Anscombe’s Wittgenstein

This chapter examines two closely intertwined themes: Anscombe’s understanding of Wittgenstein’s thinking, and his influence on hers. It first sketches Anscombe’s general sense of Wittgenstein’s thought and of his influence on her, and her view of his philosophical ‘method’, which she doesn’t want to call quite that. Then it traces his pervasive influence in her writings on intention, the first person, and certain problems about meaning, presenting these as unified by a Wittgensteinian critique of the subject-object paradigm of thought. After showing the connection between Anscombe’s seminal paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ and Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of metaphysical illusions, it closes by discussing Anscombe’s and Wittgenstein’s respective approaches to the question of truth in religion, which may in some respects not be as far apart as they initially appear.