Where are the welfare losses of imperfect competition large?

Johan Willner*, Leila Ståhl

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The welfare losses of imperfect competition have usually been analysed using detailed information about sales, costs and profits. We present a procedure for finding the potential welfare losses which needs only demand elasticity and an indicator of concentration. The models are based on Coutnot-Nash oligopoly, collusion and Stackelberg leadership, including cases where a price taking fringe exists. When using Finnish four digit industries as an example, it turns out that the potential deadweight losses may be a matter of concern.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)477-490
Number of pages14
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume8
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 1992
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

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