G. H. von Wright on Agent Self-Understanding and Action Explanation

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This paper is about G. H. von Wright’s views on the role of agent self-understanding for action explanation. The paper argues that contrary to both von Wright himself and to contemporary interpreters, von Wright’s later account does give a privileged role to the agent’s self-understanding in action explanation. This is because von Wright’s later account still gives primacy to the agent’s effectual reasons. However, von Wright’s account still offers significant insights into the complex role of agent self-understanding in action explanation. In order properly to understand what those insights are, it is important to emphasize that von Wright’s account presupposes a certain conception of what it means to explain action.

Ingår i: On the human condition : philosophical essays in honour of the centennial anniversary of Georg Henrik von Wright. Red. Ilkka Niiniluoto, Thomas Wallgren. Helsinki: Societas philosophica Fennica, 2017.ISBN 978-951-9264-86-8

Sidor (från-till)313–324
TidskriftActa Philosophica Fennica
StatusPublicerad - 2017
MoE-publikationstypA1 Tidskriftsartikel-refererad

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