G. H. von Wright on Agent Self-Understanding and Action Explanation

A1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift (referentgranskad)


Interna författare/redaktörer


Publikationens författare: Jonas Ahlskog
Förläggare: Philosophical society of Finland
Publiceringsår: 2017
Tidskrift: Acta Philosophica Fennica
Volym: 93
Artikelns första sida, sidnummer: 313
Artikelns sista sida, sidnummer: 324


Abstrakt

This paper is
about G. H. von Wright’s views on the role of agent
self-understanding for
action explanation. The paper argues that contrary to both von
Wright himself
and to contemporary interpreters, von Wright’s later account does
give a
privileged role to the agent’s self-understanding in action
explanation. This
is because von Wright’s later account still gives primacy to
the agent’s
effectual reasons. However, von Wright’s account still offers
significant
insights into the complex role of agent self-understanding in
action
explanation. In order properly to understand what those
insights are, it is important
to emphasize that von Wright’s account presupposes a certain
conception of what
it means to explain action.

Ingår i: On the human condition : philosophical essays in honour of the centennial anniversary of Georg Henrik von Wright. Red. Ilkka Niiniluoto, Thomas Wallgren. Helsinki: Societas philosophica Fennica, 2017.
ISBN 978-951-9264-86-8


Senast uppdaterad 2019-16-10 vid 02:44