How do they get in?

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Introduction

The last few decades have been marked by a pan-European rise of radical parties. To the right on the left–right heuristic, the (populist) radical right family has increased its electoral and political strength significantly in both Western and – more inconsistently – Central and Eastern Europe, and several parties – the Italian Northern League (2001–06, 2008–11), the Bulgarian Attack (2009–14), the Dutch Party for Freedom (2010–12) and the Norwegian Progress Party (2013–) to name but a few – have gained experience of executive power or acted as (more or less) influential support parties (Akkerman et al. 2016a; Minkenberg 2017: chs. 5–6). A similar, albeit weaker, trend can be observed also at the other end of the left–right heuristic; the electoral support of the European (populist) radical left family has slowly recovered from the rock-bottom levels reached in the (early) 1990s, and several parties – such as, for instance, the communist parties of France (1997–2002) and Portugal (2015–), the Finnish Left Alliance (1995–2003, 2011–14) and the Icelandic Left-Green Movement (2009–13) – have either been included in coalitions or supported minority governments (Chiocchetti 2017: ch. 3; March 2016).

The growing importance of radical – and, in some cases, even extreme – parties in European government formation processes (see e.g. Akkerman et al. 2016b; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015; Bale and Dunphy 2011; de Lange 2008, 2012; Hough and Verge 2009; March and Keith 2016; Minkenberg 2013, 2017; Olsen, Koß, and Hough 2010) is puzzling, especially in light of the allegedly (see March 2012: 8–9; Mudde 2007: 31) anti-system (but not necessarily anti-democratic) nature of these actors. Following Sartori (1976: 133), anti-system parties do not share the values of the prevailing political order and, as a consequence, aspire to undermine the legitimacy of the existing political regime. In the words of coalition theorists, anti-system radical right and radical left parties should hence be 'non-coalitionable'; they should, as a general rule, be 'excluded [from government] through the reactions of the other [pro-system] parties' (Budge and Keman 1990: 49, 52).[1]

Against this backdrop, the present paper sets out to conduct a broad comparative assessment of how – or, put differently, under what circumstances – radical right and radical left parties are able to overcome the obstacles associated with governing and, accordingly, enter coalition governments (as junior coalition partners). By means of a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of 37 radical parties at 207 coalition formation instances in 22 European countries between 1990 and 2017 the paper sheds light on different paths that lead to government inclusion (and exclusion) of radical actors, thus contributing to increasing our still limited understanding of the intricate relationship between political radicalism and liberal democratic government. Through this specific focus, the paper is able to speak to several academic literatures: to scholarly work on (radical) political parties and party competition, to research on government formation and government participation and to the analysis of the state and future of democratic governance.

The paper is organized into five sections. The next section provides a review of previous theoretical and empirical research on government formation and, in particular, on radical and extreme parties' coalition behavior. The third section discusses the case selection, gives a brief introduction to configurational comparative methods and presents the data,

the measurement techniques and the calibration strategies. The fourth section reports and discusses the results from the empirical analysis while the fifth section concludes and suggests avenues for further research.

Radical parties in power: How do they get in?

What do we know about government participation of parties occupying the fringes of the conventional left–right distinction? Or, more precisely: Which are the factors that may enable radical right and radical left parties to – despite their inherent criticism of current liberal democratic principles – enter government coalitions in liberal democracies? To approach this problem, I apply a theory testing rather than theory generating design. The main focus is on a number of propositions related to the 'size and ideology'-framework emphasizing the role of party size (Riker 1962: 32–3) and party ideology (de Swaan 1973: 88) in the coalition formation process (see appendix A for a brief review of this literature). Inspired by previous observations indicating that the phenomenon under investigation is both complex and multi-causal in nature (e.g. de Lange 2008: 15–17; Olsen, Hough, and Koß 2010: 173–4), I expect that causation is conjunctural and, hence, that combinations of multiple factors explain a single outcome. Next, I review the existing empirical research on the behavior of radical right and radical left coalition candidates and identify a number of potentially important (non-idiosyncratic) explanatory factors.[2]

The first three of these factors are related to party size. As emphasized by Warwick (1996), a considerable parliamentary strength is a liability rather than an asset when it comes to prospective coalition partners' chances of getting into office. Instead of large parties, the *formateur* (henceforth the prime minister party) tends – in order to maximize both its own influence and the working capacity of the coalition – to prefer medium-sized partners (see de Lange 2008 and, especially, Olsen, Hough, and Koß 2010) such as, for example, the Finnish Left Alliance (in coalition 1995–2003, see Dunphy 2010) or the Slovak National Party (in coalition 2006–10, see Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov 2015). Accordingly, the first expectation reads as follows: *if the parliamentary strength of the radical right (left) party is moderate, i.e. neither minuscule nor huge, the party gets access to government.*

Another factor of potential importance is the recent electoral trend of the radical right or radical left party in question (see Mattila and Raunio 2004). The assumption here is that a party scoring a reasonably good result in the previous election is – regardless of its actual strength – a more serious candidate for office than a party with less fortunate results (especially de Lange 2008, but see also Olsen, Hough, and Koß 2010). The Swedish Left Party, for example, managed to sign a support contract with the social democratic minority government after nearly doubling its size in the 1998 general election (Koß 2010), and the Italian Northern League got in to office (in 2008, together with its long-time centre-right ally) after a highly successful electoral result (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: ch. 5). Hence, the second expectation is that *if the radical right (left) party has scored reasonably well in the most recent national election it gets access to government.*

In addition to factors related to their own electoral fortunes, radical right and radical left parties' abilities to get into office or becoming support parties may also be influenced

by the size of the prime minister party (de Lange 2008; Olsen, Hough, and Koß 2010; see also Strøm et al. 1994; Warwick 1996). The (by Scandinavian standards) rather weak Danish Social Democrats, for example, had to rely on support from the Socialist People's Party (and from the Red-Green Alliance) in the 1990s (Christensen 2010) while the minority coalition led by the Dutch (centre-right) People's Party for Freedom and Democracy counted on support from the Party for Freedom between 2010 and 2012 (Akkerman 2016). The expectation is, thus, that *if the prime minister party is comparatively weak, the radical right (left) party gets access to government.*

The next three factors are related to ideology. The first of these focuses, rather straightforwardly, on the general left–right location of the prime minister party. As the leading actor in the government formation process, the prime minister party plays an important role in the selection of coalition partners. Since radical parties tend to be shunned by parties located at or close to the opposite end of the general left–right heuristic, their chance of getting into office often hinges upon the prime minister party being located on the same side of this superdimension (e.g. Bale and Dunphy 2011; Minkenberg 2013; see also Warwick 1996). Hence, radical right parties govern with (or support) mainstream right parties, as in, for example, Latvia (2011–14, see Auers and Kasekamp 2015) and Norway (2013–, see Jupskås 2016), and radical left parties govern with – or support – mainstream left parties, as in Denmark (2011–14, see Christensen 2010) or Italy (1996–98, see Newell 2010). Accordingly, I expect that *if the government is led by a centre-right (centre-left) party, the radical right (left) party gets access to it.*

A second ideological factor worth considering is party radicalness on the most preferred policy dimension (see e.g. Döring and Hellström 2013; Savage 2014). Previous observations indicate that less rigid sociocultural rightism (radical right) and socioeconomic leftism (radical left) can open up possibilities for government participation. The Austrian Freedom Party, for example, became coalitionable (in 2000) after moderating its sociocultural positions (Heinisch and Hauser 2016). Similarly, the Spanish United Left became acceptable as a support party (in 2004) after a gradual turn towards more 'realistic' socioeconomic policies (Verge 2010). Hence, I expect that *if the radical right (left) party take a moderate position on the sociocultural (socioeconomic) dimension it gets access to government.*

The third ideological factor of interest is the distance between the prime minister party and the radical party, again on the most preferred policy dimension (see e.g. Warwick 1996). Regarding the radical right, previous research shows that political affinity between the radical right party and the prime minister party, especially on sociocultural issues, can open up possibilities for radical right government participation. In Poland (2005) and Slovakia (2006), for example, the prime minister parties (the conservative populist Law and Justice and the social democratic Direction, respectively) shared similar restrictive views on nationalism and xenophobia as their radical right coalition partners League of Polish Families and Slovak National Party (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov 2015; Kasprowicz 2015). A similar pattern can be observed on the left. Here, an increasing distance between a right-turning centre-right and a left-turning centre-left – as in, for example, Portugal (Freire and Lisi 2016) – have increased the chances for radical left parties to become serious candidates for government. My final expectation is hence that *if the radical right (left) party locate itself*

close to, or more central than, the prime minister party on a sociocultural (socioeconomic) dimension it gets access to government.

Taken together, the six factors introduced in the discussion above are all assumed to be relevant when seeking to understand the fortunes of radical right and radical left parties in government formation processes. As the structure of the hypotheses ('if-then') indicate, their relevance is assumed to be implicational rather than covariational (Thiem et al. 2016; see also Schneider and Wagemann 2012). I expect, hence, that the endogenous factor – the governmental status of radical parties – is best understood by focusing on necessary, sufficient and INUS[3] conditions and by allowing for conjunctural, equifinal and asymmetric causation. To reiterate: the general assumption – and, indeed, the core hypothesis of the study – is that *the factors related to party size and party ideology introduced above work together to produce different, mutually non-exclusive, paths to government (non)-participation for radical parties.*

Cases, methods and data

Case selection

The study includes 37 radical parties from 22 European countries, observed at, in total, 207 government formation instances between 1990 and 2017. The cases of interest are relevant radical right and radical left parties. Following Mudde (2005), radicalism is defined as opposition to key features of liberal democracy and support of a root (lat. *radix*) and branch transformation of society.[4] Radical right parties are hence 'radical' and 'right' in the sense that they oppose core liberal democratic values such as pluralism and multiculturalism and, instead, pursue nativist policies associated with the sociocultural right pole of the multidimensional left–right heuristic (Mudde 1996, 2007, ch. 1). Radical left parties, by contrast, are 'radical' and 'left' because they oppose the underlying (capitalist) socioeconomic structure of liberal democracies and, consequently, seek to advance socialist policies associated with the socioeconomic left pole of the multidimensional left–right heuristic (March and Mudde 2005; March 2012: ch. 1). Regarding relevance, I follow the 'possibility principle' (Goertz 2006: 186) and include, in the main analysis, only radical parties that have either been included in or supported at least one government during the period of interest (i.e. parties where a positive outcome is demonstrably possible). This strategy excludes ostracized (e.g. the French National Front) and ideologically rigid (e.g. the Communist Party of Greece) parties that have, at least heretofore, been 'impossible' coalition partners (even under very favorable conditions). It also excludes parties constrained by institutional arrangements (e.g. British parties, see Strøm et al. 1994). (The inclusion of ostracized and rigid parties in the analysis does not significantly alter the results, as shown in the the discussion on robustness in appendix D3.)

To identify radical right and radical left parties, I rely on family classifications in the Manifesto Project Data (Volkens et al. 2017) and in the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Bakker et al. 2015). Other sources guiding the identification of radical parties (e.g. in case of discrepancies between or apparent misclassifications in the above-mentioned sources)

are previous authoritative works on the radical right (see, above all, Mudde 2007) and the radical left (see, above all, March 2012). To identify *relevant* radical parties, I utilize the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016) and the information provided by Akkerman et al. (2016a: 3), March (2016: 42) and Minkenberg (2017: 124). The main data set includes observations of 20 radical right and 17 radical left parties.

Regarding single observations, I consider a new government to have been formed if any of the following three events occurs: a national election, a change of the party holding the prime ministership and a major change in the composition of the governing parties. In contrast to much general research on government formation (e.g. Budge and Keman, 1990: 14–15; Müller and Strøm, 2000: 12), I hence do not consider simple prime minister swaps where the new prime minister represents the same party as his/her predecessor. Moreover, I also find it feasible to ignore minor changes in government composition, such as mergers of two (or more) of the government parties and withdrawals of minor parties. Finally, I exclude caretaker governments, governments where the prime minister represents a radical party and – due to missing data on party positions – governments formed after a number of recently held elections. This leads to 108 observations of radical right parties and 99 observations of radical left parties (for more details on included parties and countries, see table B1 in appendix B).

CCMs: What, why and how?

Configurational comparative methods (CCMs) consist of a number of set-theoretic techniques for the causal analysis of configurational data, introduced to the social sciences by, above all, Charles C. Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008). The most well-known and used set-theoretic techniques are crisp- and fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA and fsQCA, respectively). While csQCA requires the objects to be either members (1) or non-members (0) of a set, fsQCA allows for partial set membership; objects are, hence, allowed to take values also in the interval between the endpoints of full membership (1) and full non-membership (0).

In this study, I use fsQCA for a number of reasons. Following Smithson and Verkuilen (2006: 1–2), techniques based on fuzzy sets are able to handle vagueness in a systematic way, to rigorously combine set-wise thinking with continuous variables and to take account of both the categorical (qualitative) and the dimensional (quantitative) character of objects. The main reasons for relying on fsQCA are, however, related to the nature of the research problem. As noted in the previous section, recent scholarship on radical parties' government participation (e.g. de Lange 2008: 15–17; Olsen, Hough, and Koß 2010: 173–4) as well as studies on government formation in general (e.g. Andeweg et al. 2011) suggest that office entry follow a complex pattern where several factors work together in different ways to produce the outcome. Because of this complexity, configurational methods such as fsQCA are good alternatives to standard conditional and mixed logit models and qualitative case studies. To put it differently, fsQCA is an appropriate choice when the relationships of interest are assumed to be set-theoretic (logical) and multi-causal (configurational and equifinal) in nature (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 8–13; see also Smithson and Verkuilen 2006: 1–2).

fsQCA consists of three analytical phases (Thiem 2017). The first phase calibrates the raw data into configurational data and arranges it in a truth table, the second phase minimizes the truth table into a prime implicant (PI) chart and the third phase decomposes this chart in order to obtain the final solutions. The calibration process (i.e. the first part of the first analytical phase) is discussed in the following subsection. In the subsequent (fourth) section, I then turn to the key analytical phases, i.e. to the construction (second part of first phase) and analysis (second and third phase) of the truth table.[5]

Data, measurement and calibration

Irrespective of method, investigators occupied with empirical research need to concern themselves with issues related to the definition and measurement of key concepts. In fsQCA, an additional step is also required: the base variables must be calibrated into sets. The calibration of base variable X into fuzzy set A is done using a membership function $m_A(x)$ that indexes the degree, usually a number within the closed unit interval [0, 1], to which every $x \in X$ belongs to A.[6] The membership assignment process can follow three different strategies (Verkuilen 2005). The direct assignment method uses only substantial human expertise, the indirect assignment method applies a statistical model to human judgments and the transformational assignment method relies on a theoretically motivated mapping. In this paper, I use both the direct and the transformational assignment method. To calibrate the (categorical) base variable underlying the endogenous factor, I use the direct assignment method. Of the base variables underlying the six exogenous factors, five are numerical and one categorical. The numerical base variables are calibrated using (linear) transformational assignment, and the remaining categorical base variable using direct assignment.

Endogenous factor

The endogenous factor in the present study is the government status (G) of each relevant radical party at each coalition formation instance. To (directly) calibrate this factor, I proceed in three steps. First, I define a government party as a party that has at least one minister with full voting rights (e.g. Budge and Keman 1990: 73; Müller and Strøm 2000: 16). To identify such parties, I make use of the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016) and, more precisely, its Boolean indicator 'cabinet_party'. A score of 1 on this indicator indicates that the party observation has at least one minister and, hence, that it is fully in the government ($m_G[in] = 1$). In the second step, I focus on party observations scoring 0 on the above-mentioned indicator. While most of these observations can be classified as fully out of the government ($m_G[out] = 0$), some are more ambiguous. These ambiguous observations are the instances where a party act as support (or pseudo-opposition) party, i.e. agrees to lend a (minority) government explicit, comprehensive and permanent support in exchange of some other concession than access to government portfolios (Strøm 1990: 61–2; see also Andeweg 2013: 108). To identify instances where radical parties have acted as support parties, I rely on information given in previous work by Akkerman et al. (2016a: 3), March (2016: 42) and Minkenberg (2017: 124). The identified instances are examined in more detail in the third step of the calibration process. In this final step, I focus on whether

the support party occupies a key position and whether it is the only support party. The most influential support parties are those that (i) act as the only support party and (ii) are able to tip the balance of power in favor of the opposition by retracting its support. These key support parties can – without taking other support parties' desiderata into account – demand a great influence upon government measures and also determine the future of the supported government on its own. As a consequence, they are considered as clearly more in the government than out of it ($m_G[\textit{strongsupport}] = 0.70$). If a support party is only one of several and, in addition, not in a key position, its influence on the government is weaker. It is, however, considered to be slightly more in the set of government parties than out of it ($m_G[\textit{weaksupport}] = 0.51$). Support parties that are either in a key position or act as the only support party (but not both) are considered as somewhat more in the government than out of it ($m_G[\textit{support}] = 0.60$). A diagram illustrating the reasoning behind the calibration of this five-value fuzzy set is given in figure C1 in appendix C.

Exogenous factors

Next, I focus on the calibration of the six exogenous factors. First, I have argued that medium-sized radical parties (M) tend to be included in coalition governments. In order to measure parliamentary strength, I use data from the ParlGov database and divide the number of seats that the radical party holds in (the lower house of) the national parliament (the variable 'seats' in ParlGov) by the total number of seats (the variable 'election_seats_total' in ParlGov). The resulting base variable is numerical, and the membership assignment process is best performed using the transformational assignment method. Since the focus is on medium-sized parties, the set membership scores should first increase, and then decrease, as the values of the base variable increase. The underlying concept is, hence, a positive mid-point concept. Mid-point concepts require six thresholds; lower (τ_{in1}) and upper (τ_{in2}) thresholds for full inclusion, lower (τ_{ex1}) and upper (τ_{ex2}) thresholds for full exclusion and lower (τ_{cr1}) and upper (τ_{cr2}) crossover points. Despite the somewhat varying definitions used in previous research, a party holding more than 10 but less than 15 per cent of the parliamentary seats can undoubtedly be regarded as fully in the set of medium-sized parties. Hence, $\tau_{\text{in1}} = 10.0$ and $\tau_{\text{in2}} = 15.0$. Similarly, it should be fairly uncontroversial to classify parties with less than 2.5 per cent of the seats as small and, hence, non-medium-sized ($\tau_{\text{ex1}} = 2.5$), and, likewise, parties with more than 22.5 per cent of the seats as large non-medium-sized parties ($\tau_{\text{ex2}} = 22.5$). The crossover points τ_{cr1} and τ_{cr2}, finally, are set at 5 and 20, respectively.[7]

The second argument holds that radical parties that succeeded in the previous election (S) tend to be included in coalition governments. Again, the data stems from the ParlGov database, and the base variable is constructed by subtracting the share of seats won by the radical party of interest at election $e - 1$ from the share of seats won by the same party at the most recent election e (for calculation of seat shares, see above). The resulting base variable is again numerical, with positive (negative) values indicating that the party's share of seats increased (decreased), and with 0 indicating that the seat share remained unchanged (or, alternatively, that the party was not represented in parliament during the previous election term). Transformational calibration of (positive) end-point concepts assumes the

establishment of three thresholds – one for full inclusion (τ_{in}), one for full exclusion (τ_{ex}) and one crossover point (τ_{cr}). The crossover point τ_{cr} is, rather straightforwardly, set at –0.01. Negative values hence indicate that the party is (more) out of (than in) the set of winning parties while neutral and positive values imply that the party is (more) in (than out of) the set of winning parties. τ_{ex} is set at –1.0 (i.e. losses of one percentage point or more) since even a comparatively small loss should be enough for a party to be fully out of S. τ_{in} is set at 4.0 (i.e. wins of four percentage points or more).

The third argument is that radical parties tend to be included in coalition governments when the prime minister party is comparatively weak (W). As in the calculation of M above, I use data from ParlGov and construct a numerical base variable by dividing the number of seats held by the prime minister party (or the largest party in government, if the prime minister is not affiliated with any political party) by the total number of seats. The thresholds used in the transformational calibration of this negative end-point concept are $\tau_{\text{ex}} = 35.0$, $\tau_{\text{cr}} = 30.0$ and $\tau_{\text{in}} = 25.0$: prime minister parties with more than 35 per cent of the seats are, hence, undoubtedly out of the set of comparatively weak prime minister parties while parties with less than 25 per cent of the seats are undoubtedly in the same set.

Moving to the factors related to ideology, the fourth argument holds that radical right (left) parties tend to be included in coalition governments when the government is led by a centre-right (centre-left) party (C). The base variable here is binary, and the 'calibration' is performed using direct assignment. The set membership score in the crisp set C is, hence, 1 if the government is led by a party locating itself on the same side of the left–right heuristic as the radical party of interest ($m_C[\textit{same}] = 1$) and 0 if it is not ($m_C[\textit{different}] = 0$). Here, agrarian, Christian democratic, conservative and liberal parties are classified as centre-right parties, and social democratic (and socialist) parties as centre-left parties.

According to the fifth argument, radical right (left) parties tend to be included in coalition governments when they take moderate (R) positions on the sociocultural (socioeconomic) dimension. The data source here is the Manifesto Project Data which provides estimates on how much space parties' election manifestos assign to different policy categories (Volkens et al. 2017). To measure parties' sociocultural positions, I focus on four categories associated with sociocultural rightism and four categories associated with sociocultural leftism. To capture parties' socioeconomic positions, I focus on five socioeconomic right and five socioeconomic left categories (see tables C3 and C4 in appendix C for details). The resulting two numerical base variables illustrate party positions on the sociocultural and socioeconomic dimensions, with negative values indicating leftist positions and positive values rightist positions. The sociocultural scale (R_{sc}) is hence a negative end-point concept. Using data on radical right parties only, the thresholds are set at the 80th percentile ($\tau_{\text{ex}} = 3.65$), the mean ($\tau_{\text{cr}} = 2.56$) and the 20th percentile ($\tau_{\text{in}} = 1.63$). The socioeconomic scale (R_{se}), in contrast, is a positive end-point concept. To calibrate, I use data on radical left parties and set the thresholds at the 20th percentile ($\tau_{\text{ex}} = -2.31$), the mean ($\tau_{\text{cr}} = -1.21$) and the 80th percentile ($\tau_{\text{in}} = -0.05$).

The sixth and final argument holds that radical right (left) parties tend to be included in coalition governments when they locate themselves relatively proximate to the prime minister party on a sociocultural (socioeconomic) dimension (P). The data source is the

Manifesto Project Data, and the scales used are the same as for R above. To compare party positions on the preferred dimension, I, for radical right parties, subtract the sociocultural position of the radical right party from the sociocultural position of the prime minister party and, for radical left parties, subtract the socioeconomic position of the prime minister party from the socioeconomic position of the radical left party. This operation results in two numerical base variables (positive end-point concepts) where negative (positive) values indicate that the radical party locates itself closer to its 'own' endpoint (to the opposite endpoint) of the scale than the mainstream party. After transforming positive values to 0, I use data on radical right (for P_{sc}) and radical left (for P_{se}) parties to set the thresholds at the 20th percentile ($\tau_{\text{ex}}[P_{sc}] = -2.25$; $\tau_{\text{ex}}[P_{se}] = -3.80$), the mean ($\tau_{\text{cr}}[P_{sc}] = -1.08$; $\tau_{\text{cr}}[P_{se}] = -2.29$) and the 80th percentile ($\tau_{\text{in}}[P_{sc}] = 0.0$; $\tau_{\text{in}}[P_{se}] = -0.47$).

Results

After the calibration of the base variables, the resulting configurational data can be summarized in a truth table – a matrix listing all the 2^k unique conjunctions derivable from the k exogenous factors included in the study. With six exogenous factors, the truth table consists of $2^6 = 64$ unique conjunctions (i.e. minterms, or matrix rows). Each of these must be associated with a value on the endogenous factor. To do this, it is customary to rely on sufficiency inclusion scores and frequencies.[8] Following Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 128, 279), the inclusion cutoff should be specific to every research project and vary with, among other things, the number of observations, the quality of the data and the precision of the theoretical expectations. Considering the general theoretical propositions and the large number of (especially negative) observations, this study uses a relatively liberal sufficiency inclusion cutoff value of 0.750 and a low frequency cutoff value of 1. The resulting truth table is partially revealed in table 1.

The following subsection presents the minimization process and discusses the paths to government inclusion of radical parties while the subsequent one focuses on the negation of government inclusion, i.e. government exclusion.

[Table 1]

*Paths to government inclusion (*G*)*

The next stage is to identify prime implicants (PI) by minimizing the truth table. The minimization is performed using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm (Duşa and Thiem 2015). I present and interpret the parsimonious solution because, as demonstrated by Baumgartner and Thiem (2017b), it has the lowest risk of committing causal fallacies among QCA's three solution types. The PI chart (see appendix D2) shows six prime implicants of G: $\neg MWCR$, $SWCP$, $SWCR$, $SW\neg RP$, $WCR\neg P$ and $MWC\neg RP$.[9] Of these, $SW\neg RP$ and $WCR\neg P$ are essential PIs; they must be included in the final solution model because they are the only PIs that cover minterms 58 and 47, respectively. $MWC\neg RP$, by contrast, is redundant since it only covers a minterm that is already covered by the essential PI $SW\neg RP$ (i.e., minterm 62). $\neg MWCR$, finally, is also redundant: the only minterm it

covers (32) is also covered by $SWCP$ and $SWCR$, both of which also cover the remaining minterm 64. This results in the following two possible solution models:

$$sm_{G.1}: \; SW\neg RP \; \vee \; WCR\neg P \; \vee \; SWCR \; \Leftrightarrow \; G \text{ and} \tag{1}$$

$$sm_{G.2}: \; SW\neg RP \; \vee \; WCR\neg P \; \vee \; SWCP \; \Leftrightarrow \; G. \tag{2}$$

As is evident, the two models are closely related. The only difference is to be found in the last conjunction of each model, where $sm_{G.1}$ offers $SWCR$ while $sm_{G.2}$ suggests $SWCP$. Due to somewhat better summary statistics, $sm_{G.2}$ is preferred instead of $sm_{G.1}$.[10] Hence, expression (2) will be subject to a more detailed discussion. To guide interpretation, this expression can be factorized as follows:

$$sm_{G.2'}: \; SWP(C \; \vee \; \neg R) \; \vee \; WCR\neg P \; \Leftrightarrow \; G. \tag{2'}$$

Expressions (2) and (2′) as well as table 2 hence indicate that there are three paths to government for radical parties, all of which include the factor W. The first two paths both suggest that radical parties get into government when their electoral fortunes are good (S) and when the prime minister party is comparatively weak (W) and takes fairly similar policy positions as the radical party (P) on the policy dimension preferred by the radical party. In addition, the path $SWPC$ also emphasizes the importance of a location on the same side of the general left–right heuristic (C). This path, henceforth labeled the 'feasible allies'-path, thus combines favorable size conditions – a victorious radical party and a weak prime minister party – with close ideological affinity. The inclusion score of 0.815 indicates that this path is a consistent sufficient condition; $SWPC$ is an almost (albeit not fully) perfect subset of G. The coverage scores of 0.234 (raw coverage) and 0.135 (unique coverage) are, however, rather low. The path is, in other words, able to explain only a small part of the observations.

The second path – $SWP\neg R$ – adds the absence of radical party moderation on the preferred policy dimension ($\neg R$) to SWP. This path – I label it the 'radical partners'-path – hence combines favorable size conditions with radical policy convergence; the radical party and the prime minister party are fairly close to each other on the policy dimension preferred by the radical party and, moreover, take positions that are comparatively radical. With an inclusion score of 0.775, $SWP\neg R$ is a relatively consistent subset of G. The low raw (0.123) and unique (0.041) coverage scores indicate, however, that the path is able to explain only a limited part of the outcome of interest.

The final path, $WCR\neg P$, conjuncts a moderate position on the preferred policy dimension (R) with the presence of a comparatively weak (W) and distant ($\neg P$) prime minister party that, nevertheless, is located on the same side of the left–right heuristic as the radical party (C). This 'moderate followers'-path seems, hence, to emphasize the role of ideological moderation on the preferred ideological dimension; despite a large distance between the prime minister party and the radical party, the radical party may get access to executive power if it takes moderate positions and if the prime minister party is weak and ideologically related to the radical party. The inclusion score for this path is a low 0.595, and the low raw (0.059) and unique (0.018) coverage scores indicate that its overall importance may be

trivial (see appendix D3 for a discussion on robustness).

Regarding the covered cases, I note that no less than 11 of the 18 positive observations are about Latvian parties. The 'feasible allies'- and, to a lesser extent, 'radical partners'-paths seem, hence, to be rather well suited for explaining government inclusion of radical parties in Latvia – in the 1990s (TB in 1995[a–b], LVP in 1995[a] and TB/LNNK in 1998[a–c]) as well as in the 2000s (TB/LNNK in 2006[c–d]) and in the 2010s (NA in 2011[a–b] and 2014). Of all the positive Latvian observations, these two paths are able to explain some 79 per cent (11 of 14). The solution model is, hence, suitable for explaining radical (right) government inclusion in Latvia. It is, however, less suitable for explaining government inclusion of radical right parties in other countries, although it – and especially the 'feasible allies'-path – is relevant also for a number of observations from Austria (FPÖ in 1999), Denmark (DF in 2005 and 2007), Estonia (ERSP in 1992), Italy (LN in 1994) and the Netherlands (LPF in 2002). Finally, the solution model is rather ill suited for explaining government inclusion of radical left actors; the only radical left parties included are the (already mentioned) Latvian LVP (in 1995[a]) and the Finnish VAS (in 1999), the latter of which is uniquely covered by the 'moderate followers'-path.

Taken together, the model presented in expressions (2) and (2′) is doing pretty well in predicting government inclusion of radical parties – the model inclusion score of 0.762 indicates that most observations that are members of the configuration are indeed also members of the outcome G. As the – even for comparatively large-N configurational settings – low model coverage score (0.293) demonstrates, the solution model is, however, not able to deliver a comprehensive explanation of the radical government participation; only 26 per cent of the positive observations are covered (see appendix D1 for further details). There must, hence, be other paths for radical parties to enter government – paths that cannot, at least not fully, be discovered with the help of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis focusing solely on the conventional 'size and ideology'-framework. To improve the model and, hence, further broaden our understanding of radical government participation, a companion article (see [*author*]) focus on 'typical' (particularly Latvian) and 'deviant' (unexplained) cases, as suggested by Schneider and Rohlfing (2013, 2016; see also Goertz 2017; Lieberman 2005 and, regarding nested analysis in coalition research, Bäck and Dumont 2007).

[Table 2]

Paths to government exclusion (¬G)

Next, I focus on the paths that lead to government *exclusion* of radical parties. To examine government exclusion, I construct a truth table with the same exogenous factors as in table 1, but with a negated endogenous factor ($\neg G$). In contrast to outcome G, its negation $\neg G$ holds, naturally, a large number of positive observations. Accordingly, the cutoff values for sufficiency inclusion (and frequency) can be raised. With the sufficiency inclusion cutoff value set at 0.850 and the frequency cutoff value at 3, 10 positive minterms are identified (see table 3).

[Table 3]

The (parsimonious) minimization of this truth table reveals 12 prime implicants (see appendix D2). $\neg M \neg C$ is essential as the only PI that covers minterm 20. In addition, it also covers minterms 17, 19, 3, 1, 9 and 25. The remaining three minterms are orphan columns covered by multiple (8) inessential PIs. This leads to 14 solution models, with inclusion and coverage scores ranging between 0.872 and 0.913 and 0.442 and 0.504, respectively (for a complete list, see table D5 in appendix D2). Of these models, two consist of three disjuncts while the remaining 12 include four disjuncts. The two models consisting of three disjuncts show the highest inclusion scores, display satisfactory coverage scores and are easier to interpret than most of the remaining models. All 14 solution models also include $\neg M \neg C$ and either $\neg W \neg C \neg P$ or $S \neg C \neg P$:

$$sm_{\neg G.1}: \ \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg S \neg C R \ \vee \ \neg W \neg C \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G \text{ and} \tag{3}$$

$$sm_{\neg G.2}: \ \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg S \neg C R \ \vee \ S \neg C \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G. \tag{4}$$

Of these, $sm_{\neg G.1}$ shows slightly better model statistics than $sm_{\neg G.2}$. Hence, $sm_{\neg G.1}$ and, more specifically, its factorized version

$$sm_{\neg G.1'}: \ \neg C(\neg M \ \vee \ \neg S R \ \vee \ \neg W \neg P) \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G \tag{3'}$$

will be subject to a more detailed discussion.

Expressions (3) and (3′) suggest three paths (see also table 4), all of which include the factor $\neg C$. Path $\neg C \neg M$, firstly, proposes that radical parties are excluded from government when the government is formed by an ideological rival located on the other side of the left–right heuristic ($\neg C$) and when the radical party is not medium-sized, i.e. when its parliamentary size is either too small or too large ($\neg M$). In other words: ideologically distant radical parties that, due to their size, are not able to make a significant contribution to the government tend to be excluded from coalition governments. With an inclusion score of 0.907 and coverage scores of 0.325 and 0.108, this 'useless rivals'-path is a highly consistent and non-trivial sufficient condition for $\neg G$.

Path $\neg C \neg S R$, secondly, suggests that radical parties are excluded from government when the government is formed by a rival party ($\neg C$) and when the radical party is moderate (R) and lost seats in the previous national election ($\neg S$). This 'unattractive losers'-path hence suggests that a poor result in the recent election keeps radical parties out of governments formed by parties located on the other side of the left–right heuristic, even if the policy position of the radical party is quite moderate. This path is highly consistent with the outcome (0.902). The raw (0.184) and unique (0.070) coverage scores are moderate.

The third and final path, $\neg C \neg W \neg P$, proposes that radical parties are excluded from government when the government is formed by a rival party ($\neg C$) that, in addition, has a strong position in the parliament ($\neg W$) and is distant also on the preferred ideological dimension ($\neg P$). These radical parties are, hence, 'redundant antagonists': the prime minister party does not need them because of its considerable size and does not want them because of the radical party's ideological remoteness. The path is a consistent subset of $\neg G$ (0.937), and the raw (0.228) and unique (0.049) coverage scores can be classified as moderate (see appendix D3 for a discussion on robustness).

[Table 4]

The inclusion score of the solution model in expressions (3) and (3′) is 0.912, thus indicating that most observations that are members of the configuration are also members of the outcome $\neg G$. Its coverage is 0.452; of the 139 negative observations in the data, the solution model covers 37.4 per cent (52). The solution model is more adequate for negative radical left observations (covering 47.9 per cent, or 35/73) than negative radical right observations (25.8 per cent; 17/66), and also more adequate for negative Western European observations (45.1 per cent; 46/102) than for negative Central and Eastern European observations (16.2 per cent; 6/37).

Discussion, conclusions and the way ahead

Thanks to decades of academic research, our knowledge of radical (right and, to a lesser extent, left) actors is now more extensive and more detailed than perhaps ever before; we know quite a deal about the electorates as well as about the ideologies and the policy output of radical parties. Recently, there has also been an increased interest in radical party behavior on the parliamentary arena, and a number of (mainly case) studies have focused on the how's and why's of radical government participation. What has been lacking, however, is a comparative and systematic assessment of the factors that foster and, conversely, hamper government inclusion of radical parties: When are they able to get into government, and when are they deemed to stay in opposition? In order to seek answers to these questions, this theory testing study examines both radical right and radical left parties, in Western as well as in Central and Eastern Europe, using the conventional 'size and ideology'-framework as a natural starting point. Inspired by previous observations regarding the highly complex and multi-causal nature of radical government participation, the study study resorted to a configurational method – fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis – in order to identify hitherto unidentified conjunctural and equifinal patterns of causation.

The substantive findings from the empirical analysis can be summarized in five main points. First, the empirical analysis shows that *radical right* parties – in both Western and Central and Eastern Europe – may get access to coalition government following two paths where factors related to size and ideology are combined in somewhat different ways. Both paths include (i) success in the most recent national election and (ii) policy affinity with (iii) a weak prime minister party as INUS-conditions. The first path ('feasible allies') also emphasizes the importance of (iv) a (roughly) similar general left–right location while the second path ('radical partners') underlines the importance of (iv) shared radical views on issues related to the policy dimension emphasized the radical party. The second main finding concerns *radical left* parties. Here, the 'size and ideology'-framework is clearly not very relevant in explaining government participation, although (i) a weak prime minister party may seek help from (ii) a distant radical left party if the radical left party (iii) holds moderate views and (iv) is located on the same side of the left–right heuristic as the prime minister party ('moderate followers'). These two observations leads to a third, more general, conclusion. When seeking to explain radical government participation, factors related to size and ideology are relevant, but not enough in order to fully understand the phenomenon. It

also seems clear that size and ideology is more relevant for radical right parties than for radical left parties.

Regarding government exclusion, two additional substantive conclusions appear. The first of these holds that (i) ideological remoteness is an INUS-condition included in all paths to government exclusion: radical parties – to the left and to the right, in the west as well as in the east – are hence generally eliminated from government if the government is formed by a party located on the other side of the left–right heuristic. This INUS-condition needs, however, to be combined with other factors. The first path hence combines remoteness with (ii) the overtly radical party being either too weak or too strong ('useless rivals'), the second path with the (ii) radical party being (iii) too unsuccessful ('unattractive losers') and the third path with the radical party holding (ii) too distant policy positions for (iii) a strong prime minister party to take seriously ('redundant antagonists'). The second, more general, conclusion from the analysis of government exclusion holds that the solution model is generally relevant – factors related to size and ideology are able to explain about half of the instances when radical parties are excluded from government. The model is also somewhat more relevant for radical left than for radical right parties, and somewhat more relevant for Western Europe than for Central and Eastern Europe.

Taken together, this paper constitute an essential first step in a systematical and comparative search for factors explaining government inclusion and exclusion of radical parties. As the – to my knowledge – first study focusing on both left and right and on both Western and Central and Eastern Europe, it has provided intriguing insights: the study emphasize the complex and conjunctive nature of government inclusion and exclusion, it underlines differences between radical left and radical right government participation, it highlights the importance of ideological distance for radical government exclusion and it points to the need for future research to consider other factors than those related to party size and party ideology. By this, it provides new insights to the research on party competition and government participation and, more indirectly, to the analysis of the state and future of democratic governance.

Although factors related to party size and parties' ideological and policy positions play a role both for participation and non-participation, the low to moderate coverage scores indicate that there are other factors that contribute to including and excluding radical parties from governments. A number of such factors have been highlighted, but rarely systematically scrutinized, in previous research: parties' historical roots and trajectories, strategical and tactical considerations, informal relationships between prominent party representatives, previous successful cooperation on the regional or local level, policy convergence not covered by election programmes and institutional constraints not captured by the case selection strategies and factor operationalizations used in this study. A common denominator for these factors is their highly elusive, and in some cases even idiosyncratic, nature: they cannot easily be included in large cross-case studies. As a consequence, it is of imperative concern that the important initial steps taken in this study are followed by additional theory-revising research where the possible importance of other factors is examined, e.g. by means of (nested) case studies.

Notes

[1] For a discussion on definitional matters, see section 'Case selection' below.

[2] In addition to general research on government formation and (case) studies focusing explicitly on government participation of radical right or radical left parties, the discussion below is also, to some extent, inspired by theoretical literature on government participation of small parties (e.g. Bolleyer 2007) and by empirical studies focusing on government inclusion of other non-mainstream parties (e.g. Dumont and Bäck 2006).

[3] An INUS condition is 'an *insufficient* but *necessary* part of a condition which is itself *unnecessary* but *sufficient* for the result' (Mackie 1965: 245). Only minimally necessary disjunctions of minimally sufficient conditions can be causally interpreted under the INUS theory.

[4] A somewhat related term is 'extremism', usually defined as opposition to democracy per se. A watertight distinction between radical and extreme parties is often difficult to make, but since a clear majority of the parties included in this study are radical (constitutional, but anti-liberal democratic) rather than extreme (unconstitutional and anti-democratic) I utilize the term radical as a generic label.

[5] I note that CCMs are subject of intense debate, and several special issues and symposia have been devoted to discussions of the pros and cons of these methods. For a comprehensive (but not exhaustive) listing of the core debates, see endnote one in Thiem et al. (2016). In this paper, I follow established standards of good practice (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 2012; Wagemann and Schneider 2015) and, when appropriate, suggestions made in more recent evaluations of the stability of CCMs (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017a, 2017b; cf. also Hug 2013; Krogslund et al. 2010; Lucas and Szatrowski 2014). To further enhance the stability of the findings, I conduct robustness checks where case selection, calibration strategies and frequency and inclusion thresholds are altered (Skaaning 2011; see also Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 284–95).

[6] In crisp (or classical) sets, membership scores are restricted to {0, 1}, i.e. to the endpoints of the unit interval.

[7] Descriptive statistics for the base variables underlying the exogenous factors is given in table C1 in appendix C. Formulas used for the transformational calibration appear in table C2. The analyses reported in this paper (including the calibrations) are performed using the QCApro package for R (Thiem 2018).

[8] On the calculation on inclusion (INCL) and coverage (COV), see appendix C.

[9] Previous research based on CCMs has made use of different notational systems. In this paper, I apply notations from propositional logic. Hence, '$\neg$' denotes complement (NOT), '$\wedge$' conjunction (AND) and '$\vee$' disjunction (OR). For the sake of readability, '$\wedge$' is usually omitted ($SWCP \equiv S \wedge W \wedge C \wedge P$). '$\Leftarrow$' denotes necessity, '$\Rightarrow$' sufficiency and '$\Leftrightarrow$' equivalence. The prime symbol ($'$) signifies a factorized (simplified) solution model.

[10] The scores for $SWCR$ are 0.764 (inclusion), 0.194 (raw coverage) and 0.134 (unique coverage). The model inclusion score is slightly higher for $sm_{G.2}$ (0.762) than for $sm_{G.1}$ (0.760). (The model coverage scores are similar.)

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Tables and figures

Table 1: Partial truth table (outcome G)

	Exogenous factors									End.
Minterm	***M***	***S***	***W***	***C***	***R***	***P***	**INCL**	**PRI**[a]	***N***	**factor**
64	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.832	0.812	13	1
32	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.817	0.792	1	1
62	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.812	0.762	3	1
58	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.798	0.750	2	1
47	1	0	1	1	1	0	0.767	0.697	1	1
14	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.649	0.615	1	0
48	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.597	0.549	5	0
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

Note: The endogenous factor (G) is coded as 1 if INCL $\geq$ 0.750 and if $N \geq 1$. Observed minterms with INCL $\leq$ 0.500 (N = 43; range of INCL = [0.050, 0.476]) and logical reminders (N = 14) are omitted from the table. A complete truth table is accessible from the author upon request. '·' = and so on.

[a] Proportional reduction in inconsistency, calculated using the SetMethods package for R (Medzihorsky et al. 2017). Higher scores indicate that the inclusion scores for G and $\neg G$ are very different from each other. Ideally, (the product of INCL and) PRI should be fairly high (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 241–4).

Table 2: Government inclusion of radical parties (parsimonious solution)

	INCL	**COV**	**Raw COV**	**Unique COV**	**Total *N***	**Unique *N***	**TLCs**[a]
$SWCP$ ('feasible allies')	0.815		0.234	0.135	17	14	2
$SW\neg RP$ ('radical partners')	0.775		0.123	0.041	5	2	0
$WCR\neg P$ ('moderate followers')	0.595		0.059	0.018	1	1	0
$sm_{G.2}$	0.762	0.293			20		

Note: For illustrations of cases, see figures D2a–c in appendix D2. Conservative solution: $MSW\neg RP \vee M\neg SWCR\neg P \vee SWCRP$.

[a] True logical contradictions, i.e. observations with high ($>$ 0.5) membership in the outcome and low ($<$ 0.5) membership in the condition. The true logical contradictory observations here are FrP in 1997(a) and LVP in 1995(b).

Table 3: Partial truth table (outcome $\neg G$)

	Exogenous factors									End.
Minterm	***M***	***S***	***W***	***C***	***R***	***P***	**INCL**	**PRI**[a]	***N***	**factor**
17	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.968	0.967	6	1
20	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.962	0.954	10	1
19	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.957	0.956	4	1
3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.937	0.936	3	1
36	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.929	0.918	5	1
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.918	0.917	8	1
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.915	0.910	8	1
9	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.910	0.910	5	1
43	1	0	1	0	1	0	0.881	0.879	4	1
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	0.877	0.872	4	1
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

Note: The endogenous factor ($\neg G$) is coded as 1 if INCL $\geq$ 0.850 and if $N \geq 3$. Observed minterms with INCL $<$ 0.850 and $N \geq 3$ ($N = 20$; range of INCL = [0.272, 0.846]) as well as minterms with N $<$ 3 ($N = 20$; range of INCL = [0.303, 0.976]) are omitted, as are the 'true' logical reminders ($N = 14$). A complete truth table is accessible from the author upon request. '.' = and so on.
[a] See note *a* in table 1.

Table 4: Government exclusion of radical parties (parsimonious solution)

	INCL	**COV**	**Raw COV**	**Unique COV**	**Total *N***	**Unique *N***	**TLCs**[a]
$\neg M \neg C$ ('useless rivals')	0.907		0.325	0.108	40	19	4
$\neg S \neg CR$ ('unattractive losers')	0.902		0.184	0.070	12	9	0
$\neg W \neg C \neg P$ ('redundant antagonists')	0.937		0.228	0.049	29	8	1
$sm_{\neg G.1}$	0.912	0.452			57		

Note: Conservative solution: $\neg M \neg C \neg R \neg P \ \vee \ \neg M \neg W \neg C \neg P \ \vee \ \neg M S \neg W \neg C R \ \vee \ S \neg W \neg C \neg R \neg P \ \vee$ $M \neg S \neg W \neg C R P \ \vee \ M \neg S W \neg C R \neg P$.
[a] True logical contradictions, i.e. observations with high (> 0.5) membership in the outcome and low (< 0.5) membership in the condition. The true logical contradictory observations here are PRM in 1992(a–c), Attack in 2013 and ANEL in 2015.

Online appendix A: On coalition formation

The theory of coalition formation is usually described as consisting of two broad traditions – one emphasizing office-seeking goals, and another one focusing on policy-seeking incentives (e.g. Laver 1998; Nyblade 2013). The office-seeking tradition, to begin with, rests upon the assumption that gaining office is the primary goal of political actors. Inspired by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), Riker (1962: 32–3; see also Gamson 1961) thus suggested that politicians '*create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger*' (i.e., they create 'minimal winning coalitions'). This, essentially policy-blind, 'size principle' was later revised to take account also of parties' policy preferences. Leiserson (1968: 775), for example, argued that the bargaining process over coalition formation is easier with fewer members and, hence, that parties prefer minimal winning coalitions consisting of as few parties as possible. The policy component becomes even more explicit in the argumentation presented by Axelrod (1970: 170–1), whose 'minimal connected winning coalitions' consist of parties that are ideologically adjacent to each other.

Despite the role ascribed to policy in the models provided by Leiserson and, above all, Axelrod, the full-blown policy-seeking conception of government formation – i.e., the argument that political actors want to get into office mainly for ideological reasons – is usually attributed to de Swaan (1973). According to his policy distance theory, a politician strives to '*bring about a winning coalition* in which he is included and *which he expects to adopt a policy that is as close as possible* [...] *to his own most preferred policy*' (de Swaan 1973: 88, emphasis added). Starting from this general assumption, later theoretical contributions in the policy-seeking tradition have focused on uni- as well as multidimensional policy spaces and emphasized the role of centrally located parties as key players in the coalition formation process (e.g. Baron 1991: 149; Crombez 1996: 9; Laver and Schofield 1990: 111; Laver and Shepsle 1996: 69–70; Schofield 1993: 19; van Roozendaal 1990: 331, 1992: 10). More recent research has also highlighted possible institutional constraints on government formation, such as party system characteristics, size and composition requirements and rules regarding the electoral system and the operation of the government (Strøm et al. 1994).

Empirical evidence suggests that both office- and policy-driven factors are important in the coalition formation process and, moreover, that institutional constraints can have effects on coalition bargaining. In an early empirical assessment, Franklin and Mackie (1984) demonstrated that coalition formation sometimes is dominated by ideology but more often by size. Of the more recent contributions, the studies focusing on individual parties' access to office are of particular importance for this paper. Here, Warwick (1996; see also Isaksson 2005) showed that *formateurs* tend to prefer smaller partners that position themselves relatively close to the *formateur*, while Mattila and Raunio (2004) and Tavits (2008), respectively, emphasized the importance of avoiding electoral losses and adhering to the coalition agreement. Döring and Hellström (2013), finally, observed that Western European governments generally include ideologically moderate parties while governments in Central Eastern Europe tend to be formed mainly based on electoral and parliamentary strength (cf., however, also Savage 2014). (I also note that the research on government formation also include other strands. A few prominent examples are Martin and Stevenson's

(2001) highly influential examination of the characteristics of potential governments (see also Savage 2016) and Glasgow et al.'s (2011) examination of who gets the prime ministership.)

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Online appendix B: Parties included in the analysis

Table B1: Radical right and radical left parties included (in main analysis)[a]

Country	Party (Abrv)	Position	Observations
AUT	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	Right	90, 94, 95, 99, 02(a–b), 06, 08, 13
BEL	*Flemish Interest (VB)*	Right	see appendix D3
BUL	Attack	Right	05, 09, 13, 14
	United Patriots	Right	17
CRO	Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)[b]	Right	00(a–c)
CYP	Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)[c]	Left	96, 01(a–b), 06(a), 11(b)
CZE	*Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)*	Left	see appendix D3
DEN	Danish People's Party (DF)	Right	98, 01, 05, 07, 11(a–b)
	Red-Green Alliance (EL)	Left	94, 98, 01, 05, 07, 11(a–b)
	Socialist People's Party (SF)	Left	90(a–b), 94, 98, 01, 05, 07, 11(a–b)
ESP	United Left (IU)	Left	93, 96, 00, 04, 08, 11, 15
EST	Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP)	Right	92
FIN	Finns Party (PS)	Right	99, 03, 07, 11(a–b)
	Left Alliance (VAS)	Left	91, 95, 99, 03, 07, 11(a–b)
FRA	French Communist Party (PCF)	Left	93, 97(a–b), 02, 07(a–b), 17
	National Front (FN)	Right	see appendix D3
GER	*Alternative for Germany (AfD)*	Right	see appendix D3
	The Left	Left	see appendix D3
GRE	*Communist Party of Greece (KKE)*	Left	see appendix D3
	Golden Dawn (XA)	Right	see appendix D3

Continued on next page

Table B1 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Party (Abrv)	Position	Observations
	Independent Greeks (ANEL)	Right	12(a–b), 15
	Syriza[d]	Left	90, 96, 00, 04, 07, 09, 12(a–b)
HUN	*Jobbik*	Right	see appendix D3
IRL	Democratic Left (DL)	Left	92(a–b), 97
ISL	Left-Green Movement (VG)	Left	99, 03, 07, 09, 13
ITA	Lega Nord (LN)	Right	92(a–b), 94, 96(a–b), 01(a–b), 06, 08, 13
	Communist Refoundation Party (PRC)	Left	92(a–b), 94, 96(a–b), 01(a–b), 06
	Party of Italian Communists (PdCI)	Left	01, 06(a–b)
LAT	For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian Nat. Indep. Mov. (TB/LNNK)[e]	Right	93(a–b), 95(a–b), 98(a–c), 02(a–d), 06(a–d)
	National Alliance (NA)	Right	10, 11(a–b), 14
	Latvian Unity Party (LVP)	Left	95(a–d)
LTU	Party Order and Justice (PTT)	Right	04(a–c), 08, 12
NED	Party for Freedom (PVV)	Right	06, 10, 12
	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF)	Right	02, 03
	Socialist Party (SP)	Left	see appendix D3
NOR	Progress Party (FrP)	Right	93, 97(a–b), 01, 05, 09
	Socialist Left Party (SV)	Left	93, 97(a–b), 01, 05, 09
POL	League of Polish Families (LPR)	Right	01(a–c), 05(a–b)
	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP)	Right	01(a–c), 05(a–b)
POR	Left Bloc (BE)	Left	99, 02, 05, 09, 11
	Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)[f]	Left	91, 95, 99, 02, 05, 09, 11
ROU	Greater Romania Party (PRM)	Right	92(a–c), 96, 00(a–b), 04(a–b)
	Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR)	Right	90, 92(a–c), 96

Continued on next page

Table B1 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Party (Abrv)	Position	Observations
SLO	*Slovenian National Party (SNP)*	Right	see appendix D3
SVK	Slovak National Party (SNS)	Right	90, 92(a–c), 94, 98, 06, 10
	Union of the Workers of Slovakia (ZRS)	Left	94
SWE	Left Party (V)	Left	91, 94, 98, 02, 06, 10, 14
	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Right	see appendix D3

[a] Parties given in *italics* are 'irrelevant' (but politically more or less significant) parties only included in the robustness checks (see appendix D3 for details). Regarding included countries, I do not consider parties from the less consolidated or non-democratic regimes of Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine), Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). I also exclude the European micro-states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino) and Switzerland (due to its directional government and fixed coalitions). (Countries not included in the main data set due to lack of at least one *relevant* radical party are Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.) [b] Prime minister party in 1992 and in 1995, no longer radical right after 2000 (Mudde 2007: 305). [c] Prime minister party 2006b and 2011a. [d] Synaspismos –2004; SYRIZA prime minister party 2015a and 2015b. [e] TB 1993–95; TB prime minister party 1995c and 1995d. [f] Compete in elections as a part of Unitary Democratic Coalition, together with Ecologist Party 'The Greens'.

Online appendix C: Calibration, scales and calculations

Calibration



Figure C1: Calibration of outcome

Table C1: Calibration of conditions: base variable descriptives and thresholds

Factor	**Min**	$\boldsymbol{P}_{20}$	$\boldsymbol{P}_{50}$	$\boldsymbol{P}_{80}$	**Max**	**Avg**	**SD**	τ_{ex}	τ_{cr}	τ_{in}
M	0.50	4.60	7.39	13.91	35.71	9.56	7.22	$2.50_{(1)}$	$5.00_{(1)}$	$10.00_{(1)}$
								$22.50_{(2)}$	$20.00_{(2)}$	$15.00_{(2)}$
S	−28.60	−2.43	0.00	2.54	18.81	−0.22	6.14	−1.00	−0.01	4.00
W	6.67	23.00	33.00	43.61	66.41	33.27	11.27	35.00	30.00	25.00
C	0.00	—	—	—	1.00	0.50	0.50	—	—	—
R_{sc}	0.00	1.63	2.40	3.65	5.48	2.56	1.22	3.65	2.56	1.63
R_{se}	−3.97	−2.31	−1.32	−0.05	2.20	−1.21	1.32	−2.31	−1.21	−0.05
P_{sc}	−5.07	−2.25	−0.60	0.00	0.00	−1.08	1.29	−2.25	−1.08	0.00
P_{se}	−7.39	−3.80	−2.08	−0.47	0.00	−2.29	1.74	−3.80	−2.29	−0.47
N	2.19	3.34	4.42	5.44	7.67	4.41	1.24	7.50	5.00	2.50
E	0.00	0.00	9.00	34.80	71.00	16.62	19.47	4.00	8.00	12.00

Note: The categorical (Boolean) condition C is 'calibrated' using the direct method. For further details, see main text. R_{sc} and P_{sc} cover only observations of radical right parties, R_{se} and P_{se} only observations of radical left parties.

Table C2: Formulas used for transformational membership assignment (linear)

Concept type	**Formula**
Positive end-point concepts	$m_A(x, \tau_{[\ldots]}, p, q) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \tau_{\text{ex}} \geq x_i, \\ \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\tau_{\text{ex}} - x_i}{\tau_{\text{ex}} - \tau_{\text{cr}}}\right)^p & \text{if } \tau_{\text{ex}} < x_i \leq \tau_{\text{cr}}, \\ 1 - \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\tau_{\text{in}} - x_i}{\tau_{\text{in}} - \tau_{\text{cr}}}\right)^q & \text{if } \tau_{\text{cr}} < x_i \leq \tau_{\text{in}}, \\ 1 & \text{if } \tau_{\text{in}} < x_i. \end{cases}$
Negative end-point concepts	$m_A(x, \tau_{[\ldots]}, p, q) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \tau_{\text{in}} \geq x_i, \\ 1 - \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\tau_{\text{in}} - x_i}{\tau_{\text{in}} - \tau_{\text{cr}}}\right)^q & \text{if } \tau_{\text{in}} < x_i \leq \tau_{\text{cr}}, \\ \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\tau_{\text{ex}} - x_i}{\tau_{\text{ex}} - \tau_{\text{cr}}}\right)^p & \text{if } \tau_{\text{cr}} < x_i \leq \tau_{\text{ex}}, \\ 0 & \text{if } \tau_{\text{ex}} < x_i. \end{cases}$
Positive mid-point concepts	$m_A(x, \tau_{[\ldots]}, p, q) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \tau_{\text{ex1}} \geq x_i, \\ \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\tau_{\text{ex1}} - x_i}{\tau_{\text{ex1}} - \tau_{\text{cr1}}}\right)^p & \text{if } \tau_{\text{ex1}} < x_i \leq \tau_{\text{cr1}}, \\ 1 - \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\tau_{\text{in1}} - x_i}{\tau_{\text{in1}} - \tau_{\text{cr1}}}\right)^q & \text{if } \tau_{\text{cr1}} < x_i \leq \tau_{\text{in1}}, \\ 1 & \text{if } \tau_{\text{in1}} \leq x_i \leq \tau_{\text{in2}}, \\ 1 - \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\tau_{\text{in2}} - x_i}{\tau_{\text{in2}} - \tau_{\text{cr2}}}\right)^q & \text{if } \tau_{\text{in2}} < x_i \leq \tau_{\text{cr2}}, \\ \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\tau_{\text{ex2}} - x_i}{\tau_{\text{ex2}} - \tau_{\text{cr2}}}\right)^p & \text{if } \tau_{\text{cr2}} < x_i \leq \tau_{\text{ex2}}, \\ 0 & \text{if } \tau_{\text{ex2}} < x_i. \end{cases}$

Source: Thiem and Duşa (2013).
Note: x_i is the base variable value, and p and q are parameters for controlling the degree of concentration and dilation (normally set at 1).

Policy scales

The categories included in the scales are given in table C3. The socioeconomic scale is originally created by Laver and Garry (2000), based on categories identified by Laver and Budge (1992). The proposed sociocultural scale resembles a scale proposed by McDonald and Mendes (2001). I have, however, removed the categories per606 (right) and per706 (left). On a closer examination, these categories appears to have low face validity as indicators of sociocultural right and left, respectively. Category per606 includes favourable mentions of, e.g., help for fellow people, civil society and public spiritedness – features that may be associated with the sociocultural left as well as with the sociocultural right. Category per706, in turn, includes favourable references not only to groups typically associated with sociocultural left politics, such as women, but also to groups equally favoured by the sociocultural right (e.g. old or middle-aged people). To get an idea of the construct validity of the proposed scales, I report results from a robust confirmatory factor analysis in table C4 below. I follow Lowe et al. (2011; see also Gemenis 2013) and measure parties' socio-

cultural and socioeconomic positions using logit scales. The logit scale (θ) is calculated as follows:

$$\theta = \log(R + o') - \log(L + o').$$

R is the share of 'quasi-sentences' coded into categories assigned to the right pole and L the share of 'quasi-sentences' coded into categories assigned to the left pole. $o' = 100\frac{0.5}{N}$ (with N being the total number of sentences in the manifesto).

Table C3: Categories included in the policy scales

Left categories	**Right categories**
Sociocultural scale	
National Way of Life: neg. (per602)	National Way of Life: pos. (per601)
Traditional Morality: neg. (per604)	Traditional Morality: pos. (per603)
Multiculturalism: pos. (per607)	Law and Order: pos. (per605)
Underpriv. Min. Gr.: pos. (per705)	Multiculturalism: neg. (per608)
Socioeconomic scale	
Market Regulation (per403)	Free Market Economy (per401)
Economic Planning (per404)	Incentives: pos. (per402)
Protectionism: pos. (per406)	Protectionism: neg. (per407)
Controlled Economy (per412)	Economic Orthodoxy (per414)
Nationalization (per413)	Welfare State Limitation (per505)

Table C4: Policy scales: robust confirmatory factor analysis

Scale	**CFI**	**RMSEA**	**SRMR**
Sociocultural scale	0.74	0.05	0.03
Socioeconomic scale	0.89	0.03	0.03

Note: The data used for the computation covers all significant parties in Western and Central Eastern Europe from 1975 onwards (N = 1,970). The CFI for the sociocultural scale increases to 0.92 (RMSEA and SRMR remain unchanged) when focusing only on national way of life (per601, per602), traditional morality (per603, per604) and multiculturalism (per607, per608). Because of their high face validity, per605 and per705 are, however, retained in the scale.

Calculation of inclusion and coverage

The inclusion (or consistency) score expresses the degree (between 0 and 1) to which a proposition about the necessity or sufficiency of a condition (x_i) for an outcome (y_i) is true. According to conventional standards, the sufficiency inclusion (INCL_S) score should preferably be set at 0.750 or higher, while the lower cutoff for necessity inclusion (INCL_N) usually is set at 0.900 or higher (cf., however, Thiem 2016: 482). INCL_S is calculated as follows:

$$\text{INCL}_S(\mathbf{X}) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \min(x_i,\ y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} x_i}. \tag{0a}$$

INCL_N, by contrast, is calculated thus:

$$\text{INCL}_N(\mathbf{X}) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \min(x_i,\ y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} y_i}. \tag{0b}$$

Another important parameter of fit in QCA is coverage. Sufficiency coverage (COV_S) measures how much (between 0 and 1) of the outcome is covered by the solution. It is calculated using formula (0b). Necessity coverage (COV_N) gives the relevance of a necessary condition and is calculated using formula (0a). For details, see Ragin (2006).

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Online appendix D1: Results – uncovered observations (G)

As originally emphasized by Ragin (1987: 164, 2000: 4), QCA is not only a technique for data analysis but also a research approach. An essential part of this approach is the dialogue between ideas and evidence. Following Schneider and Wagemann (2012: ch. 1), the 'analytical moment' (i.e., the construction and analysis of the truth table) should ideally be followed by a more in depth evaluation of the findings. This evaluation can follow different strategies – it can be more or less systematic and it can emphasize different aspects (typical cases, deviant cases etc.) of the solution model (for more detailed discussions, see Goertz 2017: ch. 3; Schneider and Rohlfing 2013, 2016). With only about 26 per cent (18 of 68) of the positive observations covered (i.e., the observations located in triangle B of figure D1), a focus on the large amount of uncovered positive observations (i.e., on the observations located in the upper left quadrant A of figure D1) seems advisable. In what follows, I conduct a preliminary discussion on theoretical, methodological and empirical constraints of the model by examining the truth table in more detail.



Figure D1: (Enhanced) XY plot

One, rather obvious, explanation for the mediocre solution coverage is the relatively low (0.29) mean set membership in G. With a clear majority (74 per cent) of the observations being fully out of the set of governing parties, finding sufficient paths becomes difficult. In order to shed some light on the uncovered cases I revert to the truth table and examine, first, minterms that do not pass the chosen inclusion cutoff but yet show some, albeit very limited, evidence of sufficiency (i.e., the two minterms in table 1 where inclusion is above 0.500 but below 0.750): Is it feasible to include these minterms in the minimization process? Second, I focus on *all* (2+43) observed minterms with an inclusion score below 0.750: What can be said about the positive observations that are 'hidden' in minterms with low inclusion scores? Is it, perhaps, possible to find patterns in these minterms, and are there certain types of cases for which the solution model is particularly ill suited?

The two minterms with inclusion scores above 0.500 but below 0.750 cover, in total, only six observations (see table 1). Of these, four have an outcome value below 0.5. These observations would – like FrP in 1997(b) and LVP in 1995(c) in $sm_{G.2}$ (see table 2) – locate themselves in the bottom right quadrant D of an updated XY plot and hence cast serious doubt on the statement of sufficiency. Coding these minterms as contradictions ('C') rather than as negatives ('0') and including them in a subsequent minimization process is, thus, not an attractive option. Although the inclusion of these four minterms would lead to an increase in model coverage, the accompanying substantial decrease in the model inclusion score and, in particular, the growth of the number of true logical contradictions (TLCs) would generate a solution model that is considerably weaker than $sm_{G.2}$. I note, however, that a minimization of all minterms with INCL > 0.500 gives a single solution model with an inclusion score of 0.679 and a coverage score of 0.371. It is a submodel of $sm_{G.2}$ and reads as follows:

$$WCP \vee WCR \vee SW\neg RP \Leftrightarrow G.$$

Table D1: Selected minterms

	Conditions						***N***	***N***
Minterm	***M***	***S***	***W***	***C***	***R***	***P***	**(Tot.)**	**(Pos.)**
07	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
12	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
14	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
24	0	1	0	1	1	1	3	3
28	0	1	1	0	1	1	2	2
39	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
01	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	1
08	0	0	0	1	1	1	6	3
20	0	1	0	0	1	1	10	3
37	1	0	0	1	0	0	5	2
38	1	0	0	1	0	1	6	3
40	1	0	0	1	1	1	3	2
41	1	0	1	0	0	0	5	2
45	1	0	1	1	0	0	7	3
48	1	0	1	1	1	1	5	1
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	8	1
50	1	1	0	0	0	1	5	2
52	1	1	0	0	1	1	9	3
53	1	1	0	1	0	0	6	3
54	1	1	0	1	0	1	4	2
55	1	1	0	1	1	0	3	1
56	1	1	0	1	1	1	14	6
61	1	1	1	1	0	0	11	3

Note: Listed are minterms with INCL < 0.750 and with at least one positive observation (i.e., an observation where $G > 0.5$).

A second option is to examine the observed negative minterms in a more direct manner. From a case-based perspective, these 45 minterms can be organized into three groups. The largest group consists of 22 minterms that hold only negative outcome observations (i.e., no observations in the field corresponding to triangle B of figure D1). These are of least importance if the purpose is to increase our understanding of radical parties' government

inclusion and are, hence, not discussed here (see, however, subsection 'Paths to government exclusion ($\not{G}$)'). Of the remaining 23 minterms, six hold only positive outcome observations. In these cases, the relevant observations would fall into the field corresponding to triangle B of figure D1, with no observations in the quadrant D and with sufficiency inclusion hence being violated 'only' by the (irrelevant) observations falling into in triangle E. A closer look at these minterms (see the first six rows of table D1) reveals that eight of the nine relevant observations are of Western European radical left parties: the Cypriot AKEL in 2001(b) and 2006(a), the Danish EL in 1994 and 1998, the Italian PRC in 1996(b) and PdCI in 2006, the Icelandic VGF in 2009 and the Irish DL in 1992(b). In addition, the Slovakian SNS in 1994 is covered. For these cases, factors related to ideology seem to be somewhat more relevant than size-related factors – at least two of the conditions C, R and P are present in all minterms.

The remaining 17 minterms hold observations with positive as well as negative outcomes; sufficiency inclusion is, hence, violated by cases in the fields corresponding to both triangle E *and* quadrant D of figure D1. These minterms include in total 41 positive observations. The main conclusion from an investigation of these minterms corresponds to what has already been indicated in the paper: observations of governing Western European radical left parties seem to be especially hard to cover by $sm_{G.2}$ (and $sm_{G.1}$). If the nine observations briefly discussed above are included, 92.3 (24/26) per cent of all positive observations of (Western European; there are only two positive observations of Central and Eastern European radical left parties in the data.) radical left parties remain uncovered by the solution model. The share of uncovered observations is clearly lower (but still fairly high) for radical right parties, both in Central and Eastern (56.7 per cent, or 17/30) and in Western (58.3 per cent, or 7/12) Europe. These differences appear also by looking at the within coverage (wicov)-scores in table D2. These observations further underline the need for a re-specification of the theoretical framework, with a special (but not exclusive) focus on finding complementary explanations for radical left government participation.

Table D2: Government inclusion of radical parties (parsimonious solution): within coverage-scores per region and party family

	COV	**WICOV (CEE)**	**WICOV (WE)**	**WICOV (RRPs)**	**WICOV (RLPs)**
$SWCP$	0.234	0.358	0.220	0.386	0.118
$SW\neg RP$	0.123	0.183	0.137	0.201	0.088
$WCR\neg P$	0.059	0.033	0.162	0.110	0.083

Note: The scores are calculated using the SetMethods package for R (Medzihorsky et al. 2017).

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Online appendix D2: Results – additional tables and figures



(a) feasible allies

(b) radical partners

(c) moderate followers

Figure D2: (Enhanced) XY plots for the three sufficient paths in $sm_{G.2}$

Table D3: Prime implicant (PI) chart (outcome G)

	Minterms				
PIs	**64**	**32**	**62**	**58**	**47**
$\neg MWCR$	–	✗	–	–	–
$SWCP$	✗	✗	✗	–	–
$SWCR$	✗	✗	–	–	–
$SW\neg RP$	–	–	✗	✗	–
$WCR\neg P$	–	–	–	–	✗
$MWC\neg RP$	–	–	✗	–	–

Note: '✗' = minterm covered by PI, '–' = minterm not covered by PI.

Table D4: Prime implicant (PI) chart (outcome $\neg G$)

	Minterms									
PIs	**17**	**20**	**19**	**3**	**36**	**1**	**49**	**9**	**43**	**25**
$\neg M \neg C$	✗	✗	✗	✗	–	✗	–	✗	–	✗
$\neg M \neg P$	✗	–	✗	✗	–	✗	–	✗	–	✗
$\neg MW$	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	✗	–	✗
$\neg CR \neg P$	–	–	✗	✗	–	–	–	–	✗	–
$\neg S \neg CP$	–	–	–	–	✗	–	–	–	–	–
$S \neg C \neg P$	✗	–	✗	–	–	–	✗	–	–	✗
$\neg S \neg CR$	–	–	–	✗	✗	–	–	–	✗	–
$\neg SR \neg P$	–	–	–	✗	–	–	–	–	✗	–
$\neg S \neg W \neg C$	–	–	–	✗	✗	✗	–	–	–	–
$\neg W \neg C \neg P$	✗	–	✗	✗	–	✗	✗	–	–	–
$WR \neg P$	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	✗	–
$SW \neg C \neg R$	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	✗

Note: '✗' = minterm covered by PI, '–' = minterm not covered by PI.

Table D5: Complete list of solution models (outcome $\neg G$)

Solution models	**INCL**	**COV**
$sm_{\neg G.1} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg S \neg CR \ \vee \ \neg W \neg C \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.912	0.452
$sm_{\neg G.2} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg S \neg CR \ \vee \ S \neg C \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.913	0.444
$sm_{\neg G.3} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg S \neg W \neg C \ \vee \ \neg W \neg C \neg P \ \vee \ WR \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.882	0.469
$sm_{\neg G.4} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg SR \neg P \ \vee \ \neg S \neg W \neg C \ \vee \ \neg W \neg C \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.872	0.462
$sm_{\neg G.5} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ S \neg C \neg P \ \vee \ \neg S \neg W \neg C \ \vee \ WR \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.883	0.462
$sm_{\neg G.6} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ S \neg C \neg P \ \vee \ \neg SR \neg P \ \vee \ \neg S \neg W \neg C \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.872	0.483
$sm_{\neg G.7} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg S \neg CP \ \vee \ \neg W \neg C \neg P \ \vee \ WR \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.886	0.487
$sm_{\neg G.8} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg S \neg CP \ \vee \ \neg SR \neg P \ \vee \ \neg W \neg C \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.876	0.504
$sm_{\neg G.9} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg S \neg CP \ \vee \ S \neg C \neg P \ \vee \ WR \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.887	0.472
$sm_{\neg G.10} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg S \neg CP \ \vee \ S \neg C \neg P \ \vee \ \neg SR \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.877	0.497
$sm_{\neg G.11} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg CR \neg P \ \vee \ \neg S \neg W \neg C \ \vee \ \neg W \neg C \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.907	0.449
$sm_{\neg G.12} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg CR \neg P \ \vee \ S \neg C \neg P \ \vee \ \neg S \neg W \neg C \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.907	0.442
$sm_{\neg G.13} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg CR \neg P \ \vee \ \neg S \neg CP \ \vee \ \neg W \neg C \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.910	0.467
$sm_{\neg G.14} : \neg M \neg C \ \vee \ \neg CR \neg P \ \vee \ \neg S \neg CP \ \vee \ S \neg C \neg P \ \Leftrightarrow \ \neg G$	0.912	0.455

Online appendix D3: Results – robustness

As suggested by Skaaning (2011) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 284–95), the robustness of QCA results should be examined by altering case selection strategies and by changing calibration thresholds and inclusion and frequency cutoffs. Solution terms can be deemed robust if (i) different model specifications lead to sufficient conditions that are similar or in a subset relation with one another and if (ii) inclusion and coverage scores remain roughly the same (or vary in a predictable way) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 285–6). Overall, the parsimonious models for the positive outcome reported in the paper are robust to alterations in case selection, calibration and inclusion and frequency cutoffs. The negative models are also fairly stable, but somewhat less so (except for $\neg M \neg C$) than the positive ones.

Case selection

First, the robustness of the main solution models are examined by focusing only on governments formed after a national election, i.e. by excluding all observations of governments formed during an election term. Regarding government inclusion, a minimization procedure leads to a model with one single solution term: $SWCR$. This solution is a submodel of $sm_{G.1}$. The inclusion and coverage scores are 0.777 and 0.198, respectively. Moving to government exclusion, the minimization leads to eight solution models. The solution term $\neg M \neg C$ is – together with either $\neg W \neg C \neg P$ or $S \neg C \neg P$ – present in all of these models. The inclusion scores of the different models vary between 0.856 and 0.928, and the coverage scores between 0.437 and 0.510.

A second way to examine the effects of changing the case selection strategy is to exclude observations of borderline radical right and radical left parties. After excluding the Croatian HDZ, the Danish SF from 2007 onwards, the Dutch LPF, the Finnish PS in 1999, the Greek ANEL, the Lithuanian PTT and the Romanian PUNR, the solution models reported in the paper are reproduced, with roughly similar inclusion and coverage scores. A negation of the outcome leads to the solution model $\neg C \neg P \ \vee \ \neg CR$ – a submodel of both of the main models reported in the paper. The inclusion of this model is 0.915, and the coverage 0.526.

A third and final way to alter case selection is to include additional 'irrelevant' radical parties, i.e. radical parties excluded from the main analysis following the possibility principle (Goertz 2006). In the first step, I include four such parties: the Hungarian Jobbik (in 2010 and 2014), the German Left (90, 94, 98, 02, 05, 09, 13 and 17), the Slovenian Nationalist Party (92, 96, 00, 04 and 08) and the Dutch Socialist Party (94, 98, 02, 03, 06, 10 and 12). With the inclusion cutoff set at 0.700, the last (weak) path ($WCR \neg P$) is eliminated from the positive solution model. A supermodel ($MSWCP \ \vee \ SW \neg RP$) of the remaining paths is produced. The model inclusion score remain largely similar, and the coverage score declines somewhat, as expected. Regarding the negative outcome, (supermodels of) both of the main models are reproduced, with roughly similar inclusion and coverage scores. In the second step, I include seven additional parties: Alternative for Germany (in 2017), the Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (91, 92, 96, 98, 02, 06, 10 and 13), the Communist Party of Greece (93, 96, 00, 04, 07, 09, 12[a–b] and 15), the Greek Golden Dawn

(12[a–b] and 15), the French National Front (97[a–b], 12 and 17), the Sweden Democrats (10 and 14) and the Belgian Flemish Interest (91, 95, 99, 03, 07 and 10). With an inclusion cutoff set at 0.625, a submodel of models $sm_{G.1}$ and $sm_{G.2}$ is produced, with the model inclusion and coverage score declining, as expected. Regarding the negative outcome, (supermodels of) both of the main models are reproduced, with roughly similar inclusion and coverage scores.

Calibration

First, I recalibrate the outcome (G) by giving all supporter parties the values 0.45 and 0.55, respectively. Both recalibrations reproduce the original solution models for the positive outcome. The inclusion and coverage scores also remain more or less unchanged (around 0.750 and 0.300, respectively). For the negative outcome, the solution terms $\neg M \neg C$ and $\neg S \neg CR$ are reproduced and, hence, stable. Inclusion and coverage scores are, as in the original models, around 0.900 and 0.450, respectively.

Second, I adjust ($\pm$5%iles) the crossover points for M, S, W, R and P. By including the recalibrated conditions individually, 20 (i.e., 10 for the positive outcome, 10 for the negative outcome) sets of alternative solution models is acquired. All of these solutions include models that reproduce – or are in a sub-/superset relation to – the main models reported in the paper. Again, the inclusion and coverage scores remain largely unchanged.

Inclusion and frequency cutoffs

To assess the effect of changing the inclusion and frequency thresholds, I proceed as follows. Regarding the positive outcome, I first increase the inclusion cutoff to 0.775 and, second, raise the frequency cutoff to 3 and 5, respectively. The increased inclusion cutoff produces two models, both of which are submodels of those reported in the paper ($SW\neg RP \vee SWCR$ and $SW\neg RP \vee SWCP$). Submodels ($W\neg RP \vee SWCR$ and $SWCP$) are produced also by raising the frequency cutoff to 3. By raising the frequency cutoff to 5, the conjunctions $SWCR$ and $SWCP$ are produced. The inclusion and coverage scores for the different sets of solution models vary in a predictable way, between 0.637 and 0.815 and 0.194 and 0.313, respectively.

Moving to the negative outcome, I change the inclusion cutoff to 0.800 and 0.900 and the frequency cutoff to 1 and 5. Here, a minimization with a frequency cutoff at 1 gives 32 solution models. Among these are a number of models that are supermodels of the ones presented in the paper. Setting the frequency cutoff at 5 produce 26 models, including the ones reported in the paper. Inclusion and coverage scores are around 0.900 and 0.450 for all solution models. Changing the inclusion cutoff to 0.900 and 0.800 produce 36 and 4 models, respectively. None of these are perfect super- or subsets of the models reported in the paper. The path $\neg M \neg C$ is (or its superversion) is, however, reproduced in 37 of these. Rising the inclusion cutoff to 0.900 does not affect the inclusion and coverage of the solutions; the scores remain around 0.900 and 0.450. A lower cutoff at 0.800 causes a predictable decrease in inclusion (to around 0.850) and a corresponding increase (to around 0.600) in coverage.

Can model statistics be improved by adding exogenous factors?

Finally, I also examine whether adding exogenous factors leads to an improvement of model statistics. Here, I focus on party system characteristics (effective number of parliamentary parties; N) and parliamentary experience (consecutive years in parliament; E). The assumptions here are that radical parties tend to be included in coalition governments when the options are limited (i.e., when the effective number of parliamentary parties is low, see de Lange 2009; Olsen, Hough, and Koß 2010) or when they are fairly established political actors (i.e., when they have been represented in the national parliament during several electoral terms, see e.g. Warwick 1996). The factor N is hence a negative end-point concept, and the thresholds are set at 7.5 (τ_{ex}), 5.0 (τ_{cr}) and 2.5 (τ_{in}). E is a positive end-point concept, and thresholds are set at 4.0 (τ_{ex}), 8.0 (τ_{cr}) and 12.0 (τ_{in}). Including N in the minimization procedure leads to a reproduction of both $sm_{G.1}$ and $sm_{G.2}$ and, in addition, to 10 additional models. The inclusion and coverage scores of these models range between 0.696 and 0.772 and 0.293 and 0.369, respectively. Generally, models with a considerably higher coverage (around 0.350) than $sm_{G.1}$ and $sm_{G.2}$ have low inclusion scores (< 0.750). An inclusion of E in the minimization leads to eight models, two of which are supermodels of $sm_{G.1}$ and one of $sm_{G.2}$. The inclusion and coverage scores remain largely unchanged, varying between 0.696 and 0.772 and 0.263 and 0.295, respectively. The conclusions from including additional exogenous factors are, hence, rather straightforward: including N or E in the minimization process reproduce (supermodels of) $sm_{G.1}$ and $sm_{G.2}$, and neither of the factors are able to significantly improve model statistics. The same holds for the negative outcome. The inclusion of N does not improve model fit. Several of the resulting solution models are able to reproduce the conjunctions $\neg M \neg C$ and $\neg W \neg C \neg P$ (and $S \neg C \neg P$), but none reproduce $\neg S \neg CR$. The inclusion of E leads, on average, to somewhat lower inclusion scores, and to somewhat higher coverage scores. The solution models produced include supermodels of both $sm_{\neg G.1}$ and $sm_{\neg G.2}$.

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