Abstract
I argue that a careful consideration of the internal relation between the expression of an emotion, ‘I am angry’, and the description of the object of that emotion, ‘That was wrong’, illuminates the sense in which emotions are intentional, and perhaps also rational, as brought out in cognitive accounts of emotion. It also throws light on the moral and interpersonal aspects of our emotional life, which I instantiate through a discussion of the different perspectives on what has happened between the parties in a quarrel and the kinds of failures of understanding that may take place in such cases.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 577–596 |
Journal | Philosophy |
Volume | 94 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |
MoE publication type | A1 Journal article-refereed |
Keywords
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig
- moral emotions
- emotions