Abstract
The design of lattice coset codes for wiretap channels is considered. Bounds on the eavesdropper's correct decoding probability and information leakage are first revisited. From these bounds, it is explicit that both the information leakage and error probability are controlled by the average flatness factor of the eavesdropper's lattice, which we further interpret geometrically. It is concluded that the minimization of the (average) flatness factor of the eavesdropper's lattice leads to the study of well-rounded lattices, which are shown to be among the optimal in order to achieve these minima. Constructions of some well-rounded lattices are also provided.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 9354828 |
Pages (from-to) | 3645-3663 |
Journal | IEEE Transactions on Information Theory |
Volume | 67 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2021 |
MoE publication type | A1 Journal article-refereed |
Keywords
- Fading channels
- Error probability
- Lattices
- Minimization
- Decoding
- MIMO communication
- Coset codes
- flatness factor
- information theoretic security
- lattices
- multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels
- number fields
- physical layer security
- Rayleigh fast-fading channels
- single-input single-output (SISO) channels
- well-rounded lattices
- wiretap channels