Policy objectives and performance in a mixed market with bargaining

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyse a mixed duopoly in which wages and salaries are determined by Nash bargaining and where the public firm's unit costs depend on its objectives. Because of constant returns to scale, welfare maximisation without restriction would eliminate or significantly weaken the private firm. Therefore, we focus on constrained welfare maximisation, in which case unit costs are normally higher in the public firm. On the other hand, the private firm may even earn more than in a monopoly if the public firm maximises profits or if the constraint offers too much protection.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)137-145
Number of pages9
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume17
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1999
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • L 44
  • L32
  • Mixed oligopoly
  • Public ownership

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