Abstract
The paper aims at making explicit and question the dominant conception that morality is a matter of values and valuation. This conception is usually taken as the self-evident frame of analysis, both in ethical theorizing and in everyday life and also in most discussions of ethics in medical contexts (e.g. in debates about values-based practice'). We argue that the dominant conception is deeply flawed insofar as it implies a repression of the fundamental importance of I-you relationships. As a consequence of this repression, what are commonly taken to be personal' and even individualist' moral outlooks are, in fact, merely the reverse side of collective norms and values, just as particularism' in ethics is not a real alternative to universalism', but rather both are variations on the same repressive theme. In showing this, we also outline the sense in which the moral relationship between an I' and a you' has an altogether different grammar' or sense.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 466-476 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice |
Volume | 22 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Aug 2016 |
Externally published | Yes |
MoE publication type | A1 Journal article-refereed |
Keywords
- conscience
- I-you relations
- moral particularism
- repression
- social morality
- values
- violence
- 611 Philosophy