Liberalisation, competition and ownership in the presence of vertical relations

Johan Willner*

*Tämän työn vastaava kirjoittaja

Tutkimustuotos: LehtiartikkeliArtikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

3 Sitaatiot (Scopus)

Abstrakti

This contribution analyses a market with an upstream bottleneck monopoly and a downstream activity that may either be vertically integrated or separated. Separation always reduces the consumer surplus, and the total surplus unless there are large cost reductions. Downstream competition from a public or private network monopoly would crowd out other firms, also when public ownership is associated with more modest objectives than welfare-maximisation. A market is therefore less likely to remain a mixed oligopoly than without vertical relations. However, private firms would survive in a moderately welfare-improving mixed oligopoly with cross-subsidisation and access charges equal to marginal costs.

AlkuperäiskieliEnglanti
Sivut449-464
Sivumäärä16
JulkaisuEmpirica
Vuosikerta35
Numero5
DOI - pysyväislinkit
TilaJulkaistu - 2008
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA1 Julkaistu artikkeli, soviteltu

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