R. G. Collingwood and the Presence of the Past

A1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift (referentgranskad)


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Publikationens författare: Jonas Ahlskog
Förläggare: Brill
Publiceringsår: 2017
Tidskrift: Journal of the Philosophy of History
Volym: 11
Nummer: 3
Artikelns första sida, sidnummer: 289
Artikelns sista sida, sidnummer: 305
eISSN: 1872-2636


Abstrakt

This essay examines recent theories about the presence of the past from
the perspective of Collingwood’s philosophy of history. In the work of
Eelco Runia and Frank Ankersmit among others, elaborate theories are
offered for explaining how the past conditions and moves the present.
Collingwood addresses the same kind of issues in his philosophy of
history, but his ideas are very seldom discussed in presence theory. The
aim of this essay is to place Collingwood’s philosophy of history in
dialogue with presence theory. I show that, even though Collingwood and
presence theory have similar aims, Collingwood offers a fundamentally
different account of how the past lives on in the here and now. Not only
is Collingwood’s account different – his conception of history
undermines central presuppositions of presence theory. In conclusion, I
argue that Collingwood’s account shows how questions about the presence
of the past are intimately connected with self-knowledge.


Senast uppdaterad 2019-18-10 vid 03:11