Speaking Souls

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On Expressing Attitudes and Showing Faith

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Introduction

If my son comes home all wet and I *say* "You didn't have an umbrella with you today", I *show* my understanding of rain and how to decrease its effects. I know you get wet from walking in the rain, and I know that an umbrella might help to alleviate that wetness. If I see someone falling in the street and I say "Do you need help?", I *show* my understanding of pain and its possibly debilitating impact on human action and movement. But if I go to bed and do not give any thought to, let alone *say* anything about, the possibility that my partner could stab me with a knife while I sleep, then what does my behavior *show*?

One answer philosophers have wanted to give to this question is that it shows our trust in people. But not in the ordinary way I may trust a friend to help me out when I am in trouble. What my behavior shows, these philosophers have said, is a kind of *basic* trust in my relation to my partner, or in my relation to other people *per se*.

Olli Lagerspetz has partly questioned this intuition. He has, both in writing but more vividly in my memory of different discussions, remarked on the seeming peculiarity in saying that I trust my partner not to stab me in my sleep. I do not, he has emphasized, even consider this a possibility! If we as philosophers here speak of a basic trust, we thus misrepresent the matter. We fail to make clear that in many cases in which we can be said by others to simply trust, the kind of attitude we take to another changes if we attempt to speak about it, or try to justify this attitude or relation to the other by

putting it into words. This thought in some ways seems to mirror the earlier Wittgenstein's concern that we cannot *speak* about what can only be *shown*.

In a discussion of the role of trust in conversation, David Cockburn (2022) responds to Olli's concern that philosophers speak too lightheartedly about "trust" when they claim that trust, or basic trust, is always an aspect of our relations. Owing his formulation to Knud E. Løgstrup, Cockburn too seems to suggest that trust is always an aspect of our conversations. However, he thinks that this emphasis on the role of trust in conversation only makes sense against the background of a philosophical tradition whose framing of the questions has been characterized by *doubt*. He thus opens for the possibility that we in some situations may be called upon to speak in ways that in other contexts appear as unspeakable. This may be taken to suggest a peculiarity in forms of speech that appear to be more narrowly ethical.

In this article, I consider these issues in the context of a discussion of what it means to think of the attitude I take to another human being, or other human beings, as an attitude towards a soul. I discuss why such ways of speaking should not be read as offering theoretical justification of the claim that other people have souls but as expressive of an attitude we may take to another being. But I also question attempts to ethically ground certain ways of perceiving other human beings by attending to such attitudes, and finally suggest that such sayings do not just invoke an ethical perspective, as Olli together with Lars Hertzberg propose, but can be seen as ways of speaking from "a religious point of view" (Rhees 1984, 94), involving not just trust but a leap of faith.

My presentation of the issue is heavily indebted to David Cockburn's understanding of these questions,[1] but it is at the same time a continuation of the dialogue on trust that Olli has been central in furthering at the research seminars at Åbo Akademi University

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[1]   In fact, the bulk of my paper, in section 1 and 2, builds on an essay written for a course on "Later Wittgenstein" that David Cockburn gave and that I attended in 1998–99 at the University of Wales, Lampeter.

during my years of both studying, researching and teaching philosophy there.

1. An attitude towards a soul

I cannot pinpoint my first encounter with Wittgenstein's remark, "My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul." (Wittgenstein 2009, § II:22), but I know that a seminar course based on the manuscript of Cockburn's *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Souls, Science and Human Beings* (2001) in my second year of studying philosophy played a crucial role in changing my perception of the relationship between the human body and mind, as well as interpersonal understanding. Two years after the seminar I relate my experience of the shift it occasioned in the following way.

One of the first thoughts that struck me when I encountered Wittgenstein's remark that our attitude towards other human beings is "an attitude towards a soul" was that with this idea, much of the importance I had previously seen in the question whether human beings have souls or not disappeared. Before that, I had often had the feeling that, with the decreasing influence of the church and the Christian faith, we were slowly losing what grounds we might have had for acting morally towards our fellow human beings. I am not sure if I can describe exactly what my concerns were at this point, but they went in the direction that, if there were no such thing as a soul to the human being, there would be no justification for treating human beings in the special way the Judaeo-Christian tradition demands of us. Without a concept of a soul, there would, as I saw it, be no reason for treating a human being any differently than an animal, a tree or a stone, bearing in mind the great differences there are in how we treat these. There would, I thought, be no reason for regarding the human being as something special, no reason for valuing and respecting the human life.

To be able to defend our moral behavior, which I wanted to maintain unaltered, it then seemed as if we needed to provide a definite description of what a human being is, to make sense of the

idea that a human being is to be treated in some other way than an animal, a tree or a stone. As I tried to find such a description of what a human being is, I looked for something that could be understood in terms of a non-religious soul, or, to escape the religious connotations, a mind, an entity that possessed certain qualities such as thinking or self-consciousness. Saying what this "something" was, much less finding it, or what the words "soul" or "mind" were meant to refer to, was of course very difficult, but the temptation to say, as Cockburn has put it (2022, 4), that the "real person" was something other than the human body was still very strong.

Through engaging with Wittgenstein's remark, however, the question whether human beings have souls, or what a soul, or a mind is, lost much of its appeal. The question that now started to occupy me, was not so much whether we can be said to have souls or not, or how we could understand the notion of a soul. The point was that we react to human beings as we react to souls, and that this was where we needed to start if we wanted to know what is meant with words such as "souls" and "human beings".

Already looking back on my old thinking a few years on in my studies, I had some difficulties in understanding that this was the way I thought about these things. I could, however, still remember the struggle I had with some of these questions and the importance I attached to finding an answer to them. I still think I was right in suggesting that this shows the powerful grip the Christian division between body and soul and the Cartesian division between body and mind has had on our thinking, including mine. We seem to be tempted to think about human beings in this way; it seems to be very easy to see the real human being or the real person as something else than the body and to attach more value to this unobservable non-bodily being than to the bodily being standing in front of us.

Our being drawn to this picture of a human being, however, does not only reflect the impact certain philosophical or religious traditions has had on our way of thinking. There seems to be something more in our lives that tempts us to think in these ways, even if it is probably impossible to state exactly what. Descartes was not simply

stupid or mistaken. He rather caught on to something that everyone of us has experienced who ever wondered whether they in fact were alone in the world or if they ever really could understand other people.

My first reading of Wittgenstein's remark also feels as quite a crude reading of what he is saying. I think however that there is something important in the way I first understood it. With the remark, Wittgenstein wanted to direct our attention away from one way of looking at the questions involved. He wanted to show that the questions we are asking are the wrong questions, that we, in a way, are looking in the wrong place when we are both asking and trying to answer these questions.

The question is not whether I can be justified in thinking that other people have minds or souls, or a mental life like my own. The point that Wittgenstein wants to make is rather that we respond to human beings in a certain way, without having any further justification for it. We take a certain attitude toward other human being that is not grounded in opinions about what kind of beings they are, but rather presupposes responses of this sort. These reactions, what Wittgenstein sometimes calls primitive reactions, do not build on certain thoughts or ideas, which would justify us responding in this way. Rather, our thoughts and ideas build on such responses. The "behaviour is pre-linguistic … a language-game is based *on it, …* it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought." (Wittgenstein 1967, 541). In the next section, I will discuss how we are to understand these remarks in relation to the Cartesian picture of the human being as consisting of two parts, a material body and an immaterial mind or soul. I will then return to the kind of understanding these remarks can provide if not seen as providing us with another form of grounding of our thought.

2. The best picture of the soul?

One of the main problems I now see in my initial attempt to answer the question whether human beings have souls or not, is that it is very difficult to grasp what the question is about. How can I separate

something like a soul or a mind from the living human being that I meet? What would it even mean for me to think of them as not possessing this soul or mind? As John W. Cook (1969) says in an early attempt of stating the problem of other minds in relation to Wittgenstein's writing, there is something awry in asking "Do other people have a mental life, as I do?" since asking that of other *people* already comes with the acknowledgement that they are people, that is, beings with a mental life, thoughts, feelings and so on. When we are posing the philosophical question about other minds, Cook points out, our interest is not to find out whether any particular person has a mental life, is able to think and feel, as in a case where they are in a coma. The question rather seems to be, "Are the things that I take to be people really people, that is, do they have thoughts and emotions and so on?" (Cook 1969, 121). If this is the question, it is indeed very difficult to answer. If they are not human beings, then what are they? What could they be? When I look at other human beings, talk to them and so on, it is very difficult for me to think of them as something else than a human being, such as a statue or a machine. There does not seem to be room for the doubt to creep in that the "thing" I have in front of me, is not a human being.

Descartes's meditations, however, seem to leave room for such a doubt. His thought experiment works on the assumption that, when I look at other human beings, I could imagine that they were mere bodies or automata, moving around by some strange force but not having minds as we do. Wittgenstein responds to this idea when he asks, "But, can't I imagine that the people around me are automata" (Wittgenstein 2009, § 420). In response to such a question he says, he can picture "people with fixed looks (as in a trance) going about their business" (Wittgenstein 2009, § 420). When he tries to imagine that "[t]he children over there are mere automata; all their liveliness is mere automatism" however, the words only become meaningless or produce an "uncanny feeling" (Wittgenstein 2009, § 420). In other words, even if we, like Wittgenstein, can picture people as machines in some circumstances, allowing that it can be a bit uncanny, there is something strikingly difficult in pressing the picture of machines on human beings in their ordinary circumstances, at

least not without getting the feeling that something weird is going on.

Now, Wittgenstein claims that this is not because I believe or am certain that they are not automata. I do not see them as automata because I am justified in the belief that they are something else, namely human beings. I see them, first and foremost, as human beings and this is something that is more basic than anything I can entertain any beliefs about. Saying "'I believe that he is not an auto-maton', just like that, so far makes no sense." (Wittgenstein 2009, § II:22). At least not in the way we can recognize sentences like "I be-lieve she is tired after being up so late," or "I believe he is not coming, if he is not here yet" can make perfect sense in some easily imaginable contexts. In contrast to these sentences, "I believe that he is not an automation" does not carry with it any self-evident meaning. It is, for instance, unclear what it would be to be uncertain that he is not an automaton, in the way we can be uncertain whether someone will make a meeting on time, due to oversleeping because of partying too much, or failing to get a bus because the bus drivers are on strike.

In renouncing the idea that we could provide justification for holding these attitudes to other people, Wittgenstein distances him-self from the idea that we could provide an intellectual argument for seeing people in this way. Instead, he inquires into the pictures of the human being we bring into our philosophizing, and the picture of the human being that seems to lend support to the Cartesian separation of body and mind. It is, as it were, only possible to doubt whether other beings are the same as I am, if I start seeing the mind as something distinct from the bodily being, if I see it as the "real person" behind the veil of the body. For, the Cartesian argument goes, whereas I am directly conscious of the "real person", the mind, in myself, I am never directly conscious of the "real person" in the other beings I meet. I am only confronted with their bodies and can only infer indirectly that they have minds as I do.

However, as Cook remarks, there is something "highly extra-ordinary" in the use we make of the word "body" to present this Cartesian picture of body-mind dualism. There is nothing in this

use of the word that reminds us of how we think of bodies, when we say things like, "'His body was covered with mosquito bites', 'His body was found at the bottom of the cliff', 'He has a strong body but no brains'" (Cook 1969, 123–4). In none of these cases do we rely on a distinction between him and his body. We do not, for instance, say, "His body, but not his mind, was covered with mosquito bites", and might just as well say, "He was covered with mosquito bites" (Cook 1969, 124). Furthermore, Cook makes the point that when we are just talking about a person's "body", we are sometimes talking about the dead. We use the word body to describe a corpse. This contributes to the uncanniness of imagining other human beings as mere automata, since it seems to invite us to think of other people in zombie-like ways as moving corpses, the mind or the soul as a Rylean "ghost in the machine" (1955).

To expel the hold such ghost stories have on our thinking, Wittgenstein remarks, "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (Wittgenstein 2009, § II:25). This remark follows his remark that "my attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul" (Wittgenstein 2009, § II:22). It suggests that we may be helped by thinking of the human body itself as soulful (in terms of "full of soul"). On the Cartesian view, the bodily movements of another in themselves appear to have become empty of meaning. They derive any possible meaning they may have only from the mind behind the movements. This suggests that seeing other beings doing various things is a matter of seeing limbs moving purposelessly, muscles contracting and so on. But this, Wittgenstein suggests, is not the way in which we usually see others. We see movements with a purpose, and people acting for reasons. We see people walking in the street, waving their arms in greeting each other, or writhing on the ground in pain. There is no step where we just see the bodily movements, and then go on to infer that they are walking to the shop, waving at passers-by or writhing in pain. We do not see the multitude of individual movements that goes to form the walking, waving or writhing, we simply recognize and describe the person as doing these things. This does not exclude that we at times can also be puzzled about what a person is doing, and what their movements

are aiming at. However, it is perhaps primarily the moments of puzzlement that give us an idea of bodily movement as distinct from meaningful actions and reactions in the first place.

At the forefront of Wittgenstein's thought is thus the living human being, not a body in motion. As he writes in a remark to which Cockburn repeatedly returns (cf. Kronqvist 2023), "only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious" (Wittgenstein 2009, § 281). As in the case of bodily movements, this remark reminds us that we do not come to the conclusion that another is joyful, angry, afraid or in pain by inferring to an inner state from the measurements or the physiognomy of their faces. We see joy, anger, pain or fear in people's faces and that we do so comes to show in how we speak of these emotions (Wittgenstein 1967, § 225). In other words, the joy, anger and so on, we see in somebody's face are not external to our concepts of "joy", "anger", "pain", or "fear", and are not some behavior that merely might accompany our inner feelings. A baby responding to its mother's smile with a smile, you feeling intimidated by my angry look, perhaps wanting to hide from it, him nervously looking around when someone's eyes fill with fear, her reacting to someone groaning and clutching their foot by tending to the foot (cf. Wittgenstein 1967, § 540–541), and attending to the other person, show what it means to understand others as joyful, angry, afraid or in pain.

In asking us to acknowledge the other living human being, with all its vitality and variety of expressions, as part of how we come to understand others as feeling, thinking, and seeing, Wittgenstein also calls for a reconsideration of how we think of ourselves in relation to another. The Cartesian story, and other similar stories, about the mind as the real person behind the body, promotes a picture of an individual thrown into the world, already equipped with the knowledge of minds and sensations needed to make sense of themselves. He (because he often seems to be a he) knows what it is to be conscious, to see and hear, feel pain, joy, anger or fear. He knows this because he can refer to his own private experience. He does not,

however, know whether other people have similar experiences when they talk about pain, joy, anger and fear. Considering that he is a rational, intelligent being, however, he manages to conclude that, since the other beings behave as he does, they do also, with most probability, feel as he does. The possibility that he has made a mistake, however, always lurks in the background.

The problem with this idea is that we do not come into this world as rational, thinking beings that already know how to make conclusions about ourselves and the rest of the world. Rational, thinking beings is something we become when we grow into a language and a community where much of the groundwork for being rational and thinking has been provided *to us by others*. The idea that I come to know about emotions, minds and human beings in a way that is essentially private is thus problematic. I do not come to know what pain, joy, anger, fear, minds and human beings are solely from my own private experience, where I mark an inner experience with the word "pain". I learn to speak of pain, joy, and so on, in a complex interplay with others in which I do not only speak about my own experiences, but also about the experiences of others, and significantly speak *to* them about what we are experiencing, together and as individuals.

Here there are two important points to be made. First, I use these words not only to speak *about* feelings and emotions, I speak *out of* them. I do not learn what pain is only because I have an inner experience of this pain, but also because I react to this inner experience in different ways, I cry out, wince, rub the sore part and so on, and because other people react to me and my pain in both similar and different ways. They may wince, cry out, but also ask me what hurts. (The words "I am in pain", as Wittgenstein says, replaces the spontaneous cry, it comes to form a new pain behavior (Wittgenstein 2009, § 244).) Second, I do not only react to or out of my own pain, but also to the pain of others. I see pain in their faces and behavior, I tend, treat the part that hurts, look into their eyes, and so on. As Wittgenstein says, I pay attention to their pain behavior in a way I do not attend to my own (Wittgenstein 1967, § 541). These

two points show what it could be to think of mental language as an extension of a form of pre-linguistic behavior.

3. The end of justification

As I said, the remark addressing an "attitude towards a soul" exemplifies a case in which "[j]ustification by experience", as Wittgenstein says, "comes to an end" (Wittgenstein 2009, § 485). "[M]y spade is turned" (Wittgenstein 2009, § 217), and instead of asking "How do I know that (others are human beings, have a mental life as mine)?", I am asked to acknowledge that here there is no answer to my question. I need to accept that not being able to answer it in a meaningful way is not a failure of our language but an ineliminable aspect of our life. There is in this case no place or need for an explanation.

Wittgenstein rejects the idea that we think of these words as providing epistemic grounds for the belief or opinion that human beings have souls. Nevertheless, we may ask whether in the end he also offers a kind of grounding of such beliefs. I cannot help but wonder whether this was also part of what impressed me in my first reading of this rebuttal of skepticism. He does, on this reading, not offer rational grounds for taking certain statements as true, or for accepting certain reactions to others as justified. He does, however, show how our understanding of the words we use to speak about our mental life is grounded in more "primitive reactions". He thus seemingly suggests that certain forms of reactions underlie the concept of a human being and contribute to forming such a conception. For is this not what he says in suggesting that this kind of behavior is pre-linguistic and that "a language-game is based *on it*". Or when he says that certain forms of reactive attitudes is not "the result of thought" but the "prototype of a way of thinking" (Wittgenstein 1967, § 541).

I think there is something right in this. Wittgenstein's writings do suggest that the language we use to speak about our own and others' mental life presuppose ways of reacting and acting that can be seen as part of our natural history. Without these "very general

facts of nature" (Wittgenstein 2009, § II:365) our ways of speaking would not have the meaning that they have. This we could say is a *logical* point. There are ways of speaking, as it were, that rely on ways of reacting for their sense. The logical point, however, is all too often taken as a *psychological* or *anthropological* explanation. On such a view the words used to talk about our mental life are simply taken to refer to some individual or generally shared natural reactions. Therefore, we may think that we can explain the meaning of the concepts by pointing to these reactions. The meaningfulness of speaking about others as having souls, whether it has meaning, and what meaning it has, is then an outcome of enough people exhibiting the requisite attitude. This cannot be right.

The problem we encounter here seems to surface when we read Wittgenstein as not just offering a description of how we do understand words such as joy, anger, fear and pain, but also of how we should understand other human beings. This becomes especially evident in discussions where one starts speaking, as I also have, in general terms of *an* attitude towards a soul, as if this were the attitude people take to living human beings per se. (See Winch 1981 for an early discussion and Dain 2019 for a later discussion that seem to invite this reading.) This is unfortunate because it seems to muddle Wittgenstein's point.

We may well register the logical point that our spontaneous ways of responding to other people do not fit easily with regarding them as moving corpses. Nevertheless, there are many reactive attitudes to others as living human beings that do not seem to measure up to the awe and wonder one may associate with the more religiously sounding "attitude towards a soul" (cf. Philips 1992). A spontaneous reaction to joy in another's face may be to quench it. Rather than caring for someone who is hurting, a possible reaction to a pained expression on someone's face can be to humiliate the other even further. An angry tirade may be met with laughter and dismissed as expressive of bad taste or poor intelligence. Also these kinds of reactions contribute to our forming our concepts of human moral psychology, and it is at least unclear why a consideration of

these reactive attitude should necessarily lead us to a particular conceptual framework, such as one including "souls".

Here I agree with Olli, who, with Lars Hertzberg, seems to suggest that the kind of trust in others Wittgenstein *shows* in speaking about his attitude to others as "an attitude towards a soul" "invokes an ethical perspective on human action" (2013, 39) and, I add, reaction. Any seemingly neutral description of what reactive attitudes "our concept of a human being" are based on therefore seems to smuggle in a conception of what are valuable ways of relating to others. Any such concealed attitude should, we may think, be made explicit, and not be allowed to work as a secret assumption in our thinking.

The point of Wittgenstein's remark in this perspective is not to classify his reaction to another as "an attitude towards a soul", and to raise further questions as to how prevalent such an attitude is among people generally: How do *we* react to others? Rather, his speaking about "*my* attitude towards him" (emphasis added) is itself a way of speaking *out of* this attitude: His *saying* this *shows* his attitude. (In the way of "If I think of and respond to him in these ways, then my attitude towards him can be characterized as an attitude towards a soul"). By contrast to the remark about a living human being of which "one only says …", it is here the first person singular that speaks. It is "my attitude" rather than "what *we* do" that is at stake. The saying thus reveals a personal stance, a kind of commitment, that is both formed by the person's responses to others and informed by the words they together with others use to make sense of them.

Over the years, however, I have started to wonder whether Wittgenstein's remark not only has an ethical point, but whether it at times is better read as addressing a problem that Wittgenstein, as he confessed in a conversation with his friend M. O'C. Drury, could not help but seeing from "a religious point of view" (Rhees 1984, 94). The saying, as it were, does not just reveal something about its speaker. It is also a confession to, perhaps not an ideal, but a certain form of life. It testifies not just to what he, himself, deems as important but what he thinks should be of importance to *us*.

One may ask whether it makes a difference whether we regard this as an ethical or as a religious remark. Depending on what we put into the words, it may not matter much. Perhaps, a better question is what changes if we see it first as an ethical remark and then as a religious one? For me, the religious is here a way of bringing in an absolute perspective, an idea of something higher, or greater, whereas a focus on the ethical may still lead us to relativize too much of what is shown in these ways of speaking. The man who reacts to another as a soul, tends to his wounds, rejoices in his successes, concedes his anger when just, certainly reveals to us the kind of man he is. His actions, words and reactions, reveal his goodness. But acknowledging that a person's actions and reactions reveal something about himself, his character, does not reveal to *us* the value of being that kind of man, why *we* should care about being good, why it matters to *us* if *I* am not.

There is nothing in my reactions or my concepts that prevents me from looking at others as living corpses, as automata, or in perhaps more readily and personally available language as gullible but astoundingly destructive sheep. If you feel uncertain about what I mean by seeing people in this way, I am also quite certain that given enough time I could help you see what I see. The experience that this is not the way to see them, that is, *us*, then, does not lie in what is either conceptually or humanly available to me. The words I use to make sense of others may as well lead me farther away from them, than closer to them, and again farther from any deeper appreciation of what characterizes not *them* but *us*. The experience that in certain ways of thinking and speaking of others, *I* alienate myself from them, that *I* no longer conceive myself as part of an *us*, therefore has another root. It speaks out of and to a different kind of doubt than the epistemic craving for certainty and justification. And if this feeling of alienation is what the skeptic's outspoken doubt shows, it shows itself, not just as a form of metaphysical doubt, but as a kind of religious doubt, a failure of belonging to the world.

Where is this root? Of what does this doubt speak? I do not know. But I want to say, of a sense of uprootedness and rootlessness

(cf. Weil 2001). Of a fear of not belonging and a longing for belonging, of being part of something greater, possibly higher, a greater whole.

What answers to this doubt? Is trust as Cockburn suggests an answer in this ongoing conversation? I do not know. But if the doubt is religious then the religious answer seems to be faith.

Coming to an end

I ended my first student essay on an attitude towards a soul with the sentence: This is where everything begins, and where my need for justification ends. As many of my ending sentences, it is and was overly melodramatic. As it stands, it is probably wrong. At least I had not specified what it could mean. I think, however, it can be partly helped by adding "everything of importance", for it seems, if we follow Wittgenstein, that when it comes to matters of importance, we must give up any imagined need for justification, and rather recognize, acknowledge and accept what is important, without being able to say just why it is, and without necessarily relying on anything given by our shared practices with others. (Except in the way perhaps that we may think that sharing such practices is important itself.)

Thinking of what is important in those ways reveals the aspects of our life where every one of us must speak for ourselves, and as I have put it, out of ourselves. For Wittgenstein, speaking in such ways has an ethical or religious character. It is ethical, I have wanted to suggest, in that these ways of speaking reveals something about the person speaking, reveals their character. It is religious in the way it reveals something about the speaker's world (in the slightly technical sense Wittgenstein speaks of a world in *Tractatus.)* Is there for instance a place for wonder in or at the world?

As I planned this article, I hoped to develop the ways in which Wittgenstein's speaking of "my attitude towards a soul" revealed a place where people have been drawn to think that he is taking an ethical stance. Starting from that I wanted to show that we might be helped by thinking that he is speaking from a religious point of view,

and that Wittgensteinian philosophers who only focus on the ethical aspect of this speech perhaps do it in an attempt to, if not naturalize, then secularize his thought. I did not have a chance to do this. I have rather recorded the thought processes that led me to say this. But as in the case of Wittgenstein's remark, I have perhaps shown where a certain kind of thought begins. As Wittgenstein, I leave it open where thinking of another as a soul might end.[2]

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[2] I have already acknowledged many of the roots of my thinking on this issue in the Wittgensteinian conversations furthered by Olli, but also by David and Lars. Finally, I want to acknowledge the short e-mail exchange with Henry J. Staten that occasioned me to look back on my early engagement with these conversations, and consider both the ways in which my own thinking has changed over the last 25 years and how it in some respect has remained the same.

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