What was already there: On scepticism and the fundamental reference of signification

The first half of the paper discusses Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysics in the Philosophical Investigations, of why metaphysical uses of language are idling, by examining the rationale and method of inquiry informing Descartes’ first principle of philosophy. The focus will be on clarifying how it is that metaphysical language use reproduces, or manifests, the very sickness of thought it is supposed to cure. In the second half, the paper discusses in what sense, and to what extent, the critique of metaphysics eliminates the relevance of the kinds of concerns that underpin metaphysics. The proposal is that while the central problem with metaphysical uses of language lies in its excessive urge to subdue its philosophical concerns to questions of knowledge, Philosophical Investigations brings to light the essentially moral-existential nature of these concerns, particularly the question of the essence of signification.