 Summary

This section has examined the solution model presented in expression (1) by means of case studies of three typical cases. Regarding the first path, the case study provide reasonably good support for the INUS-status of the four conditions involved. According to figure 2a, radical parties may get access to power following a two-step path where ideological kinship before and during the electoral campaign is followed by size-related incentives emerging from the electoral result. The second and third paths both include negations for which the causal importance remains unclear. Regarding the second path, it is hard to prove that non-moderation ( $\neg R$ ) is an INUS-condition. Rather, its presence indicates that even non-moderated parties are – perhaps against conventional wisdom – able to enter government, providing that ideological kinship with the prime minister party (or largest cabinet party) before and during the electoral campaign is followed by size-related incentives emerging after the election (see figure 2b). Similarly, the INUS-status of non-proximity ( $\neg P$ ) in the third path is hard to prove. Like non-moderation, the factor may, however, be of descriptive

relevance; its presence indicates that even parties that are not proximal to the prime minister party may, surprisingly enough, be able to enter government, providing that the party is moderate and located on the same side of the left–right heuristic as the prime minister party. The INUS-status and, indeed, descriptive relevance of the remaining factor  $W$ , by contrast, is highly questionable. Consequently,  $W$  can, at least tentatively, be dropped from the third path (see figure 2c), leading to the following revised solution model:

$$sm_{2a'} : SWP(C \vee \neg R) \vee CR\neg P \Leftrightarrow G. \quad (3)$$

As is evident, the submodel  $sm_{2a'}$  is nearly identical to  $sm_2$ ; the only difference is to be found in the (only weakly sufficient) third path. To further improve the model, an examination of the numerous deviant cases for coverage is, hence, feasible.

[Figure2]

## 4 Deviant cases for coverage

A deviant case for sufficiency coverage is a case that is a member of the endogenous factor but a non-member of (each term of) the QCA solution model (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). To identify the best deviant cases for sufficiency coverage ( $S_{Dcovi}$ ), Schneider and Rohlfing (2016: 554) use the right-hand side of formula (2). In contrast to the identification of most typical cases, the point of reference is now the truth table row to which the deviant case belongs, with  $X$  representing membership in the conjunction of exogenous factors and  $Y$  representing membership in the endogenous factor. Again, lower scores indicate more adequate cases. Table 6 lists all contradictory truth table rows (minterms) observed in the cross-case analysis. These 17 rows include in total 115 cases: 41 positive (listed in table 6), and 74 negative.

[Table6]

To empirically examine these cases, I again rely on process tracing. In contrast to the previous section, the following examination is, however, more inductive – the aim is to identify and formulate new hypotheses rather than to test existing ones. By utilizing several secondary sources (electoral reports, yearbook entries and previous case studies), I set out to assess why the outcome of interest is observed for the deviant case(s) coverage but not for other cases in the same truth table row (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013: 574; 2016: 542). The following discussion summarizes the observations made from examinations of all 17 rows: Is it possible to identify hypothetically relevant factors that can contribute to an increasing understanding of radical government participation?

### 4.1 Explaining deviant cases: Three hypotheses

The investigation of the 41 positive (and 74 negative) cases in the contradictory rows points to a number of factors that have the potential of being relevant when seeking to increase our understanding of radical parties' coalition behavior. The following discussion focuses

mainly on three factors that appear particularly promising (in terms of their ability to solve existing contradictions): pre-electoral agreements, atypical ideological similarities, and issue salience and issue ownership patterns.

First, the existence of a pre-electoral coalition (or, more generally, pre-electoral agreement) between the radical party and the prime minister party should be considered as a potentially relevant explanatory factor in future cross-case examinations of radical government involvement. With reference to table 6, this factor can separate the deviant cases for coverage (i.e., the positive cases LN 2008 and PCF 1997a) from the negative cases (CDU 1999 and IU 1993) in minterm 54. Regarding Northern League (LN), the party competed alone in the 2008 Italian election in order to maintain its regional character but agreed to form a pre-electoral alliance with Berlusconi's new centre-right umbrella organization People of Freedom (PdL) (Ignazi, 2009: 1002; Wilson, 2009: 219). The election resulted in a victory for PdL, who subsequently formed a centre-right coalition government together with its allies LN and Movement for the Autonomies (MpA). A pre-electoral agreement was also formed before the French 1997 election, when the socialists (PS) created a political and electoral alliance consisting of several leftist actors, including the communists in PCF (Ysmal, 1998: 397–398). After the left victory, the alliance members formed a coalition government. In the negative cases of minterm 54, by contrast, no relevant pre-electoral coalitions existed; the Spanish United Left (IU) did, hence, not form a coalition with the winning socialist PSOE before the 1993 elections (Lancaster, 1994), nor did the Portuguese communists (CDU) form a coalition with the winning socialist PS ahead of the 1999 elections (Corkill, 2000).

In addition to the contradiction discussed above, several other minters indicate that pre-electoral agreements may be of importance. The most relevant of these is minterm 38, where the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (SV) was a member of the pre-electoral 'red-green' alliance in 2005 and 2009 (Sitter, 2006: 576–577; Allern, 2010: 904). By including this information, these two cases (SV 2005 and SV 2009) can be separated from the remaining positive and negative cases where no agreements were present. There are also a few instances where single parties can be separated from contradictory minters by accounting for the existence of pre-electoral agreements. These are minterm 08 where LN 2001 (a and b) competed together with, among others, Forza Italia (Ignazi, 2002: 992) and minterm 37 where the Swedish Left Party (V 2002) formed a loose pre-electoral 'red-green' cooperation pact with the governing Social Democratic Party (Widfeldt, 2003: 1094).

In light of the evidence presented above, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

(H1) Radical parties can be included in coalition governments when there is a pre-electoral agreement between the radical party and the prime minister party.

Second, it is reason to focus more also on the cross-case importance of atypical ideological and strategical coalescence between the radical party and the prime minister party. Looking at table 6, this factor may be able to separate the deviant cases for coverage from the negative cases in minterm 50. Both deviant cases are radical parties governing with mainstream parties from the other side of the general left–right heuristic; the radical left party Union of the Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) entered a coalition government led by the centre-right People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in 1994, and the radical right Slovak National Party (SNS) joined a coalition led by the cente-left Direction – Social

Democracy (SMER-SD) in 2006. In both cases, the radical party shared a populist and nationalist character with the prime minister party. Wightman and Szomolányi (1995: 613) thus note that ZRS and HZDS shared a propensity to national and social populism as well as to authoritarianism, while Gyárfášova and Mesežnikov (2015: 242–243; see also Pytlas and Kossack, 2015: 123–124) observe that SNS has coalition potential only when populist, non-moderate, parties such as HZDS or the increasingly nationalist SMER-SD form the government. No manifest evidence of such an overlap can be found when focusing on the negative case; the radical right League of Polish Families (LPR) and the social democratic prime minister party Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) seem not to have shared important ideological traits in 2001 (a, b and c) (Jasiewicz and Jasiewics-Betkiewicz, 2002; Millard, 2003; see also Pytlas and Kossack, 2015: 115–117).

Two additional minterms can possibly be resolved by accounting for atypical ideological resemblance. In minterm 01, the only deviant case – the radical right Independent Greeks (ANEL) in 2015 (January and September) – joined forces with the radical left prime minister party Syriza. Despite their significant differences in terms of sociocultural views, ANEL and Syriza took the same position on important socioeconomic issues, with both parties developing anti-austerity platforms (Rori, 2016: 1331, 1340). An analogous pattern can be observed in minterm 49, where the only deviant case – the Bulgarian radical right party Attack in 2013 – tacitly but indispensably supported a centre-left government. Again, the common denominator was the parties’ socioeconomic policies: the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) ‘called for a definitive change in in the neo-liberal economic model’ while Attack ‘rejected the neo-liberal economic model’ (Kostadinova and Popova, 2014: 366–367). Looking at the (in total 14) negative cases corresponding to these two minterms, no evidence of atypical ideological resemblance can be observed.<sup>15</sup>

Taken together, the cases briefly illustrated above point to the possible relevance of atypical ideological similarities between the radical party on the one hand and the prime minister (or largest cabinet) party on the other. These similarities can take at least three forms; a radical left party cooperating with a centre-right party due to sociocultural similarities (as in the case of ZRS and HZDS); a radical right party cooperating with a centre-left party, again due to sociocultural similarities (as in the case of SNS and SMER-SD); and a radical right party cooperating with a (centre) left party because of socioeconomic similitude (as in the cases of ANEL and Syriza, and Attack and BSP). Therefore, the following general hypothesis can be proposed:

(H2) Radical parties can be included in coalition governments also when there are atypical socioeconomic and sociocultural similarities between left and right parties.

Finally, future cross-country research on radical government inclusion should focus not only on party positions along wide-ranging ideological scales, but also on how parties deal with single issues. More specifically, it is worth examining whether a radical party benefits from situations where the electoral campaign is heavily focused on an issue that is clearly emphasized (or ‘owned’) also by the radical party.<sup>16</sup> Minterm 53 in table 6 includes three deviant cases for coverage: the Swedish V in 1998, the Danish DF in 2001 and the Bulgarian Attack in 2009. In all three cases, the radical party addressed issues that were at the core of the electoral campaign. V thus emphasized important campaign themes such as child

and geriatric care (Arter, 1999: 297) while DF – in line with many voters and several other (non-leftist) parties – considered immigration as the most salient issue in Danish politics (Andersen, 2003: 188–189). Attack, finally, appealed to feelings of discontent in a campaign dominated by a widespread dissatisfaction with the incumbent government (Spirova, 2010: 176–177). Looking at the negative cases, the concordance between the issues emphasized by the radical party on the one hand and the more general campaign issues on the other are less clear. The Portuguese Left Bloc (BE) in 2009 focused hence mainly on criticizing the policies of the incumbent PS (Lisi, 2010: 384) while the Slovak SNS in 1990 demanded independence for Slovakia in an election where the main dividing line was between the defenders of the old (real socialist) society and the supporters of market economy (Jehlička, Kostecký, and Sýkora, 1993: 244, 249). Although the Swedish V in 1994 also focused on issues of ‘general salience’ such as unemployment, it was mainly occupied with the upcoming referendum on EU membership – ‘despite the studied attempts of all the other [major] parties to exclude [this issue] from the election’ (Madeley, 1995: 426).

To conclude, minterm 53 indicates that radical parties may gain access to office if they emphasize topical issues that other parties care about (either for policy or strategic reasons). The third and final hypothesis derived from a case-based investigation of deviant cases thus reads as follows:

(H3) Radical parties can be included in coalition governments when their preferred issues are at the core of the present electoral campaign.

The three hypotheses introduced above are able to resolve some of the contradictory minterms in table 6. As indicated in the discussion above, at least 13 of the in total 41 deviant cases for coverage can be removed to new non-contradictory minterms by considering all three factors. The inclusion of these three factors in an updated cross-case analysis has the potential to increase the explanatory power (i.e., solution coverage) considerably, and future research should take steps to examine their substantive importance.

It is, however, likely that a number of cases remain unexplained also after taking the above-mentioned hypotheses into consideration. In these cases, radical government inclusion is probably a consequence of configurations including highly idiosyncratic factors (see also the discussion in Andeweg et al., 2011). Such factors include (but are not limited to) strategic considerations (e.g. the inclusion of radical parties in order to secure majority or to reduce their long-term influence, see Luther, 2003: 148 on the Austrian FPÖ in 2002), party history and party traditions (e.g. previous history of governing, see Dunphy, 2007: 37–38 on the Finnish VAS in 1995–2003), previous cooperation on the regional or local level (see Delgado and Lopez Nieto, 2005: 1191 on the Spanish IU in 2004), and external shocks (see Chari, 2004: 962 on – again – the Spanish IU in the 2004 election (held three days after the Madrid train bombings)).

## 5 Conclusion

Recently, a number of studies have focused on the how’s and why’s of radical government participation. The usual starting point in these endeavors has been (explicitly or implicitly)

the conventional ‘size and ideology’-framework. In a recent comparative assessment, [author] shows, however, that this framework is able to explain radical right and radical left government participation only partly. In this paper, the initial steps taken in the above-mentioned cross-case study are followed by nested within-case studies. These case studies seek to, first, substantiate our knowledge about radical government participation: Are the sufficient terms from the cross-case study causally related to the outcome? And, if so, how? A second set of case-based investigations sets out to further improve our understanding of radical government participation: If well-known ‘size and ideology’-factors are able to explain only a small part of radical government participation, which are the additional components that should be included in an enhanced explanatory framework?

The results from the case studies point, first, to the causal relevance of the three sufficient solution terms found in the cross-case investigation. In a limited number of observations, the conventional ‘size and ideology’-framework is enough to explain radical government participation. The first two paths (see figures 2a and 2b) illustrate a process where radical parties get access to power following a two-step mechanism where ideological kinship before and during the electoral campaign is followed by size-related incentives emerging from the electoral result. In the third (less important, and less stable) path (figure 2c), ideological kinship seem to be enough. It is worth noting that both the second and the third path include single factors for which the causal importance remains unclear or (in the third path) even doubtful. In all, however, the case-based investigation of typical cases strengthens our understanding of the causal mechanism linking the sufficient configuration to the outcome, thus providing tentative support for the use of the conventional ‘size and ideology’-framework as a natural starting point for cross-case research.

Second, the paper proceeds with a search for (non-idiosyncratic) factors that are able to increase the explanatory coverage of the original model. By examining deviant cases for coverage, three (contradiction-resolving) factors have been identified; the existence of pre-electoral agreements between the radical party and the prime minister party (H1), atypical ideological similarities between radical and the prime minister parties (H2), and beneficial issue salience and issue ownership patterns (H3). Together, the inclusion of these factors may increase the explanatory power of the cross-case model considerably, and future cross-case research might do well in considering them.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Previous research based on CCMs has made use of different notational systems. In this paper, I apply notations from propositional logic. Hence, ‘ $\neg$ ’ denotes complement (NOT), ‘ $\wedge$ ’ conjunction (AND) and ‘ $\vee$ ’ disjunction (OR). For the sake of readability, ‘ $\wedge$ ’ is usually omitted ( $SWCP \equiv S \wedge W \wedge C \wedge P$ ). ‘ $\Leftarrow$ ’ denotes necessity, ‘ $\Rightarrow$ ’ sufficiency and ‘ $\Leftrightarrow$ ’ equivalence. The prime symbol (') signifies a factorized (simplified) solution model.

<sup>2</sup> The inclusion (or consistency) score expresses the degree (between 0 and 1) to which a proposition about necessity or sufficiency is true. According to conventional standards, the sufficiency inclusion score should preferably be 0.750 or higher. Sufficiency coverage measures how much (between 0 and 1) is explained by the solution.

<sup>3</sup> Gerring (2017) distinguishes between the largely descriptive typical case study on the one hand, and the diagnostic causal pathway case study on the other. In this paper, I follow the terminology used in

methodological work on configurational multi-method research and hence use the term ‘typical’ also in a causal setting.

<sup>4</sup> I note that the relevant size and ideology-conditions take similar values for governments formed immediately after an election (NA 2011a and TB 1995a) and for governments formed mid-term (NA 2011b and TB 1995b). The discussion below will focus primarily on the formation process that occurs immediately after an election (i.e. NA 2011a and TB 1995a, respectively). (Excluding mid-term governments from the cross-case analysis produce robust results, as shown in [author].)

<sup>5</sup> This definition is a revised version of an earlier authoritative characterization provided by George and Bennett (2005: 6). For other useful definitions, see Beach and Pedersen (2013: 3), Gerring (2008: 216), Rohlfing (2012: 158) and Van Evera (1997: 64). Regarding the concept ‘causal mechanism’, I apply a minimal definition according to which a causal mechanism is understood as the ‘pathway [...] by which a causal factor [...] is thought to affect an outcome’ (Gerring, 2007: 163). (For a more elaborated definition, see George and Bennett (2005: 137) and Bennett and Checkel (2015: 12).)

<sup>6</sup> An ‘*insufficient* but *necessary* part of a condition which is itself *unnecessary* but *sufficient* for the result’ (Mackie, 1965: 245, emphasis in the original).

<sup>7</sup> Latvia is a unicameral parliamentary republic with a legislature, *Saeima*, consisting of 100 members. The members are elected proportionally for (since 1998) four-year terms from five multi-seat constituencies, with the national threshold for party lists being (since 1995) 5 per cent. The party system is unstable and relatively fragmented due to low institutional barriers for new parties. Governments have usually been centre-right majority cabinets consisting of two or more parties (see Auers, 2013: 110–123).

<sup>8</sup> Today, roughly one fourth of the Latvian population belong to the Russian-speaking minority – a decrease from over two thirds in the early 1990s.

<sup>9</sup> For further information on the categories and scaling techniques used when constructing the sociocultural and socioeconomic scales, see tables B1 and B2 in appendix B. A largely similar conclusion emerges from looking at the 2010 Chapel Hill expert survey (Bakker et al., 2015): all Latvian parties – except from SC and the newly founded ZRP – are considered as slightly opposed to immigration and more (NA) or less (V and ZZS) critical towards multiculturalism and ethnic minorities.

<sup>10</sup> For details on the Latvian political system, see endnote 7 and Smith-Sivertsen (1998: 111–119).

<sup>11</sup> Since the prime minister was non-affiliated, the following discussion (regarding the factors *W* and *P*) transfers the focus from the prime minister party to the largest party in the coalition (DP’S’).

<sup>12</sup> Expert survey data is not available for the 1995 election in Latvia.

<sup>13</sup> Finland is a unicameral parliamentary republic with a legislature, *Eduskunta*, consisting of 200 members. The members are elected proportionally for four-year terms from 14 multi-seat constituencies and one single-member district. The party system is stable and relatively fragmented, and governments have usually (since the 1970s) been stable, and somewhat over-sized, majority cabinets where any two of the three biggest parties have formed the basis of the coalition (see Karvonen, 2014: 15–17, 73–79).

<sup>14</sup> On the 11-point scale (0–10) used in the CHES data, VAS is located at 1.8 in 1999 and at 2.0 in 2002. This is to the right of the mean values (1.61 and 1.43, respectively) for the European radical left family (excluding the French social-liberal PRG, which is (mis)classified as a radical left party in the CHES data).

<sup>15</sup> The negative cases are PCF 1993, PCF 2007 (a), LN 2006, LN 2013, BE 2011, IU 2000 and IU-UPe 2015 in minterm 01, and Attack 2005, DF1998, VGF 1999, PRC 1992 (b), CDU 2011, IU 1996 and FPÖ 2006 in minterm 49.

<sup>16</sup> A party emphasize an issue if it is highly salient in the party’s manifestos, campaigns etc. (Budge, 2015: 764–766). An issue is ‘owned’ by a party if there is an identification between the party and the issue, or if the party is considered particularly competent to handle the issue (Walgrave et al., 2015: 778, 780).

## References

Akkerman T, de Lange SL and Rooduijn M (2016) Inclusion and mainstreaming? Radical right-wing populist parties in the new millennium. In: Akkerman T, de Lange SL and Rooduijn M (eds) *Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?* Abingdon: Routledge, pp.1–28.

- Allern EH (2010) Survival of a majority coalition: The Norwegian parliamentary election of 14 September 2009. *West European Politics* 33(4): 904–912.
- Andersen JG (2003) The general election in Denmark, November 2001. *Electoral Studies* 38(1): 186–193.
- Andeweg RB, De Winter L and Dumont P (eds) (2011) *Puzzles of Government Formation: Coalition Theory and Deviant Cases*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Arter D (1999) The Swedish general election of 20th September 1998: A victory for values over policies? *Electoral Studies* 18(2): 296–300.
- Auers D (2013) Latvia. In: Berglund S et al. (eds) *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (3rd ed.) Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp.85–123.
- Auers D and Kasekamp A (2015) The impact of radical right parties in the Baltic states. In: Minkenberg M (ed.) *Transforming the Transformation? The East European Radical Right in the Political Process*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp.137–153.
- Bakker R et al. (2015) Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey trend file, 1999–2010. *Party Politics* 21(1): 143–152.
- Beach D and Pedersen RB (2013) *Process-tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Beach D and Rohlfing I (2018) Integrating cross-case analyses and process-tracing in set-theoretic research: Strategies and parameters of debate. *Sociological Methods and Research* 47(1): 3–36.
- Bennett A and Checkel JT (2015) Process tracing: From philosophical roots to best practices. In: Bennett A and Checkel JT (eds) *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.3–37.
- Berglund S (1995) The Finnish parliamentary election of 1995. *Electoral Studies* 14(4): 461–464.
- Bloom S (2011) The 2010 Latvian parliamentary elections. *Electoral Studies* 30(2): 379–383.
- Budge I (2015) Issue emphases, saliency theory and issue ownership: A historical and conceptual analysis. *West European Politics* 38(4): 761–777.
- Budge I and Keman H (1990) *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chari R (2004) The 2004 Spanish election: Terrorism as a catalyst for change? *West European Politics* 27(5): 954–963.
- Chiocchetti P (2017) *The Radical Left Party Family in Western Europe, 1989–2015*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Corkill D (2000) Portugal’s October 1999 election: Not quite a foregone conclusion. *West European Politics* 23(3): 201–206.
- Davies PJ and Ozolins AV (1996) The Latvian parliamentary election of 1995. *Electoral Studies* 15(1): 124–128.
- de Lange SL (2008) Radical right-wing populist parties in government: Determinants of coalition membership. Paper presented at the Politics of Change Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
- Delgado I and Lopez Nieto L (2005) Spain. *European Journal of Political Research* 44(7–8): 1188–1194.

- Democratic Party ‘Saimnieks’ (1995) 9. Демократическая партия Саймниекс [9. Democratic Party ‘Saimnieks’ (electoral manifesto)]. Retrieved from [https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp\\_dashboard\\_dataset/](https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/).
- Dunphy R (2007) In search of an identity: Finland’s Left Alliance and the experience of coalition government. *Contemporary Politics* 13(1): 37–55.
- Dunphy R (2010) A poisoned chalice? Finland’s Left Alliance and the perils of government. In: Olsen J, Koř M and Hough D (eds) *Left Parties in National Governments*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.69–86.
- For Fatherland and Freedom (1995) 14. Объединение Тевземей ун Бривибай [14. Union For Fatherland and Freedom (electoral manifesto)]. Retrieved from [https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp\\_dashboard\\_dataset/](https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/).
- George AL and Bennett A (2005) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gerring J (2004) What is a case study and what is it good for? *American Political Science Review* 98(2): 341–354.
- Gerring J (2007) The mechanistic worldview: Thinking inside the box. *British Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 161–179.
- Gerring J (2008) *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gerring J (2017) *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. (2nd ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goertz G (2017) *Multimethod Research, Causal Mechanisms, and Case Studies: An Integrated Approach*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gyárfášová O and Meseřnikov G (2015) Actors, agenda, and appeal of the radical nationalist right in Slovakia. In: Minkenberg M (ed.) *Transforming the Transformation? The East European Radical Right in the Political Process*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp.224–248.
- Ignazi P (2002) Italy. *European Journal of Political Research* 41(7–8): 992–1000.
- Ignazi P (2009) Italy. *European Journal of Political Research* 48(7–8): 998–1005.
- Ikstens J (2011) Latvia. *European Journal of Political Research* 50(7–8): 1035–1044.
- Ikstens J (2012) Latvia. *European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook* 51(1): 175–186.
- Ikstens J (2013) Latvia. *European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook* 52(1): 134–139.
- Ikstens J (2014) Latvia. *European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook* 53(1): 198–204.
- Ikstens J (2015) Latvia. *European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook* 54(1): 181–189.
- Jasiewicz K and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz A (2002) Poland. *European Journal of Political Research* 41(7–8): 1057–1067.
- Jehlička P, Kostelecký T and Šýkora L (1993) Czechoslovak parliamentary elections 1990: Old patterns, new trends and lots of surprises. In: O’Loughlin J and van der Wusten H (eds) *The New Political Geography of Eastern Europe*. London: Belhaven Press, pp.235–254.

- Karvonen L (2014) *Parties, Governments and Voters in Finland: Politics under Fundamental Societal Transformation*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Kolstø P and Tsilevich B (1997) Patterns of nation building and political integration in a bifurcated postcommunist state: Ethnic aspects on parliamentary elections in Latvia. *East European Politics and Society* 11(2): 366–391.
- Kostadinova P and Popova M (2014) The 2013 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria. *Electoral Studies* 34: 365–368.
- Lancaster TD (1994) A new phase for Spanish democracy? The general election of June 1993. *West European Politics* 17(1): 183–190.
- Left Alliance (1998) Ihmisen kokoinen unelma: Vasemmistoliiton poliittinen tavoiteohjelma puoluekokouskaudelle 1998–2001 [A human-sized dream: Target program for the Left Alliance for the period 1998–2001 (electoral manifesto)]. Retrieved from <http://www.fsd-uta.fi/pohtiva/ohjelmalistat/VAS/811>.
- Lieberman ES (2005) Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative research. *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 435–452.
- Lisi M (2010) The renewal of the socialist majority: The 2009 Portuguese legislative elections. *West European Politics* 33(2): 381–388.
- Luther KR (2003) The self-destruction of a right-wing populist party? The Austrian parliamentary election of 2002. *West European Politics* 26(2): 136–152.
- Mackie JL (1965) Causes and conditions. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 2(4): 245–264.
- Madeley J (1995) The return of the Swedish social democracy: Phoenix or ostrich? *West European Politics* 18(2): 422–428.
- March L (2012) *Radical Left Parties in Europe*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- March L (2016) Radical left ‘success’ before and after the great recession. In: March L and Keith D (eds) *Europe’s Radical Left: From Marginality to the Mainstream?* London: Rowman and Littlefield, pp.27–50.
- Millard F (2003) Elections in Poland 2001: Electoral manipulation and party upheaval. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 36(1): 69–86.
- Minkenbergh M (2015) Profiles, patterns, process: Studying the East European radical right in its political environment. In: Minkenbergh M (ed.) *Transforming the Transformation? The East European Radical Right in the Political Process*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp.27–56.
- Minkenbergh M (2017) *The Radical Right in Eastern Europe: Democracy under Siege?* New York: Palgrave Pivot.
- Morris HM (2004) President, party and nationality policy in Latvia, 1991–1999. *Europe-Asia Studies* 56(4): 543–569.
- Mudde C (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- National Alliance (2011) Nacionālā apvienība ‘Visu Latvijai!-Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK’: Priekšvēlēšanu programma 2011. gada 17. septembra 11. Saeimas vēlēšanas [National Alliance ‘All for Latvia!-For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK’: Electoral manifesto for the election to the 11th Saeima on 17th September 2011]. Retrieved from <https://www.cvk.lv/cgi-bin/wdbcgiw/base/komisijas2010.CVKAND11.progr?NR=4>.

- Nurmi H and Nurmi L (2001) The 1999 parliamentary elections in Finland. *Electoral Studies* 20(1): 147–157.
- Olsen J, Hough D and Koß M (2010) Conclusion: Left parties in national governments. In: Olsen J, Koß M and Hough D (eds) *Left Parties in National Governments*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.173–185.
- Paastela J (1991) *The Finnish Communist Party in the Finnish Political System 1963–1982*. Tampere: University of Tampere.
- Pabriks A and Štokenberga A (2006) Political parties and the party system in Latvia. In: Jungerstam-Mulders S (ed.) *Post-communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp.51–67.
- Pettai V and Kreuzer M (1999) Party politics in the Baltic states: Social bases and institutional context. *East European Politics and Society* 13(1): 148–189.
- Pryce P (2012) The 2011 parliamentary election in Latvia. *Electoral Studies* 31(3): 613–616.
- Pytlas B and Kossack O (2015) Lighting the fuse: The impact of radical right parties on party competition in Central and Eastern Europe. In: Minkenberg M (ed.) *Transforming the Transformation? The East European Radical Right in the Political Process*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp.105–136.
- Rohlfing I (2012) *Case Studies and Causal Inference: An Integrative Framework*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rohlfing I and Schneider CQ (2018) A unifying framework for causal analysis in set-theoretic multi-method research. *Sociological Methods and Research* 41(1): 37–63.
- Rori L (2016) The 2015 Greek parliamentary elections: From great expectations to no expectations. *West European Politics* 39(6): 1323–1343.
- Sartori G (1976) *Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schimmelfennig F (2015) Efficient process tracing: Analyzing the causal mechanisms of European integration. In: Bennett A and Checkel JT (eds) *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.98–125.
- Schneider CQ and Rohlfing I (2013) Combining QCA and process tracing in set-theoretic multi-method research. *Sociological Methods and Research* 42(4): 559–597.
- Schneider CQ and Rohlfing I (2016) Case studies nested in fuzzy-set QCA on sufficiency: Formalizing case selection and causal inference. *Sociological Methods and Research* 45(3): 526–568.
- Sitter N (2006) Norway’s Storting election of September 2005: Back to the left? *West European Politics* 29(3): 573–580.
- Smith-Sivertsen H (1998) Latvia. In: Berglund S, Hellén T and Aarebrot FH (eds) *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp.89–119.
- Spirova M (2010) The 2009 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria. *Electoral Studies* 29(2): 276–278.
- Sundberg J (1996) Finland. *European Journal of Political Research* 30(3–4): 321–330.
- Sundberg J (2000) Finland. *European Journal of Political Research* 38(3–4): 374–381.
- Sundberg J (2003) Finland. *European Journal of Political Research* 42(7–8): 940–942.

- Thiem A (2018) QCApro: advanced functionality for performing and evaluating qualitative comparative analysis. R package version 1.1-2.
- Unity (2011) Vienotība: Priekšvēlēšanu programma 2011. gada 17. septembra 11. Saeimas vēlēšanas [Unity: Electoral manifesto for the election to the 11th Saeima on 17th September 2011]. Retrieved from <https://www.cvk.lv/cgi-bin/wdbcgiw/base/komisijas2010.CV-KAND11.progr?NR=2>.
- Van Evera S (1997) *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Volkens A et al. (2017) The Manifesto data collection. [Dataset, version 2017b.] Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).
- Walgrave S, Tresch A and Lefevere J (2015) The conceptualisation and measurement of issue ownership. *West European Politics* 38(4): 778–796.
- Widfeldt A (2003) Sweden. *European Journal of Political Research* 42(7–8): 1091–1101.
- Wightman G and Szomolányi S (1995) Parties and society in Slovakia. *Party Politics* 1(4): 609–618.
- Wilson A (2009) The Italian election of April 2008: A political earthquake? *West European Politics* 32(1): 215–225.
- Ysmal C (1998) France. *European Journal of Political Research* 34(3–4): 393–401.











## Tables and figures

Table 1: Government inclusion of radical parties (parsimonious solution)

	<b>INCL</b>	<b>COV</b>	<b>Raw COV</b>	<b>Unique COV</b>	<b>Total N</b>	<b>Unique N</b>	<b>TLCs<sup>a</sup></b>
<i>SWCP</i>	0.815		0.234	0.135	17	14	2
<i>SW¬RP</i>	0.775		0.123	0.041	5	2	0
<i>WCR¬P</i>	0.595		0.059	0.018	1	1	0
<i>sm<sub>2</sub></i>	0.762	0.293			20		

*Note:* The analysis was performed using the QCApro package for R. See Thiem, A. “QCApro: Advanced Functionality for Performing and Evaluating Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” R package version 1.1-2, 2018. Conservative solution:  $MSW¬RP \vee M¬SWCR¬P \vee SWCRP$ .

<sup>a</sup> True logical contradictions, i.e. cases with high ( $> 0.5$ ) membership in the endogenous factor and low ( $< 0.5$ ) membership in the conjunction.

Table 2: Typical cases

<b>Term</b>	<b>Most typical case(s)</b>	<b><math>S_T</math></b>
<i>SWCP</i>	NA 2011 (a, b)	0.000
<i>SW¬RP</i>	TB 1995 (a, b)	0.761
<i>WCR¬P</i>	VAS 1999	0.561

*Note:* The other cases corresponding to path *SWCP* are DF in 2007, ERSP in 1992, LN in 1994, LVP in 1995 (a), NA in 2014, TB/LNNK in 1998 (a–c) and LPF in 2002, FPÖ in 1999, DF in 2005, TB/LNNK in 2006 (c–d) and the logical contradictions LVP 1995 (b) and FrP 1997 (a). The other cases corresponding to path *SW¬RP* are DF in 2005 and TB/LNNK in 2006 (c–d).

Table 3: The 2011 parliamentary election in Latvia

<b>Party</b>	<b>Position (L–R)</b>	<b>Position (sociocult.)</b>	<b>Votes (pct)</b>	<b>ΔVotes (pct pts)</b>	<b>Seats (N)</b>	<b>ΔSeats (N)</b>
SC	Centre-left	0.00	28.4	2.4	31	2
ZRP*	Centre-right	2.83	20.8	(n/a)	22	(n/a)
V*	Centre-right	2.40	18.8	−12.4	20	−13
NA*	Radical right	1.77	13.9	6.2	14	6
ZZS(*)	Centre-right	3.43	12.2	−7.5	13	−9
Other			5.9		0	

*Note:* The information in column 2 broadly indicates the general left–right location (radical left, centre-left, centre-right or radical right) of the party. Agrarian, Christian democratic, conservative and liberal parties are classified as centre-right, social democratic and labour parties as centre-left and green parties as either centre-left or centre-right, depending on context. The data in column 3 gives the sociocultural position of the electoral manifesto (see Fagerholm, “How...” for more information), and the data in 4–7 the electoral results (based on Auers, “Latvia”, 113).

\* = government party 2011–2014 (ZZS only included in Straujuma I).

Table 4: The 1995 parliamentary election in Latvia

<b>Party</b>	<b>Position (L–R)</b>	<b>Position (sociocult.)</b>	<b>Votes (pct)</b>	<b>ΔVotes (pct pts)</b>	<b>Seats (N)</b>	<b>ΔSeats (N)</b>
DP <sup>“S”</sup> *	Centre-left	2.40	15.2	10.4 <sup>c</sup>	18	13 <sup>c</sup>
LC*	Centre-right	2.04	14.7	−17.7	17	−19
ZP	Centre-right	0.00	14.9	(n/a)	16	(n/a)
TB*	Radical right	2.71	11.9	6.5	14	8
LVP <sup>(*)</sup>	Radical left	3.04	7.2	7.1	8	8
LZS*/KDS <sup>(*)</sup>	Alliance <sup>a</sup>	3.56	6.3	−9.4 <sup>d</sup>	8	−10 <sup>d</sup>
LNNK*/LZP*	Alliance <sup>b</sup>	2.40	6.3	−8.3 <sup>e</sup>	8	−7 <sup>e</sup>
TSP	Centre-left	0.00	5.6	−6.4 <sup>f</sup>	6	−7 <sup>f</sup>
LSP	Radical left	0.96	5.6	(n/a)	5	(n/a)
Other			12.5		0	

*Note:* For further information on columns 2–7, see note to table 3. The data in columns 4–7 is based on Auers, “Latvia”, 110–111.

\* = government party 1995–1998 (LVP only included in Šķēle I, KDS only in Šķēle II).

<sup>a</sup> Both LZS and KDS can be classified as centre-right parties. <sup>b</sup> LNNK can be classified as radical right, LZP as centre-right. <sup>c</sup> Compared to the result for the main predecessor Latvian Democratic Party in 1993. <sup>d</sup> Compared to the aggregated result for LZS and KDS in 1993. <sup>e</sup> Compared to the aggregated result for LNNK and LZP in 1993. <sup>f</sup> Compared to the result for Harmony for Latvia in 1993.

Table 5: The 1999 parliamentary election in Finland

<b>Party</b>	<b>Position (L–R)</b>	<b>Position (socioecon.)</b>	<b>Votes (pct)</b>	<b>ΔVotes (pct pts)</b>	<b>Seats (N)</b>	<b>ΔSeats (N)</b>
SDP*	Centre-left	2.56	22.9	−5.4	51	−12
KESK	Centre-right	1.44	22.4	2.6	48	4
KOK*	Centre-right	3.71	21.0	3.1	46	7
VAS*	Radical left	−0.88	10.9	−0.3	20	−2
SFP*	Centre-right	3.22	5.5 <sup>a</sup>	0.0 <sup>a</sup>	12 <sup>a</sup>	0 <sup>a</sup>
VIHR*	Centre-left	−0.36	7.3	0.8	11	2
SKL	Centre-right	1.61	4.2	1.2	10	3
REM	Centre-right	(n/a)	1.0	(n/a)	1	(n/a)
PS	Radical right	0.57	1.0	−0.3 <sup>b</sup>	1	0 <sup>b</sup>
Other			3.8		0	

*Note:* For further information on columns 2–7, see note to table 3. The data in columns 4–7 is based on Sundberg, J. “Finland.” *European Journal of Political Research* 30 (3–4) (1996), 321–322 and Sundberg, “Finland” (2000), 374–375.

\* = government party 1999–2003.

<sup>a</sup> Including the seat from the unilingual Swedish one-member district Åland Islands. <sup>b</sup> Compared to the result for the Finnish Rural Party in 1995.

Table 6: Truth table rows (minterms) with both positive and negative cases

Min-term	Exo. factors						End. factor ( <i>N</i> of cases)		Deviant case(s) for coverage <sup>a</sup>
	<i>M</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>P</i>	1	0	
01	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7	<b>ANEL 2015</b>
08	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	3	<b>IU 2004</b> , LN 2001 (a, b)
20	0	1	0	0	1	1	3	7	<b>PRM 1992 (a, b, c)</b>
37	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	3	<b>SNS 1992 (b)</b> , V 2002
38	1	0	0	1	0	1	3	3	<b>LPR 2005 (b)</b> , SV 2005, SV 2009
40	1	0	0	1	1	1	3	1	SF 1994, SV 1993, <b>FPÖ 2002 (a)</b>
41	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	3	<b>VAS 2011 (a)</b> , PTT 2012
45	1	0	1	1	0	0	3	4	<b>PRC 1996 (a)</b> , SNS 1992 (c), SF 2011 (a)
48	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	4	<b>TB/LNNK 2002 (d)</b>
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	7	<b>Attack 2013</b>
50	1	1	0	0	0	1	2	3	<b>ZRS 1994</b> , SNS 2006
52	1	1	0	0	1	1	3	6	<b>PUNR 1992 (a, b, c)</b>
53	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	3	V 1998, <b>DF 2001</b> , Attack 2009
54	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	2	<b>LN 2008</b> , PCF 1997 (a)
55	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	<b>SF 1998</b>
56	1	1	0	1	1	1	5	8	<b>V 2014</b> , PRC 2006, SRP 2005 (b), VAS 1995, United Patriots 2017
61	1	1	1	1	0	0	3	8	<b>PVV 2010</b> , TB/LNNK 2006 (a, b)

<sup>a</sup> The column lists the positive cases included in each configuration. The most deviant case(s) of each row are in **bold**.







Figure 1: (Enhanced) XY plot



(a) "Feasible allies"



(b) "Radical partners"



(c) "Moderate followers"

Figure 2: Three paths to government for radical parties

*Note:* Parentheses indicate that the INUS-status of the factor is questionable. <sup>1</sup> = Descriptive relevance.