Deference and the Human Rights Committee

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    Abstract

    The decision of judicial bodies on whether or not to defer to previous decisions and findings by national authorities is increasingly attracting the attention of international legal scholars. Judicial bodies enjoy a certain degree of discretion in terms of defining the extent and intrusiveness of their review. In looking to structure the element of uncertainty that the question of deference brings with it (or conversely, to define the margin of appreciation of the state), the question is also addressed through the standard of review-notion. This article explores deference claims in the context of the Human Rights Committee. The aim of the article is to identify the structure of deference claims in the work of the Committee. A look at the Committee’s recent practice in deportation cases provides an opportunity to illustrate the nature of the doctrine of deference as a mechanism for expressing disagreement.
    Original languageUndefined/Unknown
    Pages (from-to)73–88
    JournalNordic Journal of Human Rights / Nordisk Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter
    Volume34
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - 2016
    MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

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