Policy objectives and performance in a mixed market with bargaining

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Sammanfattning

We analyse a mixed duopoly in which wages and salaries are determined by Nash bargaining and where the public firm's unit costs depend on its objectives. Because of constant returns to scale, welfare maximisation without restriction would eliminate or significantly weaken the private firm. Therefore, we focus on constrained welfare maximisation, in which case unit costs are normally higher in the public firm. On the other hand, the private firm may even earn more than in a monopoly if the public firm maximises profits or if the constraint offers too much protection.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Sidor (från-till)137-145
Antal sidor9
TidskriftInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volym17
Utgåva1
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 1 jan 1999
MoE-publikationstypA1 Tidskriftsartikel-refererad

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