Where are the welfare losses of imperfect competition large?

Johan Willner*, Leila Ståhl

*Korresponderande författare för detta arbete

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8 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

The welfare losses of imperfect competition have usually been analysed using detailed information about sales, costs and profits. We present a procedure for finding the potential welfare losses which needs only demand elasticity and an indicator of concentration. The models are based on Coutnot-Nash oligopoly, collusion and Stackelberg leadership, including cases where a price taking fringe exists. When using Finnish four digit industries as an example, it turns out that the potential deadweight losses may be a matter of concern.

OriginalspråkEngelska
Sidor (från-till)477-490
Antal sidor14
TidskriftEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volym8
Utgåva3
DOI
StatusPublicerad - okt 1992
MoE-publikationstypA1 Tidskriftsartikel-refererad

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