Abstract
The present contribution questions the seemingly self-evident idea that morality is, most basically, about values and valuation. Values are indeed pervasive in moral life, but they are not original phenomena; rather, they are repressive responses to a sense of good and evil beyond values. This 'beyond' relates, I argue, to the encounter between individual human beings, and values function to manage and mask the inescapability and difficulty of this encounter, with its unbearable either-or of openness to, or refusal of, the other; of love or destructiveness. Various manifestations of the inherently problematic character of values-thinking are examined, e.g. its inextricable intertwinement with social pressure, moralism, and egocentric concern. I also discuss the relation of shared 'moral languages' to moral understanding, and the way in which a Wittgensteinian, strictly descriptive ethics can nonetheless challenge not only theories of morality, but our moral life itself.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 39-67 |
Number of pages | 29 |
Journal | Ethical Perspectives |
Volume | 22 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2015 |
MoE publication type | A1 Journal article-refereed |
Keywords
- Values
- Wittgenstein
- I-you relations
- moralism
- evil
- racism
- WITTGENSTEIN LECTURE
- ETHICS
- 611 Philosophy