Mind as an Intrinsic Property of Matter

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Abstract

This paper argues that the epistemic gap in philosophy of mind stems from the fact that our awareness of our subjective experiences is categorically different from our knowledge of external phenomena. Our knowledge of external objects is always mediated through empirical observation or theoretical descriptions, and does not afford us knowledge of the intrinsic nature of the thing referred to, whereas our awareness of our experiences is immediate and affords us knowledge of the intrinsic nature of our experiences. Finally, it is argued that the thing itself referred to as “neural correlate of consciousness” is constituted by consciousness.
Original languageUndefined/Unknown
Pages (from-to)15–37
JournalPhilosophical Investigations
Volume39
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

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